# Streets Ahead

a joint inspection of the street crime initiative

Streets Ahead

A Joint Inspection of
The Street Crime Initiative

Contents

Preface

In April 2002, the Prime Minister personally launched the Street Crime Initiative and one-year on, he remained at its helm. With approaching half the Cabinet also engaged in the initiative, never before has there been such a high profile and wide-ranging commitment in responding to a single national crime problem.

Clearly, the central thrust of the initiative was to reduce the level of street crime but it also had other far-ranging implications. Its genesis came within the context of wider public sector reform and an associated move to rebalance the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in favour of its 'users', in particular of victims and witnesses. The initiative provided an ideal case study within which to identify the friction points and barriers inherent within the CJS and to make significant improvements that will benefit the longer-term CJ reform.

The joint inspection was also a landmark event. This report is the product of extensive collaborative work by eight inspectorates, the six CJS inspectorates (including Court Service) together with Ofsted and SSI. Within the drive for public service reform has emerged a critical examination of the role of inspectors and regulators. We believe that *Streets Ahead* exemplifies the added value of inspectorates working across system boundaries and challenging conventional thinking. Inspectorates are responding to the re-balancing of the CJS to meet the needs of victims and witnesses more effectively. There are complications to joint inspection, such as differences in methodology and information systems, and co-ordinating work across so many agencies is testing. Many useful lessons have been learned from this exercise and these will undoubtedly strengthen future collaborations. Later this year, the first inspection of a whole CJS Area will be undertaken, with a view to improving still further the degree of 'joined up' working.

On behalf of the inspection team members, thanks are extended to all agencies visited for responding positively to requests for information and accommodating interviews at the height of activity within the initiative. It is also important to acknowledge the invaluable contribution made by 'critical readers' of the report in helping the many complex issues and findings to be presented in a format that will assist those involved at all levels within the initiative to achieve further progress.

Our report underlines the achievements of the initiative, of which there are many, and seeks to highlight good practice where it occurred. *Streets Ahead* was chosen as the report title in affirmation of the positives within the initiative. However, our report also identifies significant areas for improvement. If this initiative is to be considered as a template for future approaches, it will be vital that the lessons learned so far, and those still to emerge in the continuing activity, are effectively captured and re-cycled. Only then can we hope to move towards the vision of 'Justice for All'.

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Her Majesty's Chief
Inspector of Constabulary

Denise Platt, CBE
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
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
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Executive Summary

The Street Crime Initiative

1   Early in 2002, the Government was under considerable pressure to address what the media was portraying as a situation out of control. Offences of robbery had doubled in just 4 years. The explosion in ownership of mobile phones had presented an irresistible target for robbers and drivers of high value cars were at risk of being 'car-jacked', in broad daylight.

2   Despite a pre-existing robbery reduction initiative involving five forces, together accounting for nearly three-quarters of all recorded robbery, street robberies had escalated significantly, rising by a further 26%. Something different was called for – something exceptional. The response was the "Street Crime Initiative" (SCI) and it certainly was a unique approach to tackling a crime problem.

3   The Prime Minister decided to treat street robbery as a 'national emergency' and personally led a high-level cross-departmental group to drive results. This was 'joined up' government in action. From April 2002, the Street Crime Action Group (SCAG) began meeting every 2 weeks in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), a venue normally used for co-ordinating the response to terrorism or civil emergency. The resounding message was that tackling Street Crime (SC) was not just the responsibility of the police, nor even just the criminal justice system (CJS) it was everyone's responsibility. SCAG contained Cabinet ministers and government departmental heads, as well as representatives of statutory and voluntary agencies. It was uniquely placed to bring immense influence to bear on all elements of the CJS, and well beyond

4   SCI saw the extension of the earlier robbery reduction initiative to a total of 10 police forces, together accounting for 83% of all recorded robbery, and each was set an individual reduction target, to contribute to the national reduction. In April 2002, the Prime Minister further increased pressure by publicly stating that by the end of September (2002) the problem of street crime would have been brought under control. This promise established a clear and public milestone against which all involved in SCI, and in particular the Government, would be measured.

Delivering results

5   SCAG established a central Programme Steering Group and mandated the formation of local multi-agency delivery groups, involving area heads of the CJS agencies, in each of the 10 SC areas. An action plan was produced containing around 30 individual initiatives aimed either at reducing crime or improving the

effectiveness of handling SC offenders. Weekly crime statistics were collected from areas and analysed centrally. SC arrests and case progress were followed on a central 'tracker' and close scrutiny was maintained on the relative progress within each area and the implementation of the action plan.

6   By October 2002, the Government was able to announce a reduction in overall street crime (robbery and snatch theft) of 16% (between March and September) and a reduction of 25% in street robbery alone. By the end of March 2003, as this inspection concluded, the robbery reduction for the first year was being reported in the media as 17%. If confirmed by official figures, released in July 2003, this would equate to 17,000 fewer victims of robbery than pre-SCI.

The inspectorates' assessment

7   As well as reducing crime, the first year of SCI produced other major achievements. Inspectors found that SCI provided a momentum that energised local partnership approaches to criminal justice issues. It also provided very welcome resourcing for tackling problems across the whole cycle of offending behaviour, from school-based crime diversion schemes, through to targeted police operations and co-ordinated rehabilitation and resettlement schemes. SCI highlighted issues at every stage of the CJS process and provided an opportunity, using SC offenders as specific 'case studies', to fast-track solutions to problems, some of which were long-standing and previously considered intractable.

8   SCI was an undoubted success in reducing crime and acting as a catalyst for change but it was also a real opportunity missed in some other areas. Whilst there were early improvements in crime statistics, partnership working and some aspects of offender handling or case progression, the inspection team found many examples of under achievement through failure to either clear existing barriers or extend the implementation of obvious good practice.

9   'Tracker' case progression data should have provided management information to help drive the initiative but its design and inaccuracy negated such use. Equally, the availability of funding was broadly welcomed but the short-term nature of provision created an unhelpful uncertainty and threatened sustained commitment. It is also pertinent to note that the initiative in its first year has focussed primarily on the 'front end' of the criminal justice process with development work still required to address the issues post-release of the many offenders sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

After one year of the initiative, the joint inspectorates' assessment of SCI is that the initiative has undoubtedly been groundbreaking and challenged both conventional and 'silo' thinking. It has been successful in reducing offending, increasing convictions and improving the treatment of victims and witnesses but it has yet to achieve its full potential, in particular as a partnership initiative and as a model for further improvement within wider criminal justice reform.

10   Chapters 3 – 7 of the joint report set out in detail the inspection findings regarding both the positive achievements and the identified shortcomings or underachievement of key aspects of this unique initiative. Within these chapters, a number of firm recommendations are made, together with other 'suggestions' for further action or attention. All the recommendations and suggestions are consolidated in chapter 8.

National drive

11   The personal leadership of the Prime Minister in strong support of the Home Secretary gave the initiative a momentum that was at times breath taking and placed a huge burden of expectation onto those responsible for delivery against the SCAG action plan.

12   The involvement of 'sponsor' ministers, each taking a particular interest in one of the SC areas, added to the sense of central engagement and provided a direct channel of communication from Government to the 10 areas. The application of 'ring-fenced' funding and appointment of Regional Government Offices (RGOs), as overseers and co-ordinators, added to central control.

13   There were mixed views on the high level of central involvement. Whilst additional funding was welcomed, there were problems encountered with the distribution and availability of funding, in particular the short-term nature of some funding streams. This proved unhelpful to planning and implementation at area level. There were also inherent problems with the conflicting priorities of the wide spectrum of agencies, departments and other organisations involved. Each CJ agency had different central tenets; few felt direct responsibility for tackling robbery; even within the police, some forces did not see robbery as a high priority. Within each organisation differences in emphasis, priority and ownership were also apparent and 'silo' mentalities often persisted.

14   There was a need for all involved to receive simple and relevant messages to explain the rationale for their involvement and to underline their responsibility to deliver

against the objectives and targets. The inspection team found the quality of communication, both within and between organisations, was often poor. Clear rationale rarely reached the practitioner levels whilst progress reports fed back up the command chain regularly put an over optimistic slant on achievements, in some areas. This did not extend to the weekly monitoring of the figures for street crime, the integrity of which is not questioned.

Partnership working

15   Despite these potential barriers to effective joint working, the inspection team found examples of good partnership activity and general confirmation of the view that SCI had invigorated otherwise often dormant partnership initiatives. In particular, the largely ineffective nature of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) was, once more, highlighted.

16   The local delivery partnerships were built around the CJS agencies but also attracted a number of other partners, from both statutory and voluntary agencies. On the downside, the efficacy of the enlarged groups still appeared to rely heavily on the police input and with few national drivers to encourage joint ownership or accountability, often continued to work within the 'traditional' silo regimes.

Joined-up justice

17   The CJS has long been acknowledged as a far from coherent structure. The Prime Minister described it as "a 19th century criminal justice system trying to solve 21st century crimes." The underpinning thrust of SCI was aimed at increasing the 'joined-up' nature of CJS response and ironing out the problems long experienced at the interfaces between agencies, to achieve more effective outcomes. Vitally, SCI was also seeking to increase the confidence in the CJS of victims, witnesses and the public at large.

18   At the front-end of the CJS process, the police investigation of street crime saw increased emphasis on rapidity of response, scene management, evidence capture and witness handling. The application of the National Intelligence Model also supported a robust intelligence-led focus on prolific offenders and crime hot spots. The roll-out of video identification facilities greatly improved the ability to reduce delays in the progress of cases, as well as removing the need for witnesses to confront suspected offenders.

19 Despite the greater emphasis on capture of evidence, the standard of police files did not improve within SCI. Whilst significant additional resource was applied to police operations, there was little evidence of prioritising resources within criminal justice units or in improving file quality, progression or timeliness.

20 The CPS "Premium Service" was designed to maintain the momentum of case progression. Pre-charge advice to police was intended to avoid inappropriate charging while early reviews by senior lawyers aimed to avoid poorly evidenced cases reaching court and resulting in cracked or ineffective trials. The reality was that pre-charge advice rarely occurred, either due to police reluctance or unavailability of lawyers. Cracked and ineffective trials remained a significant problem.

21 SCAG expressed a wish for 'fast-tracking' of SC offenders through the court system and robust sentencing, to allow results to be swiftly achieved and send out a deterrent message to potential offenders. Whilst practitioners were advised that the initiative was not intended to give street crime cases an automatic priority over more serious cases, the focus was upon removing any unnecessary delay through an improvement in the quality of the prosecution. This would inevitably lead to speeding up the process. Where the system appeared to work best, there was a combination of good co-ordination of efforts, robust listing procedures and a strongly supportive judiciary.

22 The role and importance of post-sentence work, in particular rehabilitation and resettlement, was almost wholly ignored during the first year of SCI. Tracker data capture stopped at sentence. Funding streams were mainly focussed at the front-end of the CJS and, whilst Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) provided supervision for young offenders on release, there was little evidence of specific sentence management provisions for adult SC offenders in custody. At the time of the inspection, few offenders within SCI had received community sentences or completed their terms of imprisonment and so supervision on licence by the Probation Service was yet to feature.

Victims and witnesses

23 The CJS has long been accused of paying scant attention to the care and support of witnesses. The successful prosecution of robbery depends upon this and in addition has to isolate the intimidation which so often surrounds this kind of crime. An early 'walk through' of the handling of SC cases had criticised the fact that no single agency took overall responsibility for witnesses. The CPS accepted responsibility for co-ordination within SCI and in each of the areas a protocol was devised to support

victims and witnesses in SC cases. This pulled together the strands of support e.g. the use of dedicated courts, special accommodation, risk assessment of vulnerability and engagement with the Victim Support Scheme and Witness Service. There was also evidence of good schemes in conjunction with YOTs for young witnesses.

24   Early indications were that this type of support was appreciated and improved the service delivered. There was widespread agreement that there should be clarity of responsibility for victim and witness care that may only come from a single, appropriately resourced agency taking full overall responsibility.

Drugs as a driver of street crime

25   A significant strand of SCI related to diverting relevant SC offenders into appropriate drug assessment and treatment. Despite this focus, the proposition that offenders resorted to street crime to fund their drug misuse was not universally accepted, particularly among those working with juvenile offenders. Alcohol was often regarded as of greater influence and young people were found to be as motivated by fashion, lifestyle choice and peer pressure as by drug acquisition.

26   However, the majority view was that many of the most prolific adult SC offenders were indeed misusers of class A drugs. Within SCI, therefore, a major drive was to identify offenders who might benefit from drug treatment and to provide it rapidly, to break the cycle of re-offending. SCAG decided that to be effective, treatment must be accessed within 24 hours of release from custody, which posed a difficult target for the providers and, in the absence of significant additional funds, would mean giving priority over those already on existing waiting lists for treatment.

27   The inspection found a significant mismatch between reported success against this target and the reality in practice. Whilst assessment of need was being accessed mostly within 24 hours, this masked the fact that the second appointment, when the treatment would begin, was routinely 9 – 12 weeks later. Treatment professionals within the community were found to be highly resistant to allowing SC offenders to queue-jump and the result, perhaps unsurprisingly, was that the dropout rate for attendance at the second appointments was as high as 97%.

28   Paradoxically, the availability of drug treatment inside prisons was of better quality and more immediate. The reputation of such treatment was so good that some offenders, desperate for treatment, considered committing a street crime to gain access to it. Equally perversely, some non-offenders were found to have requested day admission to prisons for the same reason.

Breaking the cycle of offending

29   SCI was a catalyst for further development of preventive and diversionary initiatives, in particular those targeted at vulnerable young people. 'Summer Plus', 'Splash' and similar activity schemes during school holidays were fully supported in the SC areas. Behaviour Improvement Programmes (BIP), proactive use of Behaviour and Education Support Teams (BEST), allocation of dedicated police officers to schools and co-ordinated truancy sweeps were also given a welcome boost by support from within SCI.

30   Each YOT had also been active in ensuring that

- A range of publicity and information material was available to advise potential perpetrators and victims of street crime

- Children who needed to be prioritised for the support of BEST and BIP teams were identified

- Children in care were prioritised to prevent them becoming offenders or victims

- Young offenders who were likely to continue to pose a threat in adulthood were identified to the appropriate services.

31   A major initiative to break offending cycles was to restrict availability of one of the main targets for street criminals, the mobile phone. As a visible fashion statement, symbol of street credibility and general 'must have' for young people, the proportion of street robberies involving theft of a mobile phone escalated from 8% to 28% in 2 years. Once stolen, they were easily reused and highly convertible into cash, whether to feed drugs misuse or simply improve lifestyle choices. Close collaboration with the mobile phone industry produced, in March 2003, a major change in approach, with agreement from the main network providers to jointly block the use of stolen phones making them unusable. The results of this are still awaited but eagerly anticipated.

Learning the lessons

32   To be successful, initiatives require clear and shared objectives and targets, accurate and robust monitoring, transparent accountability and sustainability, through locking in and building upon good practice. The inspection team concluded that SCI could have achieved far more in each of these elements.

33 Whilst tackling street crime was presented as a joint objective for all agencies involved, addressing street robbery did not easily fit within the highest priorities of the majority of the partners. Even within the police service, several of the SC forces did not feel street robbery was a high priority, compared for example to volume crime such as house burglary. The targets were challenged by police and never truly 'owned' by the partner agencies. There was an energy to work together but a consensus that robbery was too narrow a focus to engage partners. It was suggested that 'acquisitive crime' or even 'victimisation' would have provided a more suitable vehicle for genuine partnership commitment.

34 The inaccuracy and bureaucracy of the SC Tracker hampered the joint ownership of targets. Invariably seen in local areas as a burden rather than a management tool, the flagging of SC cases was found to be intermittent which made the tracking unreliable. The details of SC offenders continued to be duplicated as many as 7 times, as each agency logged them into their own systems, and rarely did anyone seek to reconcile the different recording systems.

35 Lack of shared ownership also manifested itself in relation to accountability. The most high profile target was of robbery reduction and, despite attempts to have this regarded as a joint objective, the police were invariably seen as the accountable body. This perception was reinforced by the regular invitation to individual Chief Constables to attend SCAG meetings at times of fading performance. If this situation is to be overcome, the new Local Criminal Justice Boards will need to learn the lessons of SCI and work to genuinely joined-up objectives and targets.

36 Despite potential barriers, the inspection team found much good practice, although largely in isolated pockets. Several strands of good practice exchange did evolve in the first year but there was no strategic or structured co-ordination of such exchanges. It was also disappointing to see that lessons from previous initiatives, such as the Persistent Young Offenders (PYO) scheme, did not appear to have been recycled into the approach to SCI, with many of the same barriers and issues again featuring.

37 Whilst the Association of Chief Police Officers encouraged police forces and practitioners to share lessons learned. CPS nationally held bi-monthly meetings for senior practitioners and other agencies also carried out internal analysis, the first visible signs of strategic consolidation of good practice came in the form of a workshop that took place in late March 2003. That event concentrated on police good practice but with the intention to apply the lessons learned more widely within the partnership arena in due course. It will be important that this intention is translated into action.

The future of SCI

38   A major aim of the joint inspection was to examine issues of sustainability , the transferability of lessons learned and the overall approach to future initiatives. In addition to building on good practice, sustainability of SCI will also depend on continued resourcing and effort. SCI funding was mostly centrally provided and largely focused on the 'front-end' of the process. The police achieved success in terms of crime reduction through resource-intensive targeted operations and high-visibility initiatives, all heavily reliant on overtime working. Such intensity of activity presents limitations when considering longer-term sustainability. In re-emphasising the partnership focus, it will be important to focus effort and resources more widely across the CJ system.

39   SCI was viewed by many as an approach with potential to be applied more widely in the CJ arena. A significant amount of resource and effort has been expended and SCI certainly broke new ground. However, as a rehearsal of CJS reform it has yet to achieve the degree of step-change in either attitude or accountability that would be required to be confident in rolling it out to other initiatives.

40   The initiative was a rapid and robust response to an urgent problem. The exponential growth in street robbery, visible a year ago has been reversed and since the start of SCI, there have been over 17,000 fewer victims of robbery in the ten street crime areas. Conviction rates have increased and the way in which victims and witnesses are accommodated and treated has also improved. The magnitude of this achievement must not be lost in the consideration of areas requiring further attention.

41   It is also vital to acknowledge the immense energy that has been expended and the considerable ingenuity shown by many practitioners from all agencies, in overcoming the obstacles the system placed in their path. If the gains made to date are not to be lost and, more importantly, further successes achieved it will be vital that lessons learned are re-cycled and thorough evaluation of results completed. Agencies must be convinced of the initiative's benefits and be better supported to achieve an even higher level of commitment to change working practices. Activity will need to be extended into the correctional context and all agencies throughout the process must take a clearer and shared ownership and accountability for delivery.

Birth of a concept

1 History of the Street Crime Initiative

1.1 Throughout most of the 1990's, overall recorded crime figures were falling but one category of crime bucked the trend for much of that period. Robberies rose steadily between 1990 and 1996 but it was the unprecedented escalation post-1998 that caught everyone's attention. Police recorded almost twice as many personal robberies in 2001/2 as in 1997/8[1] and there was sustained media coverage of public and political concerns.

Shot For Her Mobile Phone

The Evening Standard 13 February 2002

Street Crime Out of Control

The Sun 11 February 2002

Street Crime Soaring by 26%

The Sunday Times 10 February 2002

1.2 In 2000, five police forces, which together accounted for 72% of all street robberies, had been set robbery reduction targets under the Best Value framework in the Local Government Act 1999. The forces were the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, West Midlands and West Yorkshire. They were tasked to achieve a Public Service Agreement (PSA) reduction target of 14% by March 2005.

1.3 By mid-2001, however, four of the five forces had actually suffered a further rise in robberies (of between 13 and 22%) and monthly results continued to rise alarmingly throughout the remainder of 2001. The bad publicity continued and the fear of crime, portrayed in the media, rose out of all proportion to actual risk of victimisation. The theft of mobile phones accounted for just under one-third of all personal robberies, mostly involving young people as victims, whilst London, in particular, also saw the frightening emergence of 'car-jackings', often involving significant violence against unsuspecting drivers.

Are The Police Doing Enough?

The Evening Standard 2 January 2002

Our Lawless Streets

The Evening Standard 12 February 2002

I Saw Rolex Robbers Shoot Wife Dead

The Metro 22 February 2002

1.4   The Home Secretary promised robust action (BBC Radio 5 Live – 4 February 2002 – BBCi News Website)

> **These trends take off, mobile phones, car-jacking are suddenly in the headlines, you will get copycatting. We have got to send a very clear message and the message is – get involved in this and you will go down for a very long time.**

1.5   The media perceived the problem as much wider than simply deterrent sentencing. The prevailing view was summed up thus:

Extract: "Streets under seige"

"Street crime is exploding in many areas, not because phones are too easy to steal or cars too hard but because the forces of law and order are losing control of the streets. It is as simple, and as difficult, as that. We urgently need more police, patrolling more intensively, in many cities and towns. When people dare not go out in the evening and mothers are afraid to drive their children to school, civilised society is under siege."

Daily Telegraph 6 February 2002 – © Telegraph Group Ltd 2002

1.6   The Government responded by putting action to reduce robbery at the heart of its now high profile agenda for tackling crime. In February 2002, a Robbery Reduction Programme was launched, involving the ten police forces that together accounted for 83% of all recorded robbery offences in England and Wales. Avon and Somerset, Thames Valley, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire and Lancashire joined

the original five forces. A programme board was formed, chaired by a senior civil servant and including membership from the key directorates and criminal justice agencies, plus national representation from the Police Service. In addition, local project boards were established in each of the ten areas to reflect the programme board membership.

1.7   In London, the programme was launched under the corporate banner of "Safer Streets" and immediately caught the imagination by applying targeted resources and publicity to the efforts of the Metropolitan Police.

Extract: "Safer Streets – London against street crime"

Some of the high profile actions taken to reinforce the "Safer Streets" campaign:

- 315 traffic officers redirected for anti-SC work

- 160 traffic wardens switched to high visibility patrols

- 100 Territorial Support Group officers targeting SC

- 320 PYOs targeted

- 8 boroughs designated for special anti-SC operations

Metropolitan Police website

Metropolitan Police Safer Streets Campaign.

1.8 In launching this major redirection of resources, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir John Stevens, reinforced the growing realisation that police action alone would not solve the problems of street crime, it would need concerted effort from other agencies as well:

> **To put it bluntly, there will not be much gained if the Met continues to arrest more street robbers who are then simply processed and freed to rob again – so-called 'revolving door justice'.**[2]

1.9 In March 2002, the Prime Minister decided to raise the national profile still further by adopting a truly unique approach, by treating the issue of street crime as a national emergency. He convened a Ministerial Steering Group, designed to provide a strategic cross-departmental approach to the problem of street crime with the ability, and the authority, to make timely and effective decisions. The Home Secretary announced this move and the Prime Minister's personal involvement during a television interview with Sir David Frost, the week before the first ministerial group meeting.

1.10 The Ministerial "Street Crime Action Group" (SCAG) was undoubtedly a uniquely powerful array of key stakeholders in the field of criminal justice and crime.

Membership of Street Crime Action Group (SCAG)

Prime Minister
Home Secretary
Secretary of State for Education and Skills
Secretary of State for Health
Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions
Chief Secretary
Lord Chancellor
Attorney General
President of Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
Commissioner of Metropolitan Police
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary
Chair of Youth Justice Board
Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
Local Government Association

(Subsequent additions)
Director General of Prison Service
National Director of Probation Service
Association of Police Authorities (APA)
Magistrates Association
Justices' Clerk

1.11 The "Ten Force Robbery Reduction Initiative", later redesignated as the "Street Crime Initiative" (SCI), was launched in advance of the first SCAG meeting on 20 March 2002. The initiative was described as a step-change in cross Government action to tackle street crime. It was presented as a concerted effort to both reduce offending and deal more effectively with those who continued to commit such offences. The Home Secretary said, in a Home Office media release marking the launch (17 March 2002):

> **❝ We are facing head-on the thuggery and violence on our streets. We literally must reclaim our streets for the decent law-abiding citizens who want no more than to be able to walk safely, to live peacefully and to go about their business freely, untroubled by the fear of attack.**
>
> **We want more police visible on the streets, immediate action to speed the perpetrators through the system, action to protect the victims and witnesses, and to ensure that those who are remanded or convicted don't walk freely on our streets. ❞**

1.12 The initiative defined 'street crime' to include robbery, snatch theft, car-jacking and relevant firearms offences and £67m of government funding was set aside to directly support the initiative.

1.13 In addition to the existing Public Sector Agreement (PSA) target to reduce robbery by 14% by 2005, each of the 10 forces was now set an individual robbery reduction target, based on their levels of street robbery in 2001. Tony Blair made a very public pledge in Prime Minister's Questions that levels of street robbery in each of the ten forces would be under control by September 2002.

> **❝ We are confident that by the end of September we will have brought this problem under control. ❞**[3]

1.14 Individual targets were therefore designed to ensure that each force would be below their 2001 recorded robbery figures by the end of September 2002.

2 The structure for implementation

2.1 After the first meeting of SCAG, in March 2002, the group reconvened on a fortnightly basis to consider progress and decide on additional action required. These meetings took place in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), more commonly used as venue for central co-ordination of anti-terrorist and national emergency response. This symbolically reinforced the 'national emergency' approach. These discussions produced the Street Crime Action Plan.

2.2 To support SCAG, an interdepartmental officials meeting was convened under the chairmanship of the Home Office Permanent Secretary. Meeting a few days before SCAG, the Officials' Group collated results, provided updates on progress and discussed proposals for further action. Both groups were serviced by the Street Crime Action Team (SCAT), comprising a mixture of civil servants, researchers and police officers.

2.3 In addition, SCAT held a weekly Programme Delivery Group (PDG) to receive the weekly statistics and identify any short-term action required to address problems or enhance successes. A structure chart showing the organisational relationship between SCAG, the Officials Group, SCAT and PDG appears in figure 1. It will be noted that the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU) was given a role in interfacing with each of the central elements of SCI.

Figure 1: Programme structure

2.4 At the delivery level, each of the 10 SC areas were required to establish a local programme delivery group, and most based this on pre-existing Criminal Justice(CJ) Chief Officer Groups(COG). Membership of the local groups was not mandated but it was proposed that all the CJ agencies represented at SCAG should also be part of the local delivery group.

3   The business cycle

3.1   SCAG set about identifying the key areas requiring strategic drive to impact on the core problem of reducing the incidence of street crime. Whilst there was a clear and immediate spotlight on the activity of police forces, the group also sought to impact at various stages throughout the process of passing street crime offenders through the Criminal Justice System(CJS).

3.2   SCAG identified actions, both 'immediate' and 'longer' term, in 7 key stages of the process from 'prevention and reduction' to 'rehabilitation and resettlement'.

- *Crime prevention and reduction*
  Divert a proportion of 'at risk' population from offending

- *Detection and arrest*
  Improve arrest rate of serious and repeat offenders

- *Bail and remand*
  Streamline the process and prevent offences committed on bail

- *CPS and case preparation*
  Remove blockages and improve the quality of prosecution cases

- *Court process*
  Streamline the process and improve witness protection

- *Carrying out sentence*
  Ensure availability of capacity in prisons, secure training centres and local authority secure children's homes

- *Resettlement and rehabilitation*
  Work with offenders to reduce re-offending

3.3   These actions were then passed to the Programme Steering Group to progress, supported by SCAT and the PDG. Each action was allocated to one or more named departments to lead on implementation. Some actions required totally central action, for example where a change in national policy or even legislation was called for, others were passed to local partnership groups to progress. Where possible, actions were set either a delivery date or a milestone reporting date.

4 Managing performance

4.1 Clearly, whilst delivery on individual actions was a 'performance measure' in its own right, the main measure under scrutiny was the actual reduction in street crime. A core function of SCAT throughout SCI was to collate and monitor statistics on the performance of each SC area against their individual crime reduction targets and produce weekly statistical reports.

4.2 In addition to the collection and monitoring of data, SCAT also had responsibility for dissemination of performance data and production of various progress and data analysis reports. The diagram at figure 2 (from PMDU presentation 20 August 2002) sets out the range of routine reports and the key elements of the proposed performance management regime for SCI.

Figure 2: Role of performance data and progress reports in enabling active management of the initiative

WEEKLY REPORTS on offences per BCU per area compared to target

TRACKER DATA on progress of arrestees through CJS

SUMMARY REPORTS from Government Offices

PROGRESS REPORTS from departments and criminal justice agencies

- Track progress of each strand of the initiative in each area

- Identify and tackle blockages and obstacles to delivery

- Monitor impact of new initiatives in each area

- Identify and spread good practice

- Foster cooperation, information sharing and joint working across departments and criminal justice system

4.3 *Weekly reports* – The crime data for inclusion in these reports was provided on a weekly basis to SCAT by the 10 police forces involved. The new data was then assimilated into trend data both on a force-by- force basis, and as a cumulative total for the 10 areas and discussed in detail at the weekly PDG meeting. SCAT then produced a weekly summary report setting out an analysis of discernible trends and seeking to put in context any unexpected or significant findings from the PDG discussion.

4.4 *Tracker data* – SCAT also received data from police on the numbers of suspects arrested for street crime and some aspects of their progress through the CJS, as far as

sentence (the police acted as collection agents for all local agencies). This data was also discussed at PDG and was subject of regular report to the Programme Steering Group.

4.5   *Summary reports from Government Offices* – Government Offices (GO) provided weekly reports on developments and progress within their areas, including examples of specific local initiatives or schemes proving effective in reducing crime or increasing public awareness or reassurance. These reports were used by SCAT to compile a weekly bulletin, which was circulated to the 10 SC areas as a means of promulgating potential good practice.

4.6   *Progress reports* – Each department or CJ agency 'lead' for SCAG actions was required to provide progress reports for consideration at Programme Steering Group and, where appropriate, at SCAG. In addition, specific subject areas emerging at a particular SCAG discussion often prompted specially commissioned reports from named departments or agencies. These were normally filtered through the steering group stage before being reported back to SCAG.

5   The performance of the initiative

The scale of the problem

5.1   Offences of robbery (personal and commercial) more than doubled in England and Wales in 10 years. Figure 3 shows that some of the largest increases occurred in recent years.

Figure 3: Recorded robbery in England and Wales, 1990–2001/02[4]

5.2 Personal robbery accounted for the majority of these figures (89%)and virtually all of the increases. 83% of all recorded robbery between April 2001 and March 2002 occurred in just 10 police force areas (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Recorded robbery in ten SCI forces, April 2001 to March 2002[5]

These 10 areas became the constituent participants of SCI.

Targets for areas

5.3 As previously discussed, each of the 10 areas was included in the PSA target for robbery reduction. In addition, each force was set a milestone target with their progress being monitored on a weekly basis. The interim target for each area was to be either at or below their previous year's level of street crime by September 2002.

5.4 SCAT produced a weekly chart for each force, showing the previous year's performance, the target trajectory required and the current year's performance. Each week the performance against the targets was discussed at PDG and reasons for variations in performance identified. The crime reduction targets became widely understood as 'police targets'.

5.5 Explicit individual targets were not set for any of the other CJ agencies, by the Government. The implicit targets of joined-up working, however, were to make the progress of SC cases through the CJS more assured and the resultant sentencing more of a deterrent. To monitor the case progression aspect of SCI, SCAT also collated weekly 'Tracker' data on arrests and the subsequent progress of SC cases through the CJS.

5.6   Both sets of data, together with a degree of analysis and comparison, were circulated to each SC area, for use in local performance management, and reported regularly to the PDG and SCAG.

Reported results

5.7   The main public milestone for SCI was in September 2002, in meeting the deadline set by the Prime Minister. Such was the media speculation as to whether the target had been met, the Home Office released interim results in mid-September, a month earlier than intended. The Home Secretary described the results thus (HO media statement 12 September 2002):

> " These interim figures show a reduction of 14% in street crime since the initiative began, with nearly 2000 less robberies in August than in March as a result of these measures…
>
> The impact we are beginning to make on this problem across the country is down to the efforts of all those we got round the table in March to put in place a co-ordinated strategy to deal with what was an escalating trend. "

5.8   In October 2002, the Home Office published the definitive figures for street crime, up to the end of September (Appendix B). The publication set out progress against two indicators:

●   Comparison with the performance immediately before the initiative began

●   Direct comparison to the same period in 2001.

5.9   A summary of the published results is set out below.

Extract: SCI Interim Performance figures

The figures show that:

● Robberies overall were down both during the period of the initiative and compared to the same period in 2001

● Street crime (robbery & snatch theft) was down 16% between April and September 2002

● London had seen a 33% reduction between January and September 2002

● Robbery was down 25% from March to September 2002

● The increase in offences experienced in the months prior to April 2002 had been reversed by September 2002

Home Office, October 2002

6 The official verdict on SCI

6.1 The Government clearly felt that SCI had been a success, as demonstrated in both the interim and definitive statistics. The Police Service was largely supportive of this view, as summed up by Sir John Stevens, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police (in HO media statement 12 September 2002)

> **❝ The success of Operation Safer Streets has led to a steady reduction in the levels of street crime in London since February...we are grateful for the high level of Government support we are getting for the drive against street crime but we acknowledge that there is no room for complacency...❞**

6.2 Around the same time as these 'official' views of the success of SCI, an ICM poll carried out for the BBC revealed the following statistics about public attitudes towards street crime:

Extract: BBC Cracking Crime Day

Despite over 80% of respondents reporting no personal or family contact with street crime victimisation in the previous 12 months:

- 87% of those with children 10-16 years were worried they might be SC victims

- Only 8% felt 'street muggings' had decreased nationally in last 6 months

- 25% of over 55 year olds were too worried to go out for a walk in their area after dark for fear of being mugged

BBCi website, 17 September 2002

6.3 So, if this poll was representative, despite a reduction in crime and high profile coverage of the positive aspects of the initiative's contribution to tackling the problem, public fears were not significantly diminished.

6.4 A study by Civitas (The Institute for the Study of Civil Society)[6], also took the view that street crime was far from under control and made unflattering comparisons between the achievements in New York and London. The paper concluded that whilst the New York Police Department had returned to the principles enunciated by Sir Robert Peel in the 19th Century, and based on low-tech patrolling and visibility, the UK had moved away from this basic tenet.

6.5 Whilst the authors of that publication urged a look backwards, the view of the Government at this time was to look towards the future. In advance of the state opening of Parliament in November 2002, Prime Minister Tony Blair spoke of his Vision for Britain.

Extract: My Vision for Britain – Tony Blair

"Our new approach starts with opportunity…..With these new opportunities comes responsibility. The street crime initiative, for example, has been one of the most successful partnerships between government and the police in living memory. But the truth is people don't feel more secure and they know the system is not yet working as it should. It has become increasingly clear what the problem with the system is:

- *a 19th century criminal justice system trying to solve 21st century crimes*
- *too little joined-up working between police, CPS and other agencies*
- *too little focus on the hard-core of persistent offenders who commit more than half the crime*
- *court procedures that are cumbersome*
- *justice weighted towards the criminal and in need of rebalancing towards the victim*
- *police not freed up and given the flexibility to focus on the crime and anti-social behaviour*
- *punishment that often does not fit the crime*

So this autumn we will focus on tackling these problems. We are pursuing radical reform of the Criminal Justice System, tackling anti-social behaviour and restoring social cohesion to fragmented communities."

The Observer, 10 November 2002

6.6 The consensus amongst professionals and politicians, within the UK at least, appears to have been that SCI was groundbreaking and a qualified success. Even its staunchest supporters, however acknowledged after September 2002 that there was still significant scope for further improvement, in particular if the public confidence in the CJS and the rule of law was to be returned to an acceptable level.

6.7 The Home Office crime statistics covering the full first year of SCI (April 2002 to March 2003) were scheduled for publication in July 2003, but by the time of writing this report, it was being reported in the media that the national reduction in robbery offences was in the order of 17%. If confirmed this represented over 17,000 fewer victims compared to the previous year.

Joined-up inspection

1 The origins of the joint inspection

1.1 At the SCAG meeting on 24 April 2002, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCIC) proposed that the unique nature and high impact of SCI deserved to be examined in a structured way, to identify positive lessons. The Prime Minister agreed and HMCIC was asked to bring forward a plan for joint inspection activity, to monitor and evaluate the impact of the SCI approach across the CJS (See Appendix C). This was clearly a role for a joint inspection and he called together the heads of the inspectorates listed below to agree the way forward.

Inspectorate of Constabulary	(HMIC)
Office for Standards in Education	(Ofsted)
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate	(HMCPSI)
Magistrates Court Service Inspectorate	(HMMCSI)
Social Services Inspectorate	(SSI)
Inspectorate of Probation	(HMIP)
Inspectorate of Prisons	(HMIPris)
Court Service[7]	(CS)

1.2 This group subsequently formed the Joint Inspectorates Steering Group (JISG) and agreed to a joint inspection, the aim of which was:

Extract: Terms of Reference

"To provide an independent evaluation of the process adopted in the street crime initiative, its impact on street crime and on the wider criminal justice system. To provide encouragement and support to agencies in achieving their required outcomes. To add value to areas of collaborative agency working through crosscutting inspection activity. To identify any transferable lessons emerging from the initiative."

Joint Inspection Steering Group, May 2002

1.3 The objectives for the inspection were agreed as to identify and evaluate:

a) The process adopted.

b) The objectives and targets set and the respective results achieved, in particular the impact on levels of street crime and the sustainability of improvements.

c) The capacity of agencies individually and working together to achieve change and the outcomes required.

d) The impact of the initiative on the wider CJS, to include consequences which were either unintended or unforeseen.

e) Good practice within the programme methodology and any other lessons that may be transferable and could inform future activity.

1.4 The joint inspection was co-ordinated from within HMIC by Peter Winship (HM Inspector) and Peter Todd (Assistant Inspector) and each of the inspectorates provided experienced inspection staff to form the core of the inspection team.

2 Phased approach to inspection

2.1 It was clear from the outset that the scope of the inspection covered organisations that would be in very different stages of engagement with the initiative. By mid-2002, whilst the police, Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and courts were certainly processing SC offenders, Probation and Prison Services had yet to receive significant numbers of such offenders into their areas of responsibility. Outside of the narrow CJ field, education, Youth Offending Teams (YOTs), Connexions service and social services were already working hard at providing diversionary activities, in particular through the summer schemes for young people.

2.2 The JISG decided upon a 3-phase approach to the inspection. More detail of the phases and the respective methodologies employed appear in Appendix D. However, the basic approach was:

Phase 1 – April to September 2002

2.3 Phase 1 was to be an early assessment of progress but more usefully, a scoping study to help identify areas of apparent good practice or potential problems that would form the basis of in-depth joint inspection activity under phase 2.

Phase 2 – October 2002 to April 2003

2.4 Phase 2 was to include significant fieldwork both individually and in joint teams examining the multi-agency aspects of SCI. The objective was to identify transferable lessons, good practice and any unintended or unforeseen impacts of the initiative.

Phase 3 – Beyond April 2003

2.5   Depending on the sustainability of the initiative, both as a whole and in respect of individual actions within SCI, the inspectorates reserved judgement on whether a formal Phase 3 would be required and what form activity under that phase might take.

3   Findings from Phase 1 of the Joint Inspection

3.1   The report on Phase 1 of the inspection was not a published document, since it contained a significant degree of invalidated claims and reports that were to form part of the base-line material for examination during Phase 2.

3.2   Within both phases, however, inspection members worked to a guiding principle that any problems identified should be made visible to those involved in delivering SCI (if urgent then this was done immediately during the visits). Each Inspectorate provided an agency-specific feedback report to agency heads in areas. A generic summary paper was also produced and circulated to the Area COGs, setting out the key Phase 1 findings, impressions and the areas of greatest interest are shown below.

Extract: Phase 1 Inspection findings

Overall

- SCI represented a unique approach and has potential as a prototype for other important national initiatives
- The impact of SCI was generally positive and overall crime reduction targets had been achieved
- The continued involvement of the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers had been particularly powerful
- Inter-agency co-operation had been energised by the initiative
- Collaborative ventures had progressed far faster under SCI

Extract: Phase 1 Inspection findings – continued

Emerging concerns – structural

- Support structures and mechanisms had been unable to keep up with the speed of the initiative

- Funding streams were slow and disjointed

- There was an absence of cross-cutting objectives or targets

- Tracker data was confusing and inaccurate

- Little or no analysis or evaluation was evident

Emerging concerns – specific

- Police file quality had not improved

- Video identification, although welcomed, was slow to arrive

- Take up of pre-charge advice under the Street Crime Protocol was poor

- Access to drug referral and treatment appeared intermittent

- Disproportionality of ethnic minority SC offenders

Joint Inspection Steering Group, October 2002

3.3 These findings set the core agenda for Phase 2 of the joint inspection. Each of the issues listed in the above summary formed part of the overall inspection framework of questions and is reflected in the content of this final report.

The national drive

1   Introduction

1.1   It is difficult to over-state the importance and ground-breaking nature of the decision to drive SCI from a central perspective and to do so by applying pressure and momentum from the very top of Government. Whilst elements within public sector organisations had been exposed to strong national and political 'direction', SCI marked a departure into an overt drive targeted simultaneously at a number of different agencies, including voluntary agencies and even beyond the CJS.

1.2   This innovative approach also created an impact across a number of key strategic areas, not just providing food for thought in respect of this specific initiative but also raising issues of transferability to other current or future national campaigns. The issues explored in this section represent the key generic national issues that would underpin any expansion of the SCI approach towards tackling other such issues, namely:

- The impact of central controls

- Winning hearts and minds of participants, and

- Spurring local partnerships to deliver.

2   The impact of central controls

Ministerial involvement

2.1   Undoubtedly a critical element of SCI was the close and continued involvement of the Prime Minister, leading a powerful SCAG team including a large proportion of his Cabinet colleagues and key departmental heads. This made the initiative a unique exercise in Government driving local delivery in a specific area of crime reduction.

2.2   In addition to achieving consistent Cabinet involvement at SCAG level, the decision was taken in May 2002, to allocate 'sponsoring ministers' for each of the street crime areas (see table overleaf).

Area	Sponsor Minister	Dept
Avon and Somerset	Baroness Blackstone	Arts
Greater Manchester	Lord Falconer	Home Office
Lancashire	Hazel Blears	Health
London (MPS)	John Denham *(Resigned from Government of March 2003)*	Home Office
Merseyside	Yvette Cooper	LCD
Nottinghamshire	Ruth Kelly	Treasury
South Yorkshire	Stephen Twigg *(Replaced by Ivan Lewis)*	Education
Thames Valley	Barbara Roche	ODPM
West Midlands	Lord Rooker	Housing
West Yorkshire	Harriet Harman *(Replaced by Hilary Benn)*	Solicitor Gen.

2.3   Sponsoring ministers visited the areas regularly and took a significant and largely welcome interest in their respective progress. They were often able to bring their own areas of expertise to bear (e.g. education, health) and provided informed input to SCAG meetings. Their role was to provide a bi-lateral communication between areas and Government and report on local initiatives as well as encouraging area performance.

Merseyside Campaign Poster

Quote: Involvement of sponsor ministers

"The first couple of visits were very difficult. (The minister) didn't really understand what we were trying to do or the context. Once they did, however, they really helped in getting things moving. It was good to have someone back at 'the centre' putting our case."

Police Chief Officer

Funding streams

2.4 One of the acknowledged strengths of SCI was the significant level of resources allocated to it by central Government. Soon after the launch of SCI, the Home Secretary announced £67 million specifically to tackle street crime. This was sub-divided as follows:

● Police operations and community support officers	£36 million
● Video identity parades	£7.6 million
● Probation, resettlement and drugs	£10 million
● Additional CPS and court costs	£13.8 million
	(HO Press statement 116/2002)

2.5 In addition, there was already £70 million allocated to the 2002/3 Communities Against Drugs (CAD) fund – £50 million of this was distributed nationally with the additional £20 million focused on and distributed between the Crime and disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP) in SC areas (designated as "CAD Uplift" funding).

2.6 From outside of the Home Office, there were also funding streams that impacted on SCI, for example:

- £66 million DfES funding for Behaviour Improvement Programmes (BIP) (in 34 Local Education Authorities in the 10 SC areas).

- £22.5 million Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) funding for street crime wardens in the 10 areas.

2.7 The funds enabled a wide array of projects in each of the 10 areas including (as examples of the scope):

- provision of a detoxification nurse and Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice & Treatment (CARATs) worker at Bristol prison,

- two staff to support victims in Newham, London, and

- profiling of prisoners due for release in Nottinghamshire, to provide enhanced treatment opportunities.

2.8 Despite this, the single most frequent criticism of SCI during 2002, at all levels, was also in respect of funding. The criticisms were twofold, namely:

(i) uncertainty, inconsistency and short-term nature of central funding, and

(ii) over-focus on 'front-end' services (in particular police).

2.9   *Uncertainty of funding streams* – Undoubtedly, the initial provision of significant funds signalled strong Government commitment to SCI but the sheer number of different funding streams, the very different allocation criteria and often-complicated rules for application proved a constant frustration to managers and practitioners alike.

2.10   Police officers involved in SCI generally quoted between 5 and 7 different funding streams directly impacting on the initiative, including "Communities Against Drugs" (CAD), "Neighbourhood Renewal Fund" (NRF), "Single Regeneration Budget" (SRB6) and "Basic Command Unit fund". However, police personnel interviewed felt they had a relatively simple task compared to some partners. Some other agencies quoted many more funding streams, the highest being Local Education Authorities who identified 57 different sources of funds targeted at their whole range of specific projects (including SCI).

2.11   Without doubt the main frustration with funding, however, was the uncertainty over sustainability, which emanated from two main sources:

- Funds made available were generally only for one financial year, with no promise of early renewal, and

- There was widespread doubt that SCI would continue beyond September 2002.

2.12   Most funds had been provided for a single year (2002/3) with no guarantee of continuation. To achieve longer-term gains, agencies were keen to employ dedicated staff, such as drugs, youth and health workers. The uncertainty of funding, and its delayed availability, made it virtually impossible to offer potential candidates any security of tenure without taking the risk of committing local funds to underwrite unconfirmed extension of central funding.

2.13   The problems were particularly acute in planning diversion activities during school summer holidays due to the short timescale available to identify appropriate young people, plan activities and recruit staff. Delays in funding had a significant impact on all those agencies seeking to employ staff to work with children. Achieving the necessary employment clearances within the timescales of the initiative proved virtually impossible for many of the intended projects.

2.14   The perceived lack of information to and briefing of, the local strategic managers who had to take risk-based funding decisions exacerbated the uncertainty. Delayed funding led one Chief Constable to delay initial engagement with the initiative and another appointed a full-time 'Partnership Officer' simply to co-ordinate the confusing array of funding streams.

2.15   The Government stated that any scepticism concerning an end-date for SCI was wholly unjustified. Whilst the rumours were that SCI would end after the September deadline, all 'official' messages were that SCI would continue for the foreseeable future and funding was already available until March 2003.

2.16   The Home Secretary clearly sign-posted the continuation of the initiative (12 September 2002),

> **The police and all those involved have achieved a lot so far, but the fight against street crime will not stop now or at the end of September. I have made clear from the start the need for long term sustainable reductions and we will continue to work with all those involved to build on these early results.**

2.17   Unfortunately, all the unofficial messages and signposts, especially at the area level, pointed towards either SCI finishing altogether or it being subsumed into another similarly high profile initiative.

Quote: Sustainability of funding

"Whatever was being said nationally, all we were hearing was that the funds beyond the first year were not confirmed and that some we already had would be diverted after September. We couldn't plan ahead with any certainty."

Local drugs project worker

2.18   *Front-end focus of funding* – There was also significant disquiet that most of the funding was allocated within single agency streams. The inspection team found that partner agencies were particularly critical that the majority of funds for SCI were targeted at the police and the 'front end' of the CJ process. This had two particular impacts. First, the major emphasis was on short-term enforcement activity, rather than seeking to achieve longer-term change. Second, the emphasis on a single agency reinforced a 'silo' or parochial working mentality and failed to encourage true partnership effort to tackle crosscutting issues.

2.19   Victim Support, for example did not initially receive additional funding although taking on a modified role, and had to raise this at local and national level. Some other agencies also had to re-prioritise work within existing funding provision.

2.20 There were consistent calls for a single pot of funding from which each agency could draw. An alternative view expressed, however, was that this would potentially lead to direct competition between bidders, thereby producing less rather than more co-operation. The Government responded to the concerns about school holiday activities funding by establishing a cross-departmental group, in Autumn 2002, to work on a simplified system for funding. The result was an agreement from the Departments of Education and Science and Culture, Media and Sport to combine funding with the Home Office to form a single central pot, administered at a local level through Regional Government Offices. The single pot arrangements were announced in January 2003 to take effect from summer 2003.

Thames Valley Campaign Poster

Recommendation 1

Future national initiatives benefit from a 'single pot' funding approach to cut down on bureaucracy and ease allocation and that such funding should be identified for medium and long-term projects to assist with planning and recruitment.

Role of Regional Government Office (RGO)

2.21 In March 2002, RGOs received central guidance emphasising the importance of their role supporting SCI. One recipient of the guidance summarised their role as:

- Enhancing channels of communication to and from 'the centre',

- Reducing bureaucracy,

- Unblocking the system, and

- Helping solve local problems.

2.22 In addition, and importantly, RGOs were the conduit through which funding was made available to CDRPs. The Regional Crime Reduction Directors, working within RGOs, were the focal point for co-ordination of such funding.

2.23 There was no template provided for standardising the activity required and so the degree of such activity varied between RGOs. A typical spread of work included daily contact from SCAT for information and briefings; arrangement of visits to areas for sponsoring (and other) ministers; and, requests for information from other government departments.

Quote: Work of RGO

"The demand for information in the first 6 months was overwhelming. I am aware that some RGOs set up internal departments just to manage the demands associated with SCI."

RGO worker

2.24 RGOs had two particular functions that were both common throughout the SC areas and subject of significant comment, namely fund distribution and providing the regional link into SCAT.

2.25 *Fund distribution* – A number of good initiatives emerged from the provided funding. In one area, local CDRPs agreed to jointly fund a mobile CCTV van, providing a versatile asset that none of the local partnership could have afforded individually.

2.26 There were however a number of examples of areas failing to spend all the money available to them, in part due to the complexity of application procedures involved. This was starkly evidenced in one project, supported by all partners, originally submitted in October 2002. By February 2003 it was still being returned for 'a more comprehensively written business case'. The bureaucracy was jeopardising a flagship £300,000 support and drugs management project.

2.27 The inspection team took the view that RGOs in this case had failed to clear the blockages and the team made informal contact with several of the key senior managers involved highlighting the issue. It is pleasing to report that common sense prevailed, and the project was progressed.

2.28 *Link to SCAT* – The RGOs, normally through the Regional Crime Reduction Directors, provided the main official link between local delivery partnerships. The inspection team found a very mixed picture in respect of the involvement of RGOs and Regional Crime Reduction Directors.

Quote: RGO as communication conduit

"We occasionally found out more about what central Government was thinking but the information flow was virtually all one way, from us to the centre."

Member of local delivery group

2.29 Some chief officer group members were clearly disappointed at the level of support and engagement they received from the RGOs.

Quote: RGO role overall

"If the role of Government Office has been to engage the local CJS agencies, then they have significantly failed."

Member of Chief Officer Group

2.30 Elsewhere, RGOs were credited with providing a significant contribution to not only joining up the centre and areas on SCI, but also helping to connect SCI into the wider CDRP agenda locally.

Good Practice

RGO role as conduit between SCI and CDRP

Government Office West Midlands (GOWM) actively encouraged broader collaboration. They commissioned research into witness attendance with a view to producing a risk strategy, to maximise attendance. GOWM found the funding via SCI.

Suggestion A

The role of RGO should be clarified and formalised within national criteria to aid partnership working within CJ Areas.

3 Winning the hearts and minds of participants

Conflicting organisational priorities

3.1 Whilst the central political thrust was an absolutely vital element in SCI, the delivery of practical success relied almost as much on disparate organisations working together with a single purpose at both national and local levels.

3.2 Most agencies, including the CPS, Crown Courts, Health (locally through trusts) and Probation, are national bodies with a national leadership. Conversely, the police service has no national executive element, being in effect a 'confederation' of 43 separate and largely autonomous police forces. Sitting between these extremes, the Magistrates' Courts form a national organisation but retain significant local area autonomy. Each of the agencies has different lines of accountability, priority setting mechanisms and funding arrangements and so mobilisation in a common cause is not a simple task.

3.3 Perhaps of even greater relevance to SCI, and partnership working in general, each organisation has its own working ethos and fundamental principles. Put simply, whilst all the agencies seek to protect the public through preventing offending and re-offending, each has a different focus and approach to achieving this goal. The CJ field is highly complex and there is significant potential for conflict and tension between interacting agencies adopting very different stances.

3.4 In the current emphasis on 'delivery' in the public sector, these differences in focus are also displayed within the raft of individual agency objectives and targets, that together, shape their specific organisational priorities, and therefore their resource deployment. To introduce a further major commitment, especially in addition to existing high priorities, the subject has to be universally acknowledged as a joint responsibility and joint high priority.

3.5 In SCI, the Government took the unusual step of imposing a robbery reduction priority and expecting it to be at the top of the list for all the partner agencies. There was already a statutory structure under Section 17 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, for agreeing joint priorities, through CDRPs. Although having regard for nationally identified priorities, the objective setting within CDRPs was designed to be a 'bottom-up' process, firmly based on local consultation, reflecting locally agreed priorities and therefore attracting local 'buy-in'.

3.6 The inspection team found that 'robbery' and 'street crime' (as defined by SCI) was not even seen as a high priority in all of the police forces involved much less the other 'partner' agencies. The exception being YOTs who were set national targets by the Youth Justice Board (YJB). Few if any of the CDRP strategies had identified robbery as a specific objective and, apart perhaps for individual areas within London, Manchester and the West Midlands, the percentage of local offending in this category was relatively so low that it would always be difficult to engender truly joint commitment. On the contrary, in some areas, the introduction of SCI was perceived by partners as 'enforced', working against locally-consulted priorities and as displacing effort intended for existing or fully endorsed local activities.

Quotes: Robbery as a priority

"This was important to the Government and perhaps to the media, but it's only one of a number of priorities that we have to constantly juggle. We have had to shelve a local persistent offender scheme to accommodate this."

Senior CPS manager

"Robbery was an 'also-ran' in terms of the priorities of the local community."

Probation Chief Officer

3.7 SCI also produced some conflicting targets within partner agencies. The YJB had previously set YOTs a target of achieving a fall in the numbers of young people going into custody. Within SCI, the Lord Chief Justice's expectation was that SCI should see street crime attracting a custodial disposal. With so many young people involved in street crime there was clearly potential for these two aims to conflict.

3.8 From an early stage several of the forces attempted to achieve greater partner (and in some cases police) buy-in by broadening the focus into an area that *would* be seen as mutually relevant. Examples were tackling the open drugs market, combating acquisitive crime (i.e. all theft including burglary and autocrime) and reducing victimisation. Two of the best examples of partnership approaches found by the inspection team (Merseyside and Bristol) were in areas where this emphasis shift had taken place and each agency had felt able to take ownership of the newly defined problem.

Commitment within organisations

3.9 In addition to the differential levels of interest and commitment *between* agencies, the inspection team also found disparate commitment *within* individual organisations. Again the main issue was a conflict in priorities and a difficulty in taking ownership of the problem as then defined.

3.10 Generally, the inspection team found staff at all levels contributing to SCI and there were particular examples of individuals who were achieving significant progress through their personal efforts and enthusiasm. Where blockages were found, it was most obstructive when it involved middle managers. It often stemmed from a conflict of priorities affecting their personal resource deployment decisions.

3.11 There appeared to be a relationship between agency commitment and the priority given to SC by the agency. In Birmingham, for example, Robbery had been identified by the YOT as a major community issue. In response a package of measures was developed linked to a public awareness campaign, with the overall aim of reducing offending.

3.12 There were, however, some middle ranking staff, within agencies, with devolved responsibility for service delivery, who resented the resource shift to SCI, in the knowledge that they would still be held accountable for all their other objectives and priorities. An example of this was the perceived drift of police effort away from SCI at BCU level during February and March 2003, when BCU commanders refocused effort on their volume crime targets in advance of the end of the crime-recording year.

3.13 Where the resistance or ambivalence to achieving the goals of SCI was highest was generally where the lines of communication were least effective. In one area where CPS pre-charge advice was virtually unused, the inspection team discovered that the custody sergeants reported having never heard of the service being available. In some prisons SC offenders were largely ignored because there had been no internal system established for notifying the CARATs workers of their arrival.

3.14 The same criticism can be made of inter-agency communication deficiencies. Generally, such communication was intermittent although good liaison between police, CPS and courts was noted in West Midlands and Nottinghamshire. In several of the areas visited, the inspection team found that the members of the specialist subject focus groups, called together specifically for the inspection, had never met each other before (e.g. those involved in advancing cases through the CJS).

> ## Quotes: Inter-agency understanding
>
> *"Until just then (focus group), I never understood why I was having to make sure the file was stamped or what happened if I didn't remember."*
>
> *CJU member*
>
> *"It was fascinating to hear what everyone else does with the case files and realise just where I fit into the bigger picture."*
>
> *Court worker*

3.15 The inspection team found a number of examples of good practice in establishing clear and effective communication between agencies, to achieve service delivery.

Good Practice

Inter-agency communication

The Joint Action Group (JAG) in Merseyside used good communication processes linked to action and accountability to deliver services in a focused way to young people.

In Avon and Somerset, the scheme co-ordinator provided prison managers at HMPs Bristol and Eastwood Park with regular tracker updates that facilitated good pre and post-release planning.

Getting beneath the 'good news'

3.16 Having good communications channels, either within or between agencies, is important but represents only one of the critical factors. The actual message conveyed, i.e. what is said is at least as important as how the message is conveyed. In an environment of strong pressure at all levels for success, the inspection team found that there was a propensity for results, progress reports and future predictions, being proposed upwards to key stakeholders, to regularly err on the side of optimism. Within this trend there were three main types of report:

- *Selectively accurate*
  In such reports, information or data were presented that suggested a positive trend or achievement but normally without either the context or a commentary to highlight the true validity of the claimed success.

(An example was in respect of provision of drugs treatment where statistically, targets were being achieved but it was known elsewhere within the system that there was a blockage in getting initial referrals into the process that, if removed, would have challenged the apparent ability to service the throughput)

- *Optimistic assessment*
  In other reports, in particular as target milestones were approached, relatively minor gains or advances were written up as continued success or achieving targets. Even some 'failures' or poor results were presented as aberrations in preference to identification as reversals in trend.

  (An example was the reporting of successful roll-out of VIPER (Video Identification Parade Electronic Recording) video identification system in June 2002 where the reality was only one unit had been installed in most forces, which was wholly insufficient to cope with required capacities)

- *'Aspirational' (or wishful thinking?)*
  In a small number of cases, and in part driven by the sheer speed of the initiative, a report was submitted that in order to give a positive picture had to rely on faith in the ability to make the aspirational statements reality in quick time. This was clearly a high-risk strategic approach.

  (An example was an early report on the implementation of the premium service element of SC Protocols that was consciously significantly ahead of the then-current position, but with the intention of acting as an additional spur to delivery)

3.17 The SCI model of approach consisted of a very hierarchical 'command' chain and the communication chain was therefore equally hierarchical. Much of the news communicated up that chain was rightly positive and reported some genuinely successful activities. Where news was not quite so positive, however, at each stage of the chain the communicator was understandably trying to place at least an element of positive gloss onto the core message.

3.18 At the highest level this has the potential for ministers to be only partially informed and therefore miss the opportunity to highlight and address significant barriers to success, progress or sustainability.

3.19 From within the initiative, there were some mechanisms designed to test the reality of operational delivery, for example the visits to areas by SCAT Regional Liaison Officers (RLOs) and by sponsor ministers. These certainly helped to identify some areas of concern, for example the delays in VIPER roll-out.

3.20 The work of the inspectorates, however, provided an independent and professionally competent challenge to statements made at all levels and allowed the true implications of statistics or isolated reports to be viewed in context and validated, or refuted. Whilst the 'good news' effect would be impossible to eliminate totally, the lessons from the inspection are that

a) there must be structured mechanisms for testing the validity of reported successes and

b) more senior managers at *all* levels must be more receptive to genuinely bad news and approach it in a constructive manner.

3.21 These criticisms should not be taken to indicate any concerns over the validity of the weekly and cumulative figures on street crime. Their integrity is not questioned.

4 Spurring local partnerships to deliver

National context

4.1 The principle of a partnership approach to tackling crime is not new. Home Office Circular 8/1984 encouraged community crime prevention initiatives and made it clear that tackling crime is everyone's responsibility. More recently, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 sought to take this encouragement further, by giving statutory responsibility to local authorities in addition to the police.

4.2 In the past decade there has been an explosion of new partnership regimes operating in and around the area of crime and disorder seeking a more broad coalition against crime and its causes, Joining CDRPs have been Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs), education action zones, health action zones, priority policing areas and social exclusion units. Other specific areas of concern have been addressed via Connexions, YOTs, Drugs Action Teams (DAT) and a plethora of localised initiatives.

4.3 Whilst this broad spectrum of effort is commendable, there is a growing concern that the sheer numbers of different groups and the often dislocated nature of their operation has led to confusion, unhelpful bureaucracy and overall 'partnership fatigue'. The situation is typically portrayed as largely the same group of key service deliverers attending an endless stream of different partnership meetings discussing mostly the same 'client group' with the same range of partners.

4.4   YOT managers reported to the inspection team that they were looking for chief executives and chief constables to reduce and rationalise what they perceived as the increasing burdens of partnership working at a strategic level. Instead of being dynamically involved in providing solutions, agency representatives were too often engaged simply discussing the problems or worrying about haphazard funding streams. There was a general lack of an 'action planning, implementation monitoring and evaluation' culture that could have been so positive in driving success and generating momentum within all areas of partnership working.

Local partnership within SCI

4.5   This context was certainly relevant to the progress of partnership within SCI at local level. Despite there being CDRPs, co-ordinating groups and local CJ COGs already in existence, SCAG resolved that multi-agency Area Delivery Partnerships should be established to translate these aims into practical action. Interestingly they identified Police, CPS, YOTs and Courts as the key contributors but consciously excluded the Prison Service, expressed ambivalence about the local inclusion of the Probation Service, and saw the addition of Health or Education as something for later consideration.

4.6   As well as adding to the number of partnership groups operating within the crime reduction arena, the focus on the new group further undermined the CDRPs, having already sidelined their only recently produced local crime reduction strategies and objectives.

4.7   During Phase 1 of the inspection, each of the ten area delivery groups was visited. The approaches ranged widely, from using existing CJS COGs, with 6 or 8 members, who took street crime simply as one item on a routine CJS agenda, through to involving 30 plus representatives from a wide range of CJS, statutory and voluntary groups, specifically to address SCI.

4.8   Despite the differences in composition, a number of common themes emerged from the inspection teams' interaction with the SCI programme boards.

Thames Valley Campaign Poster

4.9 On the positive side:

(i) In virtually all cases, the initiative had attracted representation from agencies and groups previously absent from the forum and detached from the problems being addressed (Health and Prisons were the most regular additional attendees).

(ii) The consensus view was that SCI had greatly enhanced and improved the quality of partnership engagement and the speed of delivery of results.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Partnership working**
>
> In Merseyside weekly meetings of the Joint Action Group (JAG) tracked 'high risk' offenders, potential offenders and vulnerable witnesses across all agencies with a view to implementing intervention strategies. JAG included membership from Police, Probation, local authorities, DATs, Connexions, Health, victim support, drug arrest referral and YOTs. Other agencies also joined for specific purposes.

4.10 Conversely, there were some emergent themes that had combined to work against a truly joined-up partnership approach:

(i) Some partnerships were almost totally reliant on the police input, and therefore on the quality of police representation, which was mixed.

(ii) National funding streams were generally agency specific, which reinforced a 'silo' working mentality.

(iii) Although statistics and data were presented, there was little evidence of analysis, evaluation or feeding lessons learned back into the system.

(iv) Wider memberships moved the focus away from CJS issues onto areas some representatives regarded as irrelevant to them

(v) The lack of cross cutting objectives (either nationally or locally) allowed most agencies to avoid joint ownership or accountability for failing to meet crime reduction targets.

4.11 As discussed previously, not all participants perceived street crime to be a high priority. This was particularly relevant to CDRPs who only conducted the second of their three-year crime and disorder audits, and developed their strategies, immediately prior to the commencement of SCI.

4.12   Few CDRPs in the areas inspected had included street crime as a priority. Some were openly resentful of the imposition of street crime as a priority and felt that resources were being diverted from other important local priorities to street crime in urban districts. Examples included South Yorkshire and the Metropolitan Police Service where abstractions of roads policing staff to SCI took place. This was also true of Avon and Somerset and Nottinghamshire, where resources were focused on Bristol and Nottingham City centres to the perceived detriment of the less urban areas of these areas. Local politicians, including locally elected members of Police Authorities frequently voiced these tensions.

Recommendation 2

In planning national initiatives, early consultation should occur between national and regional stakeholders to ensure that locally agreed priorities are balanced with national goals.

Keeping the community informed

4.13   Considerable additional effort was also expended in managing local fears and expectations. Some areas, such as South Yorkshire and Lancashire where street crime, and in particular robbery, was not a major public concern prior to SCI reported that high profile media coverage nationally had an adverse effect locally, raising local fears where they did not previously exist.

4.14   Paradoxically, however, the focus on prolific street crime offenders in Bradford is said to have had a positive impact, and to have eased community tensions following the 2001 disorder.

4.15   Several areas entered into a comprehensive media campaign locally to both address fears and expectation but also get the 'good news' messages, such as successes, into the public domain. Most areas adopted a corporate identity for the street crime campaign, either creating a new one

(e.g. "Action on Street Crime", in Avon and Somerset) or 'piggy-backing' onto an existing campaign (e.g. "Safer Streets" in London). Birmingham, Bristol and Sheffield YOTs had been active in using the media to support SCI, and as a consequence each YOT had been able to convey to the public their successes. In Bristol local newspapers had printed letters to the editor expressing satisfaction at how summer diversionary schemes, directed at young people, had impacted on the community sense of security.

4.16 Engagement with the public and the media proved to have distinctly positive outcomes in some areas. Partnerships, and in particular the police, established local initiatives that had potential for positive returns well beyond SCI.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Campaigns to engage the community**
>
> Avon and Somerset purchased a police horse from SCI funds and ran a competition amongst local school children to name it. "Clifton" has been a major feature of the visibility and reassurance strands of the policing effort under SCI as well as also contributing to the 'harder edged' side, by assisting in detection and arrests.
>
> In Nottinghamshire, the CPS had established effective links with the local media, which resulted in favourable coverage of positive case results.

The emerging role of Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs)

4.17 The area local project boards for SCI were probably never envisaged as long-term, stand-alone partnership groups. They would either be subsumed within an existing partnership (e.g. Merseyside JAG) or form part of the work of the then-imminent new LCJBs.

4.18 In parallel to SCI, a great deal of work was already underway within the wider CJS to co-ordinate and consolidate the efforts, and responsibilities, of the CJ agencies. Replacing the pre-existing COGs, from April 2003 each of the 42 CJ areas were mandated to form an LCJB with membership from all the statutory CJ agencies and to take responsibility for delivering the identified national CJ priorities. LCJBs were designed to work to a National Criminal Justice Board, which itself was to be the amalgamation of a ministerial delivery committee and national strategy board in respect of the CJS reforms highlighted in the Government Criminal Justice Bill, following the white paper "Justice for all" (Now encapsulated in The Criminal Justice Bill 2003).

4.19 In announcing the LCJBs and their rationale, Lord Falconer (Minister of State for Criminal Justice) had this to say[8]:

> **It is a depressing indictment of the CJS that the sum of its parts works so much less well than the talents of the people who work in it…. Central Government must set clear priorities that agencies can understand and deliver and agencies must draw up plans against which they can show delivery progress. The local boards are clearly accountable for delivering the priorities. Their creation strongly promotes the high degree of inter-agency collaboration necessary for delivery…**
>
> **We are committed to change and will empower local boards to achieve it. But we will be looking for results and will countenance nothing less.**

4.20 Whilst LCJBs existed in 'shadow' format during the inspection, they were not a factor in the inspection activity. The inspection team welcomed, however, the principle of a wider accountability for delivery against CJ objectives.

Chapter 4

Joined-up justice?

1 The Criminal Justice System

1.1 The criminal justice 'system' is in truth anything but a coherent single structure. It is made up of a complex range of local and national services and agencies with different histories, governance arrangements, funding streams and overall operational approaches. Three separate Government departments; the Home Office, Lord Chancellors Department and Attorney General's Office oversee various elements of the CJS (See Appendix C). They have commissioned a succession of high profile examinations of the system including reviews by Sir Iain Glidewell[9], Martin Narey[10], Sir Robin Auld[11] and the White Paper 'Justice for All' in 2002. Each of the reviews has identified the importance of improving collaboration and making the interfaces between CJS agencies more efficient and effective.

1.2 The short term aims of SCI included increasing the number of arrests and convictions, and the timely and efficient handling of such cases. In the longer term the initiative aimed to support the overarching aims of the CJS by reducing the level of street crime, tackling the public's fear of crime, and increasing public confidence in the CJS. It should have also improved the experience of victims and witnesses of the judicial process. Despite the disconnected nature of the CJS and the organisational differences, the Government had already identified 2 main aims for the CJS[12]:

- To reduce crime and the fear of crime and their social and economic costs, and

- To dispense justice fairly and efficiently, promoting confidence in the rule of law.

1.3 SCI provided an end-to-end case study for examining the ability to progress specific cases through a CJS that had been closely reviewed, subject to substantial consequent changes and espousing a joined-up approach from all involved. The inspection team revealed that significant problems still existed within the system which, although not totally unique to street crime cases, were starkly highlighted by the focus upon process of SCI cases.

1.4 The main focus of this inspection was on the progress of SC cases and therefore specifically on offender and agency issues. The inspection ensured, however, that the issues relating to victims and witnesses were also addressed.

1.5 It is also worthy of note that by the time of inspection, very few SCI offenders had progressed through the system to the stage of resettlement. In view of this only a limited degree of examination of resettlement issues was possible.

2 Progress through the CJS

2.1 The key stages explored in this section of the inspection report relate to:

Initial police investigation

2.2 The inspection team's terms of reference deliberately excluded an in-depth examination of police operational tactics. In part this was because the inspection was specifically focused on the interfaces between CJ agencies, but more importantly, there were already a number of groups examining police tactics and seeking to report in a shorter time-scale than this joint inspection.

2.3 Understandably, the chief officers of the 10 forces involved were keen to identify the key tactics that might impact on the incidence of street crime. The exchange of good practice, the involvement of the national police training organisation, CENTREX and the production of a tactical menu of options and 'knowledge map' is discussed later in Chapter 7.

2.4 Through the Police Standards Unit (PSU) and the Research, Development and Statistics Directorate (RDS), the Home Office produced 3 documents associated to SCI:

    1. "The Nature of Personal Robbery"[13]

    2. "Tackling Personal Robbery; Lessons learnt from the police and community partnerships"[14]

    3. PSU Good Tactics Guide (April 2003)

2.5 The main operational tactics promoted or acknowledged within these documents are largely the same ones identified in the ACPO developmental work. In summary they were:

- Identifying crime hotspots

- Targeting prolific offenders

- Improving surveillance (e.g. town centres, retail outlets)

- High visibility policing

- Designing out crime

- Detection

- Advice to higher risk groups

- Longer-term social interventions

- Improving down-stream CJ processes.

2.6 In short, these tactics reflected the core policing approach adopted throughout UK policing to virtually all forms of crime, namely an intelligence-led, problem-solving approach which was targeted at the three main elements of any crime, the victim, the offender and the location or situation. This approach is now captured within the National Intelligence Model (NIM), based on intelligence gathering supported by targeted tasking and action co-ordination.

2.7 An acknowledged strength of NIM is that it allows crime or disorder problems at any level of seriousness to be tackled in a co-ordinated and targeted manner. The key is in targeting the appropriate resources to tackle the identified problems. The inspection team noted that most SCI police forces had adopted a specialist 'robbery squad' approach to the initial investigation of street crime, and each was trying to take into account the wider resources available within the local partnerships for problem solving at the local level.

Good Practice

NIM approach in SCI

Good practice was to be found in London, West Midlands, Merseyside, South Yorkshire and Avon and Somerset, where their approach to investigation was also two tiered. A locally based divisional team was responsible for local (level1) street robbery, whereas commercial, serious offences and cross-divisional robbery offences were investigated by a central (level 2) police team.

2.8 The RDS document ("Tackling Personal Robbery") sets out practical options in some detail but, from the area visits, the inspection team felt that 3 appeared particularly effective:

- Fast initial response to the scene

- Agreed standards for dealing with an incident

- Scene and evidence management at an early stage.

2.9 *Fast response* was often quoted as the surest way to catch street robbers at or near the place the offence had been committed. It was reported on a number of occasions that getting to the scene quickly meant a much greater chance of apprehension. Initial response to incidents varied considerably. All forces prioritised SC calls as 'immediate', but separate monitoring of response times for street crime, as against all calls, was not found.

2.10 Where patrol staff understood the importance of the initiative and had been properly briefed on the priority of this crime type, a fast response was attempted, either directly from local officers or from specialist teams.

2.11 *Standards for street crime investigation* – In Avon and Somerset, London, West Midlands and Merseyside patrol staff were issued with a booklet that set down the standards for investigating street crime. Where the book was completed it would act as a reminder for completing and taking notes of every stage of the investigation. In some areas there was also advice and guidance for victims and witnesses in the form of leaflets and handouts that formed part of the pack and could be immediately given out rather than rely on follow up visits by other staff of partners.

2.12 *Evidence capture and scene management* – In addition to the speed of the initial response, experience has also shown the importance of capturing forensic and identification (ID) evidence at the earliest opportunity. Some forces used specialist response units whilst most had clear instructions on obtaining early offender descriptions.

Good Practice

Quality response to offences

In Avon and Somerset (aligned to Operation Lynx), fast response teams, consisting of a traffic unit driver, a robbery squad investigator and an identification (scenes of crime) officer were despatched to initial reports of robberies in Bristol. They were able to respond quickly and direct local resources at the scene to contain and search for suspect, enhance victim and witness care, immediately secure the best forensic evidence when available and begin early ID procedures. Furthermore an innovative step had been taken with the re-employment of retired detectives as statement takers within the Operation Lynx investigative team.

Good Practice

Major incident room approach

The Liverpool North BCU area, representing over 40% of Force street robberies, adopted a Major Incident Room approach. This featured investigation tracked on the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) computer giving a victim-focused approach based on a fast initial response to the scene of recently occurred robberies. It offered both uniformed and investigative capability ensuring that the victim and witnesses receive the best possible service from the outset of the investigation and that the investigative team are well placed to gather best evidence. This approach has resulted in an increased number of identifications leading to the arrest and subsequent conviction of offenders. Additionally, the team members have received both verbal and written feedback from the victims complimenting them on their service.

2.13   The nature of street robbery meant that evidence via Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) was often available, in particular in the central urban areas. Seizure of CCTV tapes at an early stage was another form of evidence capture that was widely promoted within instructions to incident responders, although in practice the inspection team found that there it was necessary to further prioritise this action.

2.14   The joint thematic review of the listing and management of criminal cases in magistrates' courts conducted by HMMCSI, HMCPSI and HMIC, published in February 2003, noted the persistent problems of delay caused by failures to promptly obtain CCTV evidence. It has been recommended that the CJ agencies consider establishing a central agency to reproduce CCTV evidence for court.

Video Identification

2.15 Another absolutely key ingredient within the practical police response has been the ability to achieve the earliest possible ID of the offender. In most street crime cases, the offender is a stranger to the victim. Identification of the assailant must therefore be clarified as soon as possible.

2.16 *ID generally* – The main focus within SCI has been on the efficacy of using video ID. However, ID procedures often begin at the scene of a crime with the arrival of the first reporting officer. All SC forces had systems in place to ensure that officers took an early first description of the suspect in any street robbery.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Aide memoire for ID**
>
> In Avon and Somerset, West Midlands, Merseyside and London each responder was provided with an aide memoir as part of a booklet to enable them to record ID information in a consistent manner.

2.17 Most initial responses involved a police officer, driving or walking a victim or witness around the vicinity to see if they could recognise the suspect nearby. This method was commonly referred to as 'victim drive around'.

2.18 This type of procedure is covered by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) codes of practice and guidelines, to prevent officers drawing witness's attention to any individual or group. Where a witness recognises a potential suspect then an arrest is likely to be based on that early street ID.

> ### Suggestion B
>
> There is a need for the development and circulation of central guidance on key ID issues to assist the police and CPS to jointly understand and identify problem cases. It is suggested that the CPS would be best placed to lead this development.

2.19 Whether a charge against the suspect then resulted from the street ID differed greatly from area to area.

2.20 Differences of opinion existed between CPS and police over the binding case of R v FORBES[15] and the need to hold a parade in circumstances where there was already a street ID. In some areas, custody officers felt able to prefer charges based solely on what they perceived as a reliable street ID. In others the local

interpretation of FORBES meant that a separate formal ID procedure (parade or video ID) was always demanded prior to any charge. Fortnightly discontinuance reports provided by the CPS to SCAT revealed that a significant number of cases were discontinued on identification grounds which suggested the need to ensure a clarity of approach, in accordance with R v Forbes.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **CPS guidance on ID issues**
>
> In West Midlands comprehensive guidance provided by West Midlands CPS on ID issues helped resolve the Forbes issue locally. In addition in both West Midlands and London the CPS offered local training to operational officers on ID issues. Nottinghamshire had developed and published a comprehensive and reviewed ID policy, which was promoted to all staff via the local intranet.

2.21 Despite these localised examples of good practice, the inspection team believed that standard national guidance should have been forthcoming.

2.22 *Video ID* – Prior to SCI, there was limited availability of video ID across the country. However, the inordinate delays and problems involved in arranging and staging 'live' ID parades were major factors in allowing street crime offenders to avoid justice. The typical delay period, from arrest to completion of ID, using conventional parades, was 10 weeks, which often meant the witness's recollection was impaired. With the introduction of video ID it was possible to carry out the process within hours of an arrest and whilst the suspect remained in custody. The Home Office decided, as an urgent priority within SCI, to make video ID available in all 10 SC forces, in the shape of VIPER. The target

Viper Filming

date set by SCAG for full roll-out was originally June 2002, but this proved to be unrealistic due mainly to problems experienced in establishing the central database and system support infrastructure.

2.23 By 31 May 2002, each of the 10 forces had at least one VIPER suite in operation. At the time of inspection (March 2003) there were 60 operational sites and video ID had started to become embedded in local ID strategies. All forces had moved away from carrying out 'live' parades and in some cases virtually ceased doing so altogether.

2.24 In part through operational preference, most of the SC forces also introduced a second video ID system, called PROMAT (an off-the-shelf proprietary software system for conducting video identification parades). This alternative system offered a fully portable, stand-alone system, which made it ideal for taking to custody suites that might not otherwise warrant the infrastructure and accommodation implications of establishing a fixed VIPER site. It could also be used at a crime scene.

2.25 The inspection team found mixed opinions amongst staff within the SCI forces as to the comparative qualities of the two competing systems. Many had seen early advantages of the mobility and resilience of PROMAT but felt they had been coerced into adopting VIPER by the Government's commitment to achieving a single national video image database and, more importantly, their allocation of additional funding was only for VIPER acquisition. Only in London was an extra £600k allocated for procurement of PROMAT, as the estate costs were prohibitive for wider rollout of VIPER.

2.26 In recognition of the wisdom of promoting a standard rather than a specific product, on 21 March 2003, The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) launched the National Video Identification Strategy (NVIS). A business plan aimed at delivering NVIS was awaiting approval by the Home Office at the time of this report.

Performance of video ID within SCI

2.27 *Cancelled parades* – From performance data provided through the VIPER user group, for the period April 2002 to January 2003, 11.5% of all video ID parades planned did not take place, equating to 1,027 cancellations out of a total of 8,935 parades. Based on information provided by PITO, the national figure for 'live' parades is that 48% do not take place. This suggests a major advance both in saving time and effort and in avoiding delays and frustration.

2.28 *Positive IDs* – Research in 2002 revealed that 39% of parades were likely to be positive using video ID compared to 35% in respect of live parades (Source Home Office briefing note 2/02: The Visual Identification of Suspects.) However, this

understates the benefits of the system because four times as many video parades actually go ahead (see figures in previous paragraph) and so the actual number of IDs is significantly greater for video ID.

2.29   *Efficiency* – The overall costs associated with the running of ID parades have been reduced by 60% as a direct consequence of using video ID. The cost of a live ID parade based on one suspect, after the serving of first descriptions, including the showing of the parade and subsequent statement taking has been calculated at £520.56 (Source: Cumbria Police VIPER Business Case). The cost of a video ID parade has been calculated at £206.85 (Source VIPER Project Manager). Most courts also reported that Video ID accelerated progress of cases.

2.30   *Performance monitoring* – In all areas the inspection team heard anecdotal reports that problems with ID procedures were believed to be one of the main reasons for discontinuance. However, other than the general fortnightly reporting referred to above, there was no evidence found of systematic monitoring of street crime cases, within areas, to confirm or refute this belief. In some areas, police and CPS were beginning to jointly monitor performance in relation to ID procedures but this was not widespread.

Suggestion C

For LCJBs to understand and act on key ID problems it would be necessary to incorporate monitoring of the impact of identification procedures on case outcomes within a nationally agreed framework.

2.31   *Operating issues* – The use of 'approved persons' to conduct parades, as provided for in the codes of practice, was inconsistent. In some forces police officers below the rank of inspector had received authority, in others the prospect of using civilian staff was being discussed.

2.32   In one force, civilian staff had been authorised by the Chief Constable to conduct procedures and their role and responsibilities had been redefined and remunerated to reflect the extra level of responsibility. On the plus side, examples were given where approved persons had been called out and worked through the night to conduct urgent procedures during operations against gun-crime offenders. Conversely, concern was expressed that at least 3 cases had been lost due to errors by these staff. Clearly, further evaluation would be necessary to make any progress with such initiatives.

<table>
<tr><td>**Good Practice**</td><td>A potential ID problem was highlighted in Nottinghamshire where regular witnesses, such as store detectives and undercover police officers could potentially see many video parades over time. No system existed centrally with VIPER to ensure that all persons viewed by witnesses were logged to prevent them being inserted into future parades the witness might see on a different occasion. The ID inspector in this area had developed a local index to ensure that this information is kept and that no witness is exposed more than once to any particular volunteer on the database.</td></tr>
</table>

Suggestion D

In developing the National Video Identification Standard, ACPO should consider incorporating a full indexing process to avoid contamination of witnesses.

Street Crime protocols

2.33 Following the launch of SCI, the Attorney-General announced that in response to the initiative, the CPS would deliver a premium service in respect of SC cases. The term " Premium Service" described a package of measures aimed at ensuring a high quality of attention to SC offences. At the start of the initiative, statistics showed that in London, only 26% of robbery offences resulted in an arrest and only 4% led to a conviction at court[16].

<table>
<tr><td>**Good Practice**</td><td>**Co-ordination of response**

To underpin the national strategy, CPS headquarters set up bi-monthly CPS Area liaison meetings, which were attended by nominated SC co-ordinators, who were usually senior lawyers from the 10 participating Areas, responsible for delivering the premium service. The Area liaison meetings provided a forum for sharing good practice and for co-ordinating arrangements for delivery under different aspects of the premium service.</td></tr>
</table>

2.34 In CPS London, the official launch of the SC Protocol was marked by a conference on 6 June 2002, which was attended by the Attorney General, the Acting Chief Crown Prosecutor for London and an Assistant Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police. CPS London also instructed senior Treasury Counsel to advise on various

aspects of the initiative, including the appropriate charges to promote consistent charging practices (for police and CPS) as well as the maintenance of a robust approach when handling SC cases. This advice was disseminated to all participating Areas and in many areas formed the basis of desktop instructions for street crime staff.

2.35   Overall, the rate of attrition (cases failing between reporting and conviction) was particularly high and SCI resolved that it was essential to introduce better and more active case management systems to produce higher quality files of evidence and thereby increase the success rate at court.

2.36   Although each of the 10 SC areas had a joint agency SC Protocol that included details of the 'premium service', there was never any definitive central guidance on the content of such a protocol or service, which would have avoided some duplication of effort. An early version produced in West Midlands became the template for other areas and so each prepared a variation on the original document, but tailored to local practices and circumstances.

2.37   Whilst each Area's protocol covered similar ground overall, they varied substantially in their focus from an ambitious 'cradle to grave' concept in London (with standards for initial police response and secondary investigation through to case disposal at court), through to simple protocols limited to pre-charge advice and file quality. Broadly, however, the SC Protocol within each comprised 5 main elements:

- *Pre-charge advice* – advice from a CPS lawyer to the officer in the case dealing with a SC suspect, as to the most appropriate offence, if any, to charge and whether further investigation was warranted.

- *Allocation to senior lawyers* – to ensure that experienced in-house lawyers reviewed and presented cases, ideally dedicated to SC cases and that suitable counsel were instructed in the Crown Court.

- *File quality* – to ensure that cases submitted by the police were delivered promptly and of sufficient quality to proceed.

- *Case review and preparation* – to ensure that cases were fully reviewed and progressed and that those cases were fully prepared and ready for trial, thus avoiding delay.

- *Victim and witness care* – The CPS and police would share joint responsibility for engaging with witnesses and keeping them informed of the progress of cases and facilitating the involvement of Victim Support and the Witness Service throughout the CJ process.

2.38 *Pre-charge advice* – With the exception of London and Nottinghamshire, all other area SC Protocols contained a mandatory requirement for the police to refer to the CPS for advice in all SC cases during office hours.

Greater Manchester Police launches the Operation Hawk student campaign.

2.39 The inspection team found evidence that knowledge of the content of the protocols varied considerably from area to area. In some, custody officers had never even heard of the concept of pre-charge advice in the context of SC cases. As the officers responsible for making decisions to charge, this meant that a further opportunity to reinforce the terms of the protocols was lost. In others, the existence of the protocol was widely known, albeit not always fully implemented.

2.40 Although some increases in referral were noted during Phase 2 of the inspection, the take up of pre-charge advice by the police was often reported as very low and in consequence there was a regularly expressed concern that this had resulted in a comparatively higher discontinuance rate. The inspection team found no SCI-specific joint statistical data generated in any area to evidence these concerns or assist in quality assuring the process.

2.41 However the potential benefits of effective referral were highlighted in an unconnected internal evaluation that was conducted by a consultancy firm for the CPS, in respect of the pilot scheme for charging centres recommended by Sir Robin Auld, referred to above. Under the scheme, which was set up in parts of Avon and Somerset, Essex, Kent, North Wales and West Yorkshire, responsibility for charging lies with the CPS, save in exceptional circumstances, and the police are therefore required to refer to the CPS for pre-charge advice in nearly all cases. The CPS also advise on aspects of file quality. Research has shown that the discontinuance rate has fallen by between 60-90% as a result. The evaluation has also noted an increase of up to 40% in the number of guilty pleas entered at the first appearance and an improvement in file quality.

2.42 One issue that appeared to influence the take-up of advice prior to charging was the apparent reluctance of police staff to risk 'losing' detections. The traditional measure of success for the police service has been the achievement of "sanctioned detections" (or for the Metropolitan Police Service "judicial disposals"). Both measures include charging as a success factor. Inspectors found that achievement of detections has attained an important cultural significance and has a major influence upon the decision to charge on the basis of a prima – facie case rather than a case, which was considered to afford a reasonable prospect of conviction. Many senior police officers regarded the increase in the number of arrests and charges as a measure of success.

2.43 Another barrier to take-up was the reported unavailability of CPS lawyers to give advice when it was needed, in particular out of office hours. Nearly all area protocols contain provision for discretionary referral for advice out of office hours. In most areas, arrangements for out of hours pre-charge advice presented a difficulty for the CPS, since staff were not contracted to provide this service. In the main, senior managers have provided the service on a "goodwill" basis.

2.44 Nevertheless, another recent internal CPS survey found that the peak hours for charging suspects occurred between 11 am and 9 pm. Accordingly, it should have been possible for the CPS to service a substantial proportion of the demand for pre-charge advice during office hours. Advice referral was regarded as higher in areas where the CPS and Police were co-located, such as Avon and Somerset, West Midlands and Merseyside.

2.45 It was probably unrealistic to expect officers to seek advice in every SCI case, and it is unlikely that such full implementation could be adequately resourced. Where, however, there are clear potential evidential difficulties, outstanding issues regarding ID, or other issues relevant to the case that justify referral to the CPS for advice, it would be effective for both agencies if the Protocol were observed.

Recommendation 3

In multi-agency initiatives common standards for Joint Agency Protocols should be established in the early stages and be inclusive of all relevant agencies.

Good Practice	Pre-charge advice
	In West Midlands, the concept of pre-charge advice had been mainstreamed into everyday activity. Officers no longer felt that there was a cultural block to seeking advice and it was a normal part of the investigative process. Custody officers had regular access to lawyers and robbery squad officers and managers felt supported by the CPS.
	There was systematic monitoring of the take up of pre-charge advice in West Midlands; also, West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Avon and Somerset monitored case outcomes against whether advice was sought and West Midlands and West Yorkshire compared the information provided when advice was sought with the information contained in the full file, to improve performance. A full monitoring process was being introduced at the time of the inspection.

2.46 Despite some good practice, nearly all practitioners interviewed felt that protocols had been imposed hastily, at the start of SCI, often without adequate consultation with those expected to deliver the service on the ground. At the time of inspection, some Areas were reinvigorating their original pre-charge advice Protocols, and most of the protocols signed in each of the ten areas have been amended since the initiative began to reflect operational reality rather than aspiration. In London, a review of the protocol has allowed extension to include dealing with prolific offenders in an effort to help narrow the CJ gap.

2.47 The national introduction of the Auld Charging Centres, referred to above, whereby shadow plans will be introduced in each of the CPS Areas between March and December 2003 and full plans between January and March 2004 will circumvent the pre-charge advice issue as far as advice during office hours is concerned. In addition CPS have announced the intention to establish "CPS Direct" which would provide a centralised reference point that should bridge the gap in availability of advice and negate excuses for not consulting CPS.

2.48 *Allocation to senior lawyers* – Most area protocols provided that in the magistrates' and youth courts, wherever possible, the CPS would seek to prosecute SC cases in-house. In some areas specialist teams were established, comprising dedicated members of staff. Other areas nominated designated staff, who conducted street crime as well as non-street crime cases. Whilst there were examples of effective deployment of experienced staff in Merseyside, Nottinghamshire, Manchester, Avon and Somerset

and Thames Valley, some CPS Areas expressed a difficulty in recruiting and retaining experienced staff generally to service the initiative.

2.49   Accordingly, the initiative had not led to a decrease in the instruction of agents by the CPS to present cases in the magistrates or youth courts, in those Areas where there was a shortage of advocates. In two areas, concerns were expressed by the magistracy over the extensive use of agents in SC cases, which, in some cases was considered to have an adverse impact on the standard of case presentation. CPS Areas will wish to persist in their efforts to recruit staff, in order to re-deploy more experienced staff to conduct SC cases, wherever possible, and to ensure that experienced agents are instructed in circumstances where in-house coverage is not possible.

2.50   Overall, the judiciary considered that counsel of sufficient experience were instructed to present cases in the Crown Court and this was reflected in the findings of the inspection team. Some CPS staff considered that the graduated fee scheme for payment of counsel's fees did not enable counsel of sufficient experience to be instructed in all cases. In Merseyside, parts of London and Nottinghamshire, the CPS instructed counsel from an Area-compiled list of preferred sets of chambers. Counsel from these chambers were considered to be of a consistently high standard. The inspection team received some positive feedback from members of the judiciary regarding this practice, albeit that occasionally it was considered that the practice did not provide the flexibility required to enable the CPS to instruct the most suitable counsel in all cases.

2.51   *Police File Quality* – File quality and timeliness are essential prerequisites to building strong cases. There are two elements to be considered regarding the issue of file quality. The first relates to the quality of the investigation, whereby officers should ensure that sufficient evidence is gathered to bring and sustain the prosecution. The second concerns the quality and timeliness of the file building, which ensures that the file provided to the CPS contains all the information gathered during the investigation (including unused material) to enable a prosecution to proceed within timescales prescribed by the Courts.

2.52   These are fundamental considerations, which require the police to have a clear understanding of the evidential requirements, and how the evidence should be presented to the courts in accordance with the established rules of evidence. Where weaknesses are identified, this may disclose training needs, which both the police and the CPS should address.

2.53 File quality has been an historic issue in the CJS and much work has been done with the police to improve file quality generally. Nevertheless, it continues to be a priority for both agencies.

2.54 Joint Performance Management (JPM) is the means by which the police and CPS monitor performance relating to file quality. CPS lawyers are required to complete a monitoring form in respect of each file submitted, which contain qualitative and timeliness measures. The police collate the forms and compile quarterly performance reports. There are different methods of calculation of the data. Two police forces operated a method of dip sampling a percentage of forms submitted during the quarter; thirty forces operated full census monitoring; and the remaining forces operated exception-based reporting, whereby those monitoring forms that are not returned are assumed to be of fully satisfactory quality and timeliness.

2.55 The JPM data for the quarter ending 31 December 2002 in all cases revealed that five of the ten street crime areas performed consistently poorly in respect of quality and timeliness. However, it is also widely accepted that much of the JPM data is unreliable, as neither agency is diligent in preparing and collecting the monitoring material.

2.56 CPS staff noted a better service from robbery squad specialists, but otherwise reported that file quality overall was not prioritised in SC cases. In some areas, police felt that having dedicated robbery teams preparing all SC case papers led to de-skilling of generalist officers in file preparation. The courts reported a similar finding. Whilst acknowledging that SC cases are not the most complex evidentially, and that the issues are therefore usually narrow, they did not note a marked improvement overall in the standard of cases coming before them, with a few notable exceptions.

2.57 On the police side, file quality mostly relied on staff within very busy Police Criminal Justice (CJ) support units. In most such units there were no increased staffing levels to provide an enhanced service in street crime cases although there was evidence of limited redeployment in some of them, with officers becoming dedicated to street crime cases. Inspectors found that the majority of SCI funding allocated to police forces was used for operational purposes rather than to support the CJS activity. Overall therefore, the extremely busy departments had struggled without additional resourcing to cope with increased workloads, which staff felt was producing lower quality of files for SC cases and indeed for other types of crime.

2.58 The picture in respect of file quality was therefore quite mixed and somewhat unpredictable. The inspection team found little evidence of co-ordinated SC-specific JPM monitoring of file quality in street crime cases. In Thames Valley and South Yorkshire, some efforts had been made to separate this data, but monitoring was in the embryonic stage. Other areas used general inter-agency strategic and operational forums between the police, CPS and sometimes the court to discuss file quality. The initiative presents a valuable opportunity to reinvigorate the JPM process, to achieve demonstrable improvements in file quality.

Recommendation 4

In order to ensure offenders are dealt with appropriately, monitoring of case progression should include:

- Specific monitoring of police file quality and timeliness, with measurable actions for improvement
- Separation of case data by crime type and
- The agreement of a common CJS flagging system for tracking cases through the system from arrest to resettlement.

Good Practice

File quality

In West Midlands and Westminster dedicated detective staff were employed to check all SC files for quality and evidence. The use of a pre-trial monitoring booklet in West Midlands was also used to track file readiness. These interventions had reportedly led to a higher standard of files for this type of offence that for general file submissions.

In Nottinghamshire, Merseyside and Thames Valley, CPS noted improvements in SC file preparation, and the courts also reported improvements in the standard of cases, as compared to non-SC cases. (Indeed, in Thames Valley, where SC specific Joint Performance Management (JPM) takes place, low discontinuance rates were also recorded).

In Nottinghamshire and West Midlands, the SC Co-ordinator attended weekly meetings with the robbery squad to provide input into file preparation.

2.59 *Case review and case preparation* – A key role for the SC reviewer was to ensure the charge was appropriate and analyse the sufficiency of evidence and check file quality. In addition to deploying experienced staff (where possible) to conduct SC cases, many senior CPS Area managers also conducted quality assurance checks on finalised cases, to ensure that any adverse outcomes were not attributable to failures in the review process and to facilitate improvement through learning. Most protocols also contained a requirement that decisions to discontinue cases were authorised by senior managers, albeit that this provision was subsequently revoked. Notwithstanding the above checks, some Areas continued to record comparatively high discontinuance levels.

2.60 Following guidance issued by the Attorney General, CPS Areas introduced pre-trial checks, to ensure that cases were trial ready. They were usually undertaken 2 to 3 weeks before trial and noted as particularly effective in parts of West Midlands, Lancashire, Thames Valley, South Yorkshire (where a low ineffective trial rate of 6% was recorded), and Avon and Somerset.

2.61 In some areas, the agencies were assisted in their case management by robust case progression systems in the Crown Court. At Wolverhampton Crown Court and Harrow Crown Court, in London, all parties were required to file a certificate of readiness prior to cases being listed for trial. If the trials did not proceed, or late pleas were accepted, agencies could be held to account.

2.62 *Victim and witness care* – the arrangements for dealing with victims and witnesses was the subject of significant examination by the inspection team. It is covered in detail later in this chapter

The court process

2.63 By virtue of the seriousness of the offences involved (robbery, firearms etc) the majority of adult SCI cases were destined to be heard at the Crown Court. This introduced a time lapse between charge and court outcome, which if not managed efficiently, would be in conflict with the avowed intention of SCAG to see quick justice and send out a deterrent message to potential SC offenders, as set out in the strategy that initiated SCI[17], which sought:

Extract: SCI Strategy

"Better and more active case management of robbery allegations to move cases more swiftly through the system, getting case work 'right first time' to reduce the high rate of attrition and reinforce the message that robbery is taken seriously."

HO PMDU Review, March 2002

2.64 The average time lapse between first appearance in Magistrates Courts for indictable and triable either way cases in 2001 was around 63 days[18]. When cases moved on to be finalised in Crown Court, that average time was reported to be longer but definitive figures were not available to the inspection team. Although the provisions of Section 51 of Crime and Disorder Act 1998, whereby indictable only offences are sent to Crown Court after the first appearance at magistrates court, had resulted in a significant reduction in overall delays, there was no apparent measurement of timeliness of SC cases.

2.65 Prior to SCI, a similar problem had been encountered in the youth court in respect of a national initiative to tackle PYOs. At the start of the initiative the PYO cases were taking an average of 142 days to completion; the active case management introduced to support the initiative reduced this average to below the new target of 71 days, with performance improved to 67 days by September 2002. One significant difference with SCI was that no time target for completion of cases was ever set.

2.66 In addition to the overall speed of progress, further issues for case management included:

- identification of dedicated SC Courts which had enhanced witness care facilities in order to give witnesses confidence and therefore improve attrition by reducing ineffective trials;

- a rigorous approach to bail decisions (and enforcement);

- less 'cracked' or ineffective trials;

- robust court listing approach;

- more positive use of plea and directions hearings.

2.67 *Dedicated SC courts* –As soon as the initiative was launched, Court Service officials visited each of the ten areas to further explain the implications of the initiative. Court Service and Magistrates' Courts Service Chief Officers were asked to designate, within a period of days, specific courts to deal with street crime work. The courts were to fit the following criteria, as drawn up by SCAG:

- Separate entrance for witnesses or a facility to separate them immediately upon arrival.

- Separate secure waiting area for witnesses.

- Availability of witness support service.

- Separate lavatories and catering facilities or provision to prevent intimidation when using them.

- Capacity of the court to cope with projected workload.

- Current adequate performance.

- Availability of adequate public transport.

2.68 In total 70 courts were designated as "street crime" courts within the ten areas. Court Service officials immediately identified what accommodation changes needed to be done at each of the SC courts to ensure that the criteria were met. A successful bid by the Lord Chancellor's Department (LCD) was submitted to the CJS unallocated reserve, and works commissioned to ensure that the criteria were met or facilities enhanced in all the areas.

2.69 Inevitably, in some areas court accommodation took some time to meet the criteria, but all SC courts were encouraged to make ad hoc arrangements to ensure that they were fully operational. This included:

- Working with the Witness Service to separate witnesses on arrival.

- Security staff or Witness Service staff escorting witnesses to the toilet, and catering facilities.

- Using accommodation in other court buildings nearby as waiting areas.

2.70 By March 2003, it was reported that all the accommodation work had been completed. Examples include:

- The conversion of unused space at Inner London Crown Court to a secure witness suite.

- A new witness suite being created at Liverpool Crown Court.

> **Good Practice**
>
> Merseyside was the only SC area to have one dedicated SC magistrates and youth court for the entire area. This concept worked in its locality with a concentration of most offences in nearby Liverpool North division. A single court facilitated best use of the time of dedicated robbery squad, CPS lawyers and court staff. However this good practice may not easily transfer to other areas where the environmental circumstances are different.

2.71 *Bail decisions* – Bail decisions were taken at 2 stages; first by the police at time of charge; and second by the court, starting at first appearance. In all areas there was a strong feeling that the legal presumption of bail was being undermined by the SCI. Police custody officers regularly reported that they were being put under pressure to withhold bail from charged suspects merely because the offence was street crime, often without adequate representation from investigating officers. In one area this had even resulted in a policy of the investigating officer being asked to challenge custody officers decisions to bail in every case with the PACE superintendent.

2.72 In many cases, particularly those involving young first time offenders, custody officers avoided potential conflict by sending offenders to court for a bail decision to be made, when they had ample powers to impose conditions, such as curfews, exclusion from hotspot areas or prohibiting association with other SC offenders. On occasion, this had a counterproductive effect because the court remanded on unconditional bail, being of the view that it was more difficult to justify new conditions on the same facts considered by the police.

Quote: Use of Police bail

"If I give bail then I have to explain my reasons to the superintendent. Case officers are encouraged to appeal to the superintendent under PACE if I decide to bail SC offenders when charged. Its very difficult to even think of using police bail conditions."

Custody Sergeant

2.73 In cases where bail was being genuinely opposed, it was found to be good practice to send an officer to court to directly answer questions to secure the best chance of bail being withheld.

2.74 Bail decisions by the courts had been a significant issue from the very beginning of the initiative. In light of concerns amongst CJ agencies that a disproportionate number of defendants on bail were committing further offences, the Lord Chancellor, in a letter to all Chairmen of the Bench, urged magistrates to take a "questioning and probing" approach to the issue of bail and "an equally vigorous approach" when dealing with breaches of bail.

2.75 In December 2002, guidance was circulated to all police forces, CPS areas and courts on the procedures for handling breaches of bail.

2.76 Nevertheless, in many areas visited a view was expressed by operational police officers that the CPS and courts were taking a lenient approach to bail and remand decisions. However, when the statistics were examined, this was not substantiated. There was an increase reported in the use of conditional bail and a fall in bail without conditions for both adults and juveniles. In addition, the proportion of adults remanded in custody had increased.

2.77 In a number of magistrates' courts a senior member of staff was designated as a contact point with whom the police could raise any concerns about bail decisions. In all areas visited there were either no or very few concerns ever raised in this context. In the few cases that had been raised, court staff reported that upon investigation, there were no issues of concern.

2.78 At the start of the initiative, prosecutors were urged to use their powers to appeal against bail decisions, if they felt them to be wrong. This was encapsulated in a number of the inter-agency protocols. Statistics collected by the CPS revealed that there were very few occasions when this power was used.

2.79 It appeared that the expressed fear of 'revolving door' bail was largely one of perception, possibly based on historical practices and anecdotal evidence. If joint working is to be successful, it is important that communication between agencies is clear and that mangers of all agencies challenge entrenched attitudes towards other agencies when expressed by their staff.

2.80 *Bail enforcement* – Where bail was used for SC offenders it was almost invariably in respect of young offenders. In fact, Section 130 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, allowed for the remand of 12-16 year olds into secure detention, where the court feared re-offending if given bail. The majority continued to secure bail, however, albeit for an increasing number bail was accompanied by a restrictive condition normally either curfew or 'tagging'. In addition, in some cases, an Intensive Supervision and Surveillance Programme (ISSP) was ordered.

2.81 *"Doorstepping"* – A previous obstacle in the effective imposition of curfews was that there was confusion as to the power of the police to demand to see the individual was actually at the address stipulated. There were differing legal opinions as to whether this condition was European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) compliant. The result therefore could be that a parent might tell police calling at their address that their son was safely tucked up in bed when actually he was not in the house at all. The police had no practical way of checking and so the system fell into disrepute and many police forces declined to 'waste' the resource time to make these meaningless visits.

2.82 At the instigation of SCAG, the issue was finally clarified.

- Issue first raised at SCAG 10 April 2002.

- Lord Chancellor advised that that as this was an issue of substantive law, not just practice, the best way forward was to encourage a test case.

- CPS legal opinion from counsel on 11 April, concluded that "doorstepping" was ECHR compliant, subject to individual circumstances of the case.

- Justices Clerks Society guidance was sent to all magistrates' courts, dated 17 April in the form of a letter confirming this legal opinion. However, it acknowledged that members still had different legal opinions, therefore test case still best way forward.

- R V Chorley Justices heard by Latham J and McCoombe J heard on 9th October finding in favour of CPS, confirmed that " doorstepping" was ECHR compliant, subject to individual circumstances of the case.

2.83 *Tagging* – From 31 May 2002, electronic 'tagging' of 12-16 year olds (extended to 17 year olds in July 2001) was introduced to address the situation where a court feared re-offending if curfews were flaunted. Rather than rely on police visits, an electronic tag fixed to a defendant's ankle would alert monitoring systems if the wearer were to leave the specified premises during curfew hours.

Tagged offender.

2.84 Launching the roll out of tagging within SCI, Home Office Minister Hilary Benn said:

> **There is a core of juvenile offenders whose behaviour is out of control and who feel themselves immune from sanctions….courts now have the power to contain those young people most likely to carry on offending whilst on bail.**

2.85 In May 2002, magistrates in Walsall became the first to order a 12 year old persistent offender to be tagged to prevent her from entering the town centre after she was accused of robbing another 12 year old girl for her mobile phone and cash.

2.86 *ISSP* – The ISSP was designed as an alternative to custody for PYOs who had been charged or warned for an imprisonable offence on 4 or more separate occasions within the previous 12 months and have previously received at least one community or custodial penalty.

2.87 At the time of inspection there were 42 schemes operating, nationally in 86 YOTs. An example of the operation of a bail ISSP is shown in Appendix E. This example originates from Newham, London and illustrates the options available at each stage of consideration.

Case management –

2.88 The Audit Commission, in its 'Route to Justice' report (June 2002) identified; The pathway of an offender through the CJS is fraught with problems;

- Delays and inefficiencies are occurring throughout the process

- Cases are dropping out of the system unnecessarily, allowing offenders to evade justice

- Over £80 million is wasted each year through adjournments and cancellations of trials in courts

2.89 The inspection team found, however, that there was a confusing variety of methods in use by custody and investigating officers to 'flag' street crime case from area to area and in some cases from division to division within an area. Methods ranged from stamps on custody records and unique reference numbers through to different coloured case file jackets.

2.90 Such a variety led to cases being overlooked at each stage of the CJ process. For example, staff in one CPS office were not trained to look out for a unique reference number and merely added an additional CPS stamp to papers that they had self-defined as being part of the SCI.

2.91 Despite assurances by police that they attempted to flag SC cases not one court reported that charge sheets arrived with a systematic flagging system in place. The flagging of cases continued to cause problems as cases progressed through to sentence. No prison identified any consistent marking of remand or committal warrants.

2.92 Without adequate consistent flagging systems in place SC cases were not being afforded priority treatment within the CJ Process. Although most SC areas readily accepted that early identification and flagging of SC was essential, in 2 Magistrates Courts Committee areas a legal view was expressed that magistrates should not be told which are SC cases due to judicial independence and fear of challenges to subsequent bail decisions. All agencies, including court staff, need to be rigorous in identifying SC cases.

2.93 *Speed of progression and listing* – The expectation that courts were to 'fast-track' cases through to trial is not reflected in written policy documents beyond the discussions within SCAG, and the 'short hand' actions on the SCAG action plan. Practitioners were advised that SCI was not a 'fast track' initiative, rather one about improved quality of prosecution which would allow improved efficiency of case progression. Nevertheless, it would not always be appropriate to list a street crime prosecution ahead of more serious cases.

2.94 The Senior Presiding Judge wrote to all resident judges requesting that a robust stance should be taken to ensure timely progression and listing. This was interpreted in different ways in different areas.

2.95 Throughout the Areas, listing practices differed between Crown and Magistrates Courts. The inspection team visited areas where Crown Court Street Crime trials were given a " fixed" date on which the trial was set to proceed, to other areas where the cases were listed in a " warned" list to proceed within a certain time period, usually one week but in one court within four weeks.

2.96 In the Youth Court, any trial involving a PYO case was given a priority listing, regardless of whether it was also a SC case. Practice varied between areas as to whether SC trials, that were not also PYO cases, were listed as a priority.

2.97 Nevertheless, in some areas the courts reported that they were able to offer dates earlier than the other parties were able to accept. Good practice was found in Sheffield Crown Court where 2 weeks had been shaved off time from preliminary hearing to PDH through inter-agency agreement on the service of papers.

Case Study: Rapid justice

The fastest case the inspection team found was a drug addict arrested on 8 January and remanded in custody at magistrates court the following day. The individual appeared at Crown court within 5 days of committing the offence and was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment on 7 February.

Merseyside

2.98 From comparing statistics presented to SCAG on 29 October 2002 and 18 March 2003, it would appear that the average waiting time for SCI cases, from referral to Crown Court to trial date, has actually risen from 117 days to 121 days. It is pointed out, however, that non-SCI cases currently (March 2003) take 179 days on average. A joint thematic inspection of Crown Court listing is currently taking place and is due to report in the later in 2003. It is envisaged that this will enable a national Crown Court Listing protocol to be developed and issued to all LCJBs.

Cracked and ineffective trials –

2.99 A 'cracked' trial is where a case has been listed for a not guilty hearing but is finalised without a trial going ahead on the appointed day. The failure to proceed normally results either because the defendant pleads guilty to all or part of the indictment, or the prosecution offers no evidence (e.g. evidence is deemed insufficient to proceed).

2.100 A trial is 'ineffective' when it is unable to proceed on the scheduled day but is rescheduled for another occasion. This is normally the result of non-attendance of the defendant or a witness, lack of readiness to proceed on behalf of defence or prosecution or the unavailability of a court or judge.

2.101 Clearly, any unnecessary or avoidable adjournments simply contribute to frustrate the aim of SCI to achieve successful and timely conclusion to cases. In view of this, both cracked and ineffective trials are monitored by the Court Service case management system, 'CREST'.

2.102 Figures taken from CREST for the period July 2002 to January 2003 reported that the average cracked trial rate in SCI cases was 38.8% and ineffective trials accounted for 27% of all SCI cases. Suffice to reflect at this stage that the problems associated with cracked and ineffective trials are not yet resolved. The most significant initial step for each of the areas should be for all the individual cases to be closely reviewed, in a formal and structured manner, to identify the specific local barriers to successful conclusion of cases.

Good Practice

Reducing cracked and ineffective trials

In Nottingham the courts and CPS regularly reviewed all cracked and ineffective trials to identify reasons, and agree remedial action where appropriate. This increased the *effective* trial rate from 34% to 51% in 6 months.

In Bristol, the defence was required to file a 'confirmation of trial effectiveness'. If this was not done, the judge was notified and if the trial cracked through guilty plea, the defence counsel was interviewed by the judge as to why the plea was not entered earlier.

Suggestion E

LCJBs should aim to establish a local cross agency process for reviewing all cracked and ineffective trials to help improve attrition rates for all crime.

Positive use of Plea and Direction Hearings (PDHs)

2.103 A PDH is held prior to trial in the Crown Court for the purposes of progressing the case efficiently through the system. At the PDH the defendant is called before the court and a plea of guilty or not guilty is entered. For not guilty pleas, the issues are outlined by the parties, and witness requirements and time estimates for trial agreed. Timescales for service of documents are set down and the judge gives directions about issues such as the disclosure of unused material and a date is listed for trial. The courts can play an important part through their robust case management followed by administrative enforcement and checking by Case Progression Officers. However, the success of these actions are heavily reliant on all agencies playing their part.

Suggestion F

Agency representatives should ensure that they contribute to the effectiveness of PDHs, by;

● examining all issues in the case rigorously

● ensuring that witness availability is up to date and reliable

● ensuring that timescales agreed are realistic.

2.104 On a positive note, CJS staff noted an increase in the number of defendants entering guilty please at the PDH, or even preliminary hearings for the indictable-only offences, but this information was not being formally monitored, although it is recorded by the Crown Court case tracking system. Agencies would be assisted by monitoring and analysing case outcomes at each stage of the process as well as evaluating the effectiveness of PDHs, with reference to the incidence of and reasons for cracked and ineffective trials. This information should be available at SCI liaison meetings.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **PDH**
>
> In Merseyside the forward listing officer was present at court for the PDH to ensure the swift listing of trials.
>
> In South Yorkshire, the trial date was fixed at the Preliminary hearing and PDH (if required) was fixed for 7 days before the trial will commence.

Pre Sentence Reports (PSR)

2.105 The SC Protocol required PSRs to be written within national standards time scales. The fact that Probation and YOTs were not full partners to the SC tracker system and that information was not always shared made evaluation of this aspect difficult. Most areas had no special arrangements for SCI PSRs, but were able to produce them within the agreed time scales. Considerable effort was required to establish which cases were to be treated as SCI offenders.

2.106 However, for young people, most met the YJB national standards for presenting PSRs within 10 working days for PYOs and 15 working days for all other offenders

Sentence Management in Prison

2.107 Sentence management operates for all juveniles and young prisoners, and for adult prisoners serving sentences of more than twelve months. An assessment of criminogenic and resettlement needs informs a sentence plan which determines what interventions are undertaken in custody. Hand-over documentation is sent to the Probation Service on release to inform a supervision plan for the licence period. These systems were established in each of the 30 prisons and Young Offender Institutes (YOIs) visited but there was considerable variation in the detail and quality of practice.

2.108 The provision for juveniles (aged up to 18 years) was more focussed than that of other age groups, largely as a result of the standards required by the YJB. This was

reflected in the links between the prison staff, CARATs staff and YOT workers who provided targeted and specific case management leading to onward referral for resettlement help after release, including drug treatment. This was a service provided for *all* juveniles in the institutions the inspectors visited and whilst SCI cases benefited, the provision was the product of the Detention and Training Order (DTO) rather than the SCI itself.

2.109 All young offenders, aged 18 to 21, were subject to supervision on release but inspectors found nothing within the sentence planning documentation of SCI cases to indicate they were being afforded any priority treatment. Any individual targets relating to drug use or CARATs services were incidental. There were serious problems in obtaining quality treatment on release and inspectors were told that many young offenders failed to respond to the offer of drop-in services after leaving custody.

2.110 In the adult estate, inspectors found no specific provision for SCI cases and, as with the younger people, the difficulties in prison were fuelled by the failure to properly identify SCI cases on entry. There was also a general lack of awareness of the initiative among prison staff. Where staff were aware of SCI, this was in establishments where Governors had appointed specific staff to take SCI forward, for example; Wormwood Scrubs, Bristol and Holloway.

Supervision on licence by Probation

2.111 With the exception of a number of specific pre-sentence activities, the vast majority of the work of the Probation Service occurs after sentence. The Service works with those given community sentences (Community Rehabilitation Orders, Community Punishment Orders and Drug Treatment and Testing Orders) and with those released from custody who serve the final part of their sentence in the community, subject to licence.

2.112 The joint inspection found there were few examples of adult SC offenders receiving community penalties. The majority of the offender sentenced under the initiative received lengthy custodial sentences. As a direct result, there was very little work being undertaken with SC offenders in the community.

2.113 Probation Areas had correctly anticipated this and had focussed their attention on identifying SCI cases, flagging them on Probation systems and preparing for their eventual release.

2.114 In many areas, those identified as SCI cases were under consideration for inclusion in Persistent Offender Projects or other forms of high intensity supervision. Where available,

drug abstinence conditions were often planned to be included in licences. Where funding was available, some areas had enhanced the level of contact with offenders prior to release to ensure a clear progression from custody to licence. These projects were often multi-agency teams with the shared objective of preventing re-offending.

2.115 The National Probation Directorate had established a set of data returns to be completed monthly by Areas to monitor the progress of those sentenced under the initiative who are subject of Probation supervision.

3   Victims and Witnesses

Victim focus

3.1   Within the Government's approach to public service reform, a regular theme has been to focus on the 'citizen' or 'customer'. Within the CJS whilst the major concentration has tended to be on the CJ agencies and suspect or offender, key 'customers' are surely the victims and witnesses.

3.2   CJS Joint Public Service Agreement Targets 2001-2004 include meeting the needs of victims, witnesses and jurors within the system.

3.3   Within the work of the CJS Confidence Task Force, an attempt has been made (March 2003) to define what a customer-focused CJS might look like.

Extract: Customer focused CJS

"First and foremost, it is a system organised more explicitly around the needs of its users rather than for its own convenience. Providing a *responsive* service that is tailored to individual needs; delivering services in an *efficient* and *straightforward* way to end-users; and making sure participants receive *accurate and accessible information* are the hallmarks of a customer-focused criminal justice system."

CJS Confidence Taskforce

3.4   This statement is, of course, aspirational and post-dated the first year of SCI and the joint inspection work. Progress towards this aspiration, however, started within the first year and was focussed largely within the areas' Victims and Witness Protocols, many of which were integrated with the local Joint Agency Street Crime Protocols.

3.5   Victim and witness handling was also highlighted in the SCAT "CJ Walk-through", the findings of which greatly influenced the on-going work of the CJS Confidence Task Force.

Victim and witness protocols

3.6   In The Audit Commission's report 'Route to Justice (2002), a number of reasons are given for failure in the care of victims and witnesses

Extract: Route to justice

Witness care

● Of the adjournments in the magistrates' courts that are attributable to the prosecution, typically over one-half are due to the non-attendance of prosecution witnesses. This can be explained by a number of factors, some of which are avoidable and arise largely from poor communication, and some of which are more complex and relate to a person's willingness to come to court:

Extract: Route to justice – continued

Avoidable administrative problems:

- The police witness on his/her rest day, night shift or training day – the court has not been advised of this prior to listing. The victim/other witness is unavailable on that date – the court has not been advised prior to listing.

- Witnesses have not been warned or were warned too late to cancel other commitments.

- Witnesses have not been updated about a change to the list – for example, a change of venue.

Witness-reluctance problems:

- Fear of intimidation.

- Anxiety about the process of giving evidence.

- Uncertainty about what is required of a witness.

- Unwillingness to sacrifice income/paid leave.

- Unwillingness to waste time waiting to give evidence/attending court unnecessarily.

Audit Commission, 2002

3.7 The CPS Premium Service was designed to improve the police-CPS interface, by providing pre-charge advice and allocating experienced lawyers to reviewing SC cases. At the request of the Attorney General this concept was broadened to address issues concerning victims and witnesses. Specifically, the focus was to support witnesses through the system to avoid failed cases due to non-appearance.

3.8 Within the SCAG action plan, four actions related directly or indirectly to victims and witnesses.

- Develop victim and witness support schemes (CPS lead)

- Police to provide court protection (police and courts)

- Enhance facilities at designated SC courts (courts)

- Ensure courts are ready to accept video evidence (courts)

3.9 In each of the 10 SC Areas, police, CPS and courts collaborated with Victim Support and the Witness Service to produce protocols setting out the assistance and support to be provided. The 10 protocols, although produced individually, covered much the same ground.

- Information – general: giving general information to victims/witnesses;

- Information – witness warning: ensuring effective witness warning;

- Risk assessments – focusing on vulnerability and intimidation;

- Support – acting on the risk assessment both pre-trial and at court;

- Evidence: including

  i.   use of video recorded witness statements;

  ii.   using video ID facilities;

  iii. strengthening the prosecution evidence aside from the victim/
        lay witness;

- Case Progression – prioritisation to avoid unnecessary delay;

- Court arrangements, including:

  i.   maximising the impact of pre-trial hearings;

  ii.   effective listing practices; and

  iii. court facilities/security, particularly separate facilities for
        prosecution witnesses.

3.10 SCAG commissioned the CPS to carry out an assessment of the effectiveness
of protocols. The findings were:

Extract: Effectiveness of protocols

Strengths and Weaknesses

A strength is that the protocols exist at all. They have promoted better inter-agency working including with the voluntary sector both at a strategic level and on a daily, case-by-case, level. Many protocols cover substantially the right key activities. There is evidence to show positive benefits with witnesses who have said they would not attend court but who do so when provided with support, leading to convictions in cases that would have failed.

Weaknesses do exist. Not all protocols emphasise the importance of robust witness warning systems – critical if cases are to proceed. Other initiatives implemented since the protocols were agreed are not in the protocols (including special measures for vulnerable witnesses and CPS communication of key information direct to victims).

SCAG, March 2003

Extract: Effectiveness of protocols – continued

Key messages

1. One agency should take lead responsibility locally for victim and witness care issues (rather than have dispersed and thereby ineffective responsibility), and

2. Early and on-going risk assessment of witnesses is essential to retain the best chance of them attending to give evidence.

SCAG, March 2003

3.11 In parallel to this examination of the protocols, a victim and witness pilot was under way in West Midlands (CPS led) and London (police led). The West Midlands pilot tackled to some degree the two main lessons, with the CPS taking management responsibility for overseeing a risk assessment of witnesses required at court. The pilot started on 6th January 2003 but at the time of reporting empirical evidence of the pilot's impact was not yet available. The signs were that at an operational level the pilot was welcomed as an initiative that would, and already was, making a difference.

3.12 Throughout 2002, the CPS nationally has rolled out Direct Communication with Victim (DCV). Where a defendant is charged with an offence where there is an identifiable victim, the CPS is now responsible for notifying victims of different stages of proceedings, including explaining decisions to drop or reduce cases. The CPS is also required to notify victims of the final outcome of certain offences. Victims may also request a meeting with the reviewing lawyer . In Avon and Somerset and West Midlands, DCV Units were used to notify victims of the outcome of cases, both favourable and otherwise, and positive feedback was received regarding their effectiveness.

Local agency responsibility

3.13 Probation areas are charged with making contact with victims of certain offences (where the sentence is 12 months custody or more) within 8 weeks, and to keep them informed of the progress of the offender to release. Conditions may be inserted into the release licence to protect the victim.

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Good Practice

Support to victims

London Probation Area, in Newham, obtained SCI funding to enable a support system to be put into place for street crime victims. Two extra staff were employed to offer support and through the trial process and to keep victims informed of the results of cases.

In Merseyside, the CPS prepared witness profiles and provided a case summary and details of any special needs of witnesses to the Witness Service and Victim Support.

</div>

3.14 A major problem with shared responsibility was the fundamental lack of integration between the various agencies. In one area the Witness Service was not given any information about witnesses prior to trial due to the other agencies quoting data protection problems. The inspection team did find, however, some good examples of cooperation and exchange of relevant

Video identification viewing.

information that enabled supporting witnesses to be more effective.

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Good Practice

Victim and Witness Care

In Manchester, a dedicated SCI project manager and specialist team was based at the Victim Support and Witness Service receiving all referrals from the police warning clerks, and with a target of achieving personal contact with at least 80% of all referrals. Between the launch on 14 October 2002 and 5 February 2003, 365 referrals were received and support was offered in all cases. The scheme also identified 10 cases where reluctant witnesses had attended the trial as a result of the support received.

In West Midlands, a "Witness Strategy Group" was established to co-ordinate the improvements to victim and witness care including provision of a 'one-stop-shop' for victims and witnesses.

In Merseyside, all the agencies signed up to a witness service level agreement, to ensure agreed minimum standards of service.

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
> **Good Practice**
>
> **Victim and Witness Care – continued**
>
> In London, building on a pilot around racist and homophobic crimes, a fundamentally different approach to 'witness care' for SC will see engagement with witnesses commence immediately after the incident, rather that after charge. The MPS has appointed a Victim Co-ordinator, who will develop this model at borough level. "Victim and Witness Focus Desks" will co-ordinate support activity between volunteers and CJ agencies.
>
> In Nottingham, Birmingham, Liverpool and Sheffield the YOT had taken special steps to enhance the treatment of young victims and witnesses.
>
> In Nottingham, a co-located witness warning unit is situated in the CPS offices. There is also a CPS appointed liaison officer, whose role is to act as a contact point between the two agencies, thereby eliminating delay.

3.15 Notwithstanding the above good practice, the inspection team found a need for clearer assignments of responsibility for witness warning between the police and CPS, and for effective monitoring of the arrangements.

Risk assessment and vulnerable witnesses

3.16 The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 provides protection to certain categories of witnesses in certain circumstances. The Act provides that, following an application to the court for 'special measures', these can be made available to vulnerable, young or intimidated witnesses. These measures include giving evidence by way of a video link or behind screens, removing wigs and gowns or clearing the court.

3.17 In a judgement delivered on 4 February 2003, Lord Justice Rose upheld the 1999 Act primary rule relating to child witnesses in need of special protection. His judgement makes clear that arrangements need to be made for the case to be heard in a court, which has the necessary equipment and facilities.

3.18 In order to carry out their statutory duties, both the police and CPS staff are required to conduct a risk assessment of the needs of witnesses. This calls for a proactive approach on the part of both agencies, in order that contact may be made with witnesses at an early stage and appropriate applications made promptly to the court. Guidance issued to the CPS recommends early consultation between the police and CPS, to identify potentially vulnerable witnesses and to assist and encourage them to provide continued support to the proceedings.

3.19 The Act was implemented in July 2002 and at the time of the inspection, many areas were developing approaches to carry out the provisions. However, members of the judiciary expressed concern that in many cases the police and CPS were failing to consult at an early stage, to identify appropriate special measures and to make prompt applications to the court. As a result a significant number of applications for special measures were made on the day of the trial, or were granted by the court of its own motion. In other cases, applications were made without appropriate consultation with the witness, who either did not require special measures or required different measures, or applications were not made in circumstances where witnesses expected them to be made. This had the potential to adversely affect the quality of evidence provided to the court.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Witness special measures**
>
> In Birmingham all applications for special measures were made before a nominated judge, who endorsed the applications with a requirement that the police provide statements to the court confirming that there had been consultation with the witness concerned.

3.20 Improvements were noted and there was evidence of increasing prioritisation of the needs of victims and witnesses, as familiarity with the statutory provisions on the part of both agencies developed. However, the inspection team considers that both the police and the CPS should prioritise this aspect, in order to ensure that practitioners effectively performed their statutory duty to consult over the most appropriate arrangements to make for witnesses.

3.21 The inspection team found that there was no single agency that took on the ownership of victims and witnesses, throughout the CJ process. This meant that the 'handover' sometimes left the victim or witness in need of additional support. Although Victim Support Service (VSS) and Witness Service (WS) tried to close that gap, the fact that they are both voluntary agencies, with resourcing difficulties, meant that a seamless transition was not often achievable.

Recommendation 5

A single statutory agency should be identified to take ownership of victims and witnesses and that a national protocol is agreed for witness care with clear assignment of responsibilities.

4 Conclusions on SCI within the CJS

4.1 Following SCI cases through the CJS is instructive, both in highlighting the barriers to achieving specific objectives and timescales set by SCAG but also in reinforcing the pre-existing view that the system needs significant attention if it is to provide a joined-up service.

4.2 The SCAT team carried out a "CJ walk-through" in the summer of 2002 and identified 3 significant problems in guiding SC cases through the CJS:

- Poor case preparation,

- Lack of support and guidance for witnesses, and

- The system fails to tackle those who deliberately exploit its weaknesses.

4.3 The problems encountered 6 months later by the joint inspection team remained mostly issues that were neither street crime specific, nor a major surprise to system professionals. The poor quality of evidential files, the lack of co-ordination of effort between police, CPS and the courts and lack of robust progression of cases were all well-known and long-standing problems within the CJS. SCI had simply acted as a concentrated case study, thereby spotlighting the problem areas.

4.4 There is already significant work under way within the CJS to tackle some or all of the areas of greatest concern within SCI. The inspection team noted, however, that SCI had advanced a small number of similar long-standing problems or blockages primarily by the application of concentrated focus and high level political patronage. It is to be hoped that similar momentum can be achieved with other CJS reform and improvement. The evidence of SCI is that it is sorely needed across a wide range of areas.

Chapter 5:

Drugs as a driver of street crime

1 Introduction

1.1 In 1998, the Government introduced the first crosscutting strategy to tackle drugs in an integrated way. During 2001, this was reviewed to sharpen its focus and improve its effectiveness. The findings and recommendations of the Home Affairs Committee and the work of The Audit Commission, the Advisory Council for the Misuse of Drugs, the Health Advisory Service, the Police Foundation and others contributed to the review[19]. In 2002 the strategy was updated. The review acknowledged that the link between drug misuse and offending was complex, but identified that:

- around three-quarters of crack and heroin users claimed to be committing crime to feed their habit,

- a similar proportion of persistent offenders had misused drugs, and

- arrested persons who use heroin and/or cocaine commit almost 10 times as many offences as those who do not.

Lancashire Campaign Poster

1.2 A compulsory drug testing pilot scheme in 9 police forces reported in April 2003 and found that between 36% and 66% of all arrested persons tested positive at time of arrest for crack, cocaine or heroin. This suggests that at the very least, illegal drug use serves to amplify criminal behaviour, and the prevailing view is that the cost of maintaining an illegal drug dependency is a major factor in escalating volume crime.

1.3 However, research specifically undertaken in London[20] to identify the profile of street crime and of the offenders who committed it, failed to identify drug use as a factor. Similarly, the findings of a study commissioned by the YJB into the offending of young people, published in January 2003[21] failed to implicate drug misuse

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
except that the proceeds of street robbery were used to buy drink and drugs along with other "culturally determined status objects including designer clothes." In fact drink was felt to be a more relevant factor. This study concludes

Extract: Research into offending of young people

Street crime...cannot be tackled in isolation from other forms of offending by young people or from the wider developments in their lives.

YJB, January 2003

Quote: Drugs in street crime

"Its time to put to bed the myth that Young Street Crime Offenders are drug fuelled. There is no evidence to support that."

A YOT Manager in London

Extract: Research into offending of young people

Factors explaining different levels of SC

- Deprivation level – in particular measures of employment and income
- Population change – higher youth element or movement of residents

Main influences on offending

- Cultural – importance of image and glamorising of violence
- Economic – inability to finance the required image
- Gender – seeking male approval from older boys (usually criminals)
- Area – labelled by living in deprived areas

Personal factors

- Few involved solely in street crime
- Significant issues re absent fathers and isolation from mainstream education
- Motives not always acquisition – tough image; excitement; territorial

YJB, January 2003

2 Impact of drugs within SCI areas

2.1 Similarly the inspection team found wide variation across the street crime areas in the extent to which drugs were considered to be significant as drivers of crime. In parts of London drugs were neither perceived as a cause nor even a significant factor within SC offending. Conversely, in Lancashire and Avon and Somerset most agency heads had no doubt that drug misuse and the open drugs market were the fundamental drivers for much of the acquisitive crime, including street robbery.

2.2 In Avon and Somerset it was estimated that 6,600 problematic drug users (4000 in Bristol) were spending approximately £76 million a year on their drug use, of which half was raised through crime. Recently, Bristol has witnessed significant changes to the way drugs were supplied, in particular crack cocaine and heroin, resulting in increased consumption of crack/cocaine, and it is suggested, upturns in crime. At the last ACPO Narcotics/Cocaine Conference, 30 forces reported that they had been forced to dedicate resources to this problem. However, in Nottingham city centre a high proportion of

Lancashire Campaign Poster

street crime offenders were thought to be chaotic heroin users, and across parts of London the link between drug use and crime was considered to be tenuous. Where drugs had been linked to street crime, for example in Lambeth, crack cocaine was felt to be the primary drug used by adult offenders.

3 Drugs referral and treatment within the SCI

3.1 Despite the ambiguous findings concerning the link between drug misuse and street crime, the Government chose to focus on this as a key part of their strategy for the SCI. In May 2002, Health Minister Hazel Blears published a press statement on "Breaking the link between drugs and crime" which declared that drug treatment would be a central part of the street crime initiative.

Extract: Street Crime Press Statement

"Street crime offenders with drug problems are to be fast-tracked into drug therapy within 24 hours of release...

...the health service is building on the work taking place in the 10 street crime hotspots and ensuring that crime offenders with drug addictions are fast-tracked to treatment...

...Research shows that when drug users get treatment for their addictions, offending reduces by over 90%."

3.2 The National Treatment Agency (NTA) drives delivery of treatment services throughout England via a regional management structure and through the Drugs Prevention Advisory Service (DPAS) within Government Offices in the Regions. The NTA and DPAS monitor the effectiveness of local delivery by Drug Action Teams (DATs) through support and advice to ensure consistency of approach and high quality provision. On 24 April 2002, the NTA and DPAS circulated written guidance to all SC areas setting out the aims for drug treatment and the role expected of local DAT and others within SCI. Included within the aims was;

Extract: Aims for Drug Treatment

"As part of this process the Prime Minister has sought assurance that in the ten police areas in which the street crime initiative is operation all serious street offenders who are assessed as being drug dependant will be able to access treatment within 24 hours...

DATs in the ten police force areas.......will therefore be expected to establish procedures to enable offenders within the relevant categories to access treatment within 24 hours of their release into the community, whether this is a consequence of a bail decision or following their release from custody or other secure setting...

The target population for rapid access to treatment will be those.....who are:

1. Drug dependent

2. Whose offending is linked to their drug dependency

3. Who are willing to access the treatment."

NTA/DPAS guidance document, 24 April 2002

3.3 The numbers requiring access were predicted to be quite small, as many of the adults involved would receive a custodial sentence. The guidance pointed out that there was no new money for this fast tracking of SCI offenders.

3.4 The inspection team explored the process of drugs referral and treatment in each of the areas visited, with particular reference to any special arrangements for SC offenders.

4 Kevin's story

4.1 "Kevin's Story" is not a real case but has been compiled from elements of real cases related to inspection team members.

4.2 The profile of SC offenders appeared to vary significantly across the 10 areas and so the purpose of this case study is not to be 'typical' but to present an account of what might happen within SCI to an adult, white offender and thereby to illustrate some of the main issues encountered within the inspection.

4.3 Kevin's path through the drug referral and treatment process within the CJS highlights the generic barriers and blockages that can frustrate the intended benefits as well as identifying good practice, where it was found.

Issues covered in the story:

Issue

- Drug referral following arrest   page 98
- Assessment and treatment in the community   page 102
- Assessment and treatment in prison   page 105
- Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs)   page 107
- Rehabilitation and resettlement   page 108

Profile

- Kevin, is a 22 year old single man, unemployed and resident in housing association accommodation on a relatively deprived housing estate in an urban area.

- He is a chaotic heroin user who uses crime to finance his drug use. He has a history of minor theft convictions but has never been convicted of street crime.

- He is on a waiting list for residential rehabilitation but still has another 3 months before an expected place will be available.

STORY – Drug referral following arrest

Kevin was arrested for robbery involving a mobile phone. He was taken to the custody suite where the police custody officer listened to the circumstances given by the arresting officer and accepted Kevin into custody. All necessary documentation is completed and PACE requirements met. As part of a routine risk assessment, the Custody Officer asked questions about Kevin's health and well being which included any drug use.

✔ In Nottinghamshire, seeking authority from the prisoner for drugs arrest referral is mandatory, requiring completion prior to progressing to the rest of the computerised record.

✘ Custody officers in some areas would avoid asking these questions at busy times to avoid the need for referral

✘ In one area visited it was police force policy NOT to call a doctor for 6 hours where it was likely that they would be asked to prescribe drug maintenance treatment. It was implied this was to reduce the cost of calling out police medical examiners.

A doctor was called to assess Kevin's condition and check whether he was fit to be detained in police cells. The doctor was able to prescribe medication to help him get through the early stages of withdrawal. As Kevin had been arrested for a Street Crime offence, the Custody Officer informed him that he will shortly be seen by a Drug Arrest Referral (DAR) worker, 'Rebecca', who was speaking to another offender through the cell gate.

Kevin was given a leaflet about the DAR scheme and saw that there was mandatory referral for SC offenders. As he lay back on the cell bed, he also saw details of the scheme stencilled on the cell ceiling. As he waited, Kevin heard Rebecca talking to another offender who has just come out of interview. It seemed that the custody officer had forgotten to make the referral under the scheme but Rebecca had noticed that she had not got that person on her list and had introduced herself in passing.

✔ In Nottinghamshire arrest referral workers were permitted a free roaming role in custody suites. Here they would see offenders irrespective of whether the custody officer had carried out referral.

✘ In some areas police would not let referral workers have access to prisoners who had been violent and in any case only let conversation take place through locked doors

Rebecca asked questions designed to give an indication of Kevin's lifestyle and drug usage. He wanted to try and break his cycle of offending and drug use and readily agreed to visit a local drug treatment services provider as soon as he could. Rebecca and Kevin both realised that there was a liklihood that he would be remanded in custody but she booked an appointment for the following day just in case.

> ✓ In Wolverhampton, there were clinically qualified,health sevice based referral workers which meant that they were able to initially assess the offender without the need to refer elsewhere".

> ✗ Most areas were unable to offer a fixed appoint service. Referred persons would go to a drop-in centre on release. Take up of the appointment was generally very poor

Kevin admitted the offence and was charged. Due to his recent offending behaviour Kevin was remanded in custody to Court the next day.

The next day while waiting for his case to be called Kevin saw the duty DAR worker talking to another offender who was dealt with overnight but had been transferred to court before the worker arrived.

> ✓ It was a common finding that referral workers were able to visit offenders in court cells if it had not been possible to meet them in police custody suites.

Inspection findings: Drugs Arrest Referral (DAR)

4.4   The journey of an offender starts with arrival at a police station. As part of routine prisoner risk-assessment, custody officers begin by asking simple questions relating to the health and lifestyle of the offender There was no consistent manner for this authority to be requested elsewhere and some custody officers admitted that they failed to refer during busy periods or where offenders were violent.

4.5   To supplement referral by custody officers, good practice was found in Nottinghamshire where arrest referral workers were permitted a free roaming role in custody suites. Here they would see offenders irrespective of whether the custody officer had made a referral. One area for concern was a lack of agreed protocol for referral of juvenile offenders. Although in some areas there seemed to be an informal arrangement for offering advice to juveniles it was not part of the agreed

protocol. Referral of juvenile offenders was generally not available until the offender had entered the CJS, either through a final warning system or charge where an opportunity to be seen by a YOT drugs worker was then available.

4.6 The inspection team was pleased to hear that, in April, the YJB announced that there is to be a pilot scheme, during 2003, of drugs arrest referral in 10 YOT areas targeting young offenders with a view to expanding the scheme, if successful at a later stage.

4.7 Throughout the areas visited there was little prioritisation of referral from custody officers for street crime the exception was in Nottinghamshire where a 24 hour, 7 day a week coverage for street crime offenders was maintained through an out of hours call-out system.

4.8 *Referral workers* – The inspection team found a mixture of systems for employing referral workers. In the West Midlands, for example, there were NHS workers employed in Wolverhampton, with the qualification to carry out immediate assessment without the need to refer elsewhere. In other areas there was a mixture of agency workers employed through private contract with the police, each with varying methods of operation. The free-ranging feature of the Nottinghamshire workers was not replicated elsewhere. In some there was a mixture of partial freedom to self-refer through to denial of access without specific custody officer authority. The workload of referral workers varied considerably from a dedicated worker in a single custody suite to a rota coverage system where workers had to cover a number of suites across a wider geographical area.

4.9 Referral by workers was not necessarily prioritised for SC offenders although most were aware of the requirement to provide access to treatment within 24 hours. In areas where referral was prioritised for offenders released back into the community this was usually to either a drop-in centre, without a fixed appointment time or a fixed clinic appointment. It was reported that the subsequent take up of appointments was poor with offenders often not keeping appointments or failing to 'drop-in'. Monitoring of what occurred, post referral was poor.

Good Practice

Co-ordinated referral

Nottinghamshire

- Patrol officers demonstrated an understanding of drugs misuse being a key driver for the commission of street crime offences

- Custody officers recognised that they were pivotal in beginning the process of referral. Automated computer custody record prompts for referral to be made.

- Referral workers had 'free-reign' to roam custody suites, picking up direct referral by offenders who may have been loath to confide in officers.

- Referral workers had access to prisoners at court

- Priority call out system for SC offenders out of hours

- Where street crime offender released, fixed consultation appointment made within 24 hours

- Where remand in custody, referral workers fax information to Prison CARAT team

- If prisoner subsequently bailed CARATs ensure fixed appointment is made with Compass for ongoing community treatment.

- YOTs willing to track treatment for any SCI young offender referred

Suggestion G

National guidelines and standards for arrest referral workers should be established together with a protocol for arrest referral for children and young persons.

STORY – Assessment and treatment in the community

If Kevin had been bailed by police, or if he could have obtained bail at court, he would have been able to take up the appointment made for him by Rebecca, and visited the local drug treatment service provider. This would have provided an initial assessment and then, if appropriate, a programme of treatment visits.

✗ The option for most SCI prisoners receiving bail was referral to the local drop-in service, which was no different to that offered to any other prisoner or to those in the community. Most SCI prisoners ended up in prison on remand and in Bristol we were told that the Arrest Referral team would fax the prison to alert them. However this was not happening elsewhere and there did not appear to any nationally agreed criteria that this should be standard practice.

Inspection findings: Assessment and treatment in the community

4.10 The Drugs Strategy Directorate updated national strategy emphasised

Extract: Treatment

"Treatment works. It is the key to reducing the harm drugs cause to users, family and communities. Investing in treatment is cost effective – for each £1 spent, an estimated £3 is saved in CJ costs alone."

Updated National Drugs Strategy, 2002

4.11 The provision of timely access to drug treatment was seen as a very high priority by SCAG. The NHS representatives within SCAG had initially argued that such provision for SC offenders could not be guaranteed in under 2-3 weeks, which would in itself be a significant acceleration on provision in some areas. It was rightly pointed out that ANY gap between referral and treatment would invariably lead to the relevant drug user losing interest and probably continuing to commit offences. It was therefore decided that the target time from referral to treatment should be 24 hours.

Extract: Treatment

"SCI offenders should have access to the treatment system (Although not necessarily to the full range of treatment) within 24 hours of the individual returning to the community following arrest."

DTA/DPAS Guidance, April 2002

4.12 In cases where bail was given the access to quality (ie. Medical prescribing or residential detoxification or rehabilitation) treatment was exactly the same as for anyone else in the community. While this had been improving in most areas, (South Yorkshire was an exception with rapid access to treatment) waiting times for prescribing options ranged from six weeks to two years. Access to residential rehabilitation was even more erratic and not a relevant option in some areas

4.13 Various types of drug treatment and facilities were available and relevant to SCI, and they are set out in Appendix F.

Performance against SCI treatment targets

4.14 Consistently since the 24-hour target was set, the Health Service and NTA have reported back to SCAG and the Programme Steering Group that the target was being met throughout the 10 SC areas. Equally consistently, the inspection team members were being told that treatment was taking 9-12 weeks (or indeed longer). During the inspection, in focus groups, this paradox was discussed in some detail and the answer was relatively straightforward – it depended crucially on the definition of 'treatment'.

4.15 The service providers counted treatment as starting from the very first appointment, i.e. the assessment interview, and this was indeed taking place quite quickly (within hours of arrest where DAR workers were qualified to carry out the initial assessment). Most practitioners took the view that treatment had not truly commenced until the second appointment, when intensive specialist treatment commenced. The delays between assessment and second appointment reportedly ranged from 2 weeks to many months and from area to area, dependent on type of treatment needed. This may be symptomatic of the prioritisation of funding rather than a criticism of service provision, However it was felt to be wholly inadequate for chaotic drug users who were using acquisitive crime to finance their drugs habit because any delay increased the likelihood of continued offending and non-attendance at the subsequent appointments.

> ### Quote: Non-attendance of SCI offenders
>
> "Is it effective to prioritise treatment for a group of offenders when only 3% of referrals actually attend appointments, where in the wider drugs community patients are queuing up?"
>
> *Drug treatment worker*

4.16 The non-attendance rate was also often quoted as a major rationale for not allowing SC offenders to jump existing queues for drug treatment. In fact, the inspection team found that this masked a more fundamental objection from medical professionals, namely that referral should only be on proven medical need. SC offenders were being referred as a result of behavioural rather than medical factors and that significantly reduced enthusiasm for referral of SC offenders at all, much less ahead of other 'more needy' candidates.

Recommendation 6

The National Treatment Agency should establish a clear, measurable and achievable standard for the provision of drugs treatment for offenders identified by initiatives such as SCI.

4.17 Whilst it is difficult to deny that 'treatment' can technically be defined as starting with assessment (as with other medical conditions) it is wholly misleading in this instance to quote the proportion accessing treatment within 24 hours unless the second appointment follows virtually immediately. A 2-3 month gap is fundamentally counter-productive and defeats the purpose of the original SCAG action. Where the appropriate way forward was to be residential rehabilitation, the inspection team found waiting times in at least one area to vary from 3 – 7 months.

Suggestion H

That the definition of 'treatment' be amended to exclude any preparatory activity, such as an initial consultation ahead of actual acceptance into a medically supervised programme of activity.

STORY– Assessment and treatment in prison

During the court hearing, details of Kevin's previous drug-related offending was given. It was noted that he had had the opportunity to see a DARW and that he took up that opportunity. Kevin was remanded in custody and once Rebecca became aware of this, she telephoned the drugs service provider and cancelled Kevin's appointment.

Rebecca was a conscientious DAR worker and so she sent a fax to the local remand prison so that the CARAT Team was aware of Kevin's status as a SC offender. Prisons *should*, in any case, have been notified of Kevin's SCI status by flagging on the remand warrant from court.

> ✗ The inspection team could NOT find any evidence that warrants were being systematically marked. and the receiving prison was likely to be out of the street crime area and unaware about the initiative. This is not to say that their own CARAT team would not pick him up and offer ongoing help, probably location on a Voluntary Testing Unit, but this would not have been part of any fast track procedure.

On his arrival at the prison, Kevin was seen immediately by prison reception staff, who identified him as a SC offender from the DAR worker fax. Following initial assessment he was fast tracked for treatment, jumping a 7 day queue for other offenders and within 24 hours he underwent a full assessment of his drug usage and medical needs.

He was immediately admitted to a prison detoxification wing where he completed a 14-day treatment plan before being considered for onward movement in the prison estate.

> ✗ Prison overcrowding resulted in many transfers with little or no referral on for treatment, and the position of women offenders was particularly acute - with women being transferred from Holloway, for example, without time to complete detox programme and with no clear prospect of continuing treatment at the receiving prison. In general women SCI offenders were at a more advanced stage of drugs use/dependency and presented serious levels of vulnerability.

Within 28 days he pleaded guilty at Crown Court and a probation officer prepared a pre-sentence report (PSR). The report proposes a Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO), which would offer Kevin intensive supervision and treatment in the community

> ✗ The Probation Service did not have direct access to SC Tracker. Arrangements to access relevant information varies widely between areas.

> ✓ In Merseyside, they had achieved electronic integration of data between SC Tracker and the standard Probation system.

Despite the positive recommendation, Kevin received a sentence of 36 months imprisonment.

The committal warrant from crown court clearly identified him as a convicted SC offender and he was sent to another prison to complete his sentence.

Details of his agreed treatment plan were forwarded by the CARAT team and were available in the new prison. On arrival he was again seen immediately and offered the same fast track service for ongoing treatment. He was offered the opportunity to enter into a 'drugs-free contract which entitled him to special facilities in the prison. He volunteered for random drug testing as a condition of the contract.

Inspection findings: Assessment and treatment in prisons

4.18   Perhaps the best opportunity for treatment arose when an offender was remanded into the custody of prison. All prisoners were seen on reception and their health needs assessed. Referral for detoxification and further assessment from CARATs staff were usually made from reception.

4.19   A general absence of flagging of SC offenders from courts to prison hampered any effort to prioritise treatment under the SCI. In addition the inspection team found that the SCI had been rolled out across the prison network inconsistently.

Prison CARAT worker.

4.20   Some prisons had fully embraced the initiative and were trying to prioritise SC offenders. In some prisons the SCI had failed to make any impact at all. Where prisons embraced the SCI principles, (Holloway, Wormwood Scrubs, Liverpool) they were obliged to identify SC offenders for themselves as this had not been done reliably by the courts. In SCI and for future such initiatives prisons may wish to appoint a specific co-ordinator.

4.21 Where fast-tracking of SC offenders was embraced, tension was caused by queue jumping by SC offenders who may not have had the greatest treatment need.

4.22 The SCI had greatest impact on the role of the CARATs worker. In many cases the task of co-ordination of the initiative was being carried out by CARATs staff in addition to their role as treatment provider.

4.23 In HMP Liverpool, where community residential de-toxification waiting times were reported as lengthy, the local authority had requested permission to send community patients to the local prison for faster treatment provision.

STORY – Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs)

Had the court imposed A DTTO, in preference to a custodial sentence, Kevin would have *received* up to 20 hours treatment contact time per week. If necessary this could have included access to a variety of medical interventions such as the prescription of methadone or naltrxone. There would also have been support available to prevent relapse, work on offending behaviour and other problem areas such as poor problem solving skills and the lack of employment, training and housing. There would also have been victim awareness and practical support to assist Kevin to become drug free. This programme would have been backed by regular drug testing, the results of which would have been overseen by the courts on a regular basis.

> ✖ The Inspection Team did not find any cases of an adult street crime offender being sentenced to a DTTO.

Suggestion I

More use could be made of ISSPs and DTTOs as a realistic alternative to custody in serious crime cases for young and first time offenders.

Inspection findings: Drugs Treatment and Testing Orders

4.24 DTTOs are regarded as potentially highly effective on persistent offending. Greater detail of their purpose and format appears in Appendix G. The strength of DTTOs over previous treatments is that regular drug testing is mandatory and the court plays an on-going role in reviewing progress.

4.25 The National Probation Directorate set targets for DTTOs in May 2002. At the time of the inspection it was noted that many areas were approaching or exceeding their targets for commencements.

4.26 In one Area, where targets for DTTOs were not being met. Judges expressed a view that DTTOs were 'rationed' and that they could not make use of them as freely as they wished. There had clearly been a failure in communication somewhere as the cause of an earlier limitation had long-since been removed.

STORY – Rehabilitation and resettlement

Details of Kevin's agreed treatment plan were forwarded by the CARAT team from Kevin's remand prison and were available to the CARAT team in the new prison. On arrival Kevin was again seen immediately and offered the same fast track service for ongoing treatment.

✔ Good practice was found at Holloway prison where a drugs-free wing existed. Prisoners who volunteered were subjected to voluntary random testing in order to qualify for a place on the wing and better facilities.

✘ Generally, if drug users entering prison decline the 'priority help' they are not recorded as SCI and no further specific attention is given

In prison Kevin's sentence was managed to a limited extent but no drugs services were planned for his release. The Probation Service, were not able to liaise with the prison in advance and CARAT team advice was not sought to assist with his resettlement.

✔ In Nottingham and Bristol there were plans to ensure that SCI cases due for release who may experience drug misuse problems are interviewed prior to release to ensure routes to treatment are available. Drug abstinence conditions may also be included in release licences where appropriate.

Kevin left prison with a discharge grant and returned to his previous drug using friends in a housing association house. He went to a drop in centre, which was close to his home. The drop in centre could not offer a full range of treatment. They put him on a three month waiting list for ongoing treatment. He could not hold on this long.

Kevin began to re-associate with other drug users whilst on the waiting list for treatment.....

> ✗ The inspection found one example of a resettlement hostel located next door to the most active drug den in the town, providing almost impossible temptation to return to drug taking ways.

.....and within 10 days, Kevin is arrested for a cashpoint ATM robbery whilst trying to obtain cash to buy drugs.

Inspection Findings: Rehabilitation and resettlement

4.27   It is important to acknowledge that rehabilitation and resettlement activities across the CJS are not exclusively drugs-related. Other linked issues also appear in chapter 6.

4.28   *Rehabilitation* – Once in prison, treatment facilities were available for those who were serious about tackling their drug misuse, though less so for alcohol misuse. The inspection team heard anecdotal comments in most areas that offenders who were serious in their desire to free themselves of drugs stood the best chance of success if they were sentenced to imprisonment. This reflected shortfalls in treatment within the community rather than the inherent benefits of imprisonment.

Case Study

In Liverpool Prison CARAT workers told inspectors of at least two men who had been positively responding to community intervention and counselling. They were ready to enter a quality treatment facility to undertake detoxification but were told that no places were available and that there was an extensive waiting list. They then made conscious decisions to commit street crimes in order to enhance their chances of referral.

4.29   In one area where local authority residential rehabilitation waiting times were between 18 months and 2 years, the local authority had requested permission to send community patients to the local prison for faster treatment provision.

4.30 In Avon and Somerset, Home Office funded, Operation Lynx had sought to break the cycle of drug abuse in the remand phase prior to sentence by working with prisoners. However due to length of time prisoners spent on remand the short-term project finished before the majority of offenders could complete their programme

4.31 Pressure on the prison population results in the constant review of where prisoners are held and the movement of prisoners around the country to make space for new arrivals. This greatly disrupted treatment plans and because of the lack of adequate tracking, meant that continuity of treatment was disrupted for many individual offenders.

Good Practice	**SCI protocol in Prison**

Details of SCI Protocol developed by CARATs at HMP Liverpool:

- *Stage one – Reception*
  Prisoner identified through warrant. Substance misuse team completes CARAT/Health care screening. Leaflet given to all target offenders. Details input to database.

- *Stage two – CARAT assessment*
  CARAT worker identified each day as SC worker. Arrest referral team fax SC Drug treatment record to CARAT office. Care plan completed.

- *Stage three – Convicted prisoners*
  Convicted prisoners identified offered access to treatment prior to release. If they still want treatment two weeks before release prison sends fax to service provider with the care plan plus release address and services provided or contacted whilst in prison and copy of SC drug treatment record.

- *Stage four – Remands*
  Must print a non-return from court list. Their care plan and copy of SC treatment record should be faxed cases on to service providers indicating release from custody.

- *Stage five – Transfers*
  CARATs clerk sends all SC paperwork along with CARAT documentation.

- *Stage six – Statistics*
  Check all SCI cases on statistics sheet and fax on Monday morning to Area Drugs co-ordinator. All SCI information faxed with the rest of CARAT statistics at the end of the month to head office.

4.32 *Resettlement* – At the time of inspection very few adult offenders had completed their sentence. The inspection team did not examine the case management of offenders who had been in prison prior to April 2002. It was reported that these prisoners would not have been incorporated into any priority treatment programme.

4.33 A key problem identified through the areas visited was the availability of treatment in the community following release. The improvement to drug-focused interventions in prisons has drawn some experienced drugs workers into prisons. In some places this was at the expense of treatment in the community, which was already under-resourced and unable to provide the required service. An exception was the "Tower Project" (see paragraph 5.2) in Blackpool. It was quoted virtually from the start of SCI as good practice and by the time of this inspection virtually every force in England and Wales, and certainly all SCI forces, had visited to assess the transferability to their own areas. In February 2003, the Huddersfield University carried out a formal evaluation of the programme and their report is expected later in 2003.

4.34 This inspection was unable to comment on the extent to which drugs throughcare was provided, as too few identified SC offenders had left prison to test the system. However, CARAT workers spoken to in prisons did not expect that their experience would be any different than that of other offenders who were referred to drop-in Centres which were not able to deliver treatment for several months.

4.35 Young Offenders Institutions (YOIs) were generally better at delivering co-ordinated drug throughcare to juvenile offenders through their contractual arrangements with the YJB. All young people who are to be discharged from any part of the juvenile secure estate have the benefit of a release plan. This was designed to provide a framework for the required agencies to work together in a way which afforded the young person the best chance of successfully resettling into their community. In some areas, part of this plan required the completion of programmes designed to deal with particular aspects of their offending behaviour.

<table>
<tr><td>**Good Practice**</td><td>**Drugs throughcare for young offenders**

HMYOI Hindley, Merseyside

There were good links with outside probation and drugs workers in the community. An outside counsellor on placement also supported CARATs workers in prison. For those wanting help on release and with 6-8 weeks left to serve, outside drugs workers came into prison to complete an assessment and establish links before release. Appointments were made for young adults to attend drug agencies in the community and the CARATs workers followed up to check whether these had been kept.</td></tr>
</table>

5 Co-ordination and funding of drug treatment

Drug Action Teams

5.1 DATs bring together representatives of all the local agencies involved in tackling the misuse of drugs, including the health authority, local authority, police, probation, social services, education and youth services, and the voluntary sector. DATs work with CDRPs to help agencies and communities tackle local drug problems and associated crime.

5.2 *Funding* – Much of the funding available, such as CAD and CAD uplift has been given to support targeted, locally determined measures designed to strengthen communities, disrupt the local drugs markets and tackle drugs and drug-related crime. Good practice has resulted such as 'The Tower Project' in Blackpool, where a local crime reduction of 60% has been attributed to tackling drug dependent prolific offenders. Other areas have learned similar lessons and the inspection team found an energy locally for partners supporting similar projects. Those that were materialising were not yet in place and the inspection team will be keen to see if they achieve success when up and running.

5.3 The inspection team found that there were concerns about the lack of openness in the distribution of funding within prison areas which was linked with the lack of clarity about how prisons were supposed to be contributing to the overall initiative.

5.4 *DATs* – The inspection team formed an opinion that the process of drugs referral and treatment was often disjointed across agencies. Although there were pockets of good practice as identified, there was a lack of strategic guidance in some DATs within the partnerships. The inspection team found an example of good practice

in Merseyside, where DAT workers provided full support to women requiring drug treatment, including those leaving prison. By contrast, a DAT worker in one of the other SCI areas had not even heard of the initiative and had no idea they had to treat SC offenders differently.

Suggestion J

The Partnership Standard for DATs should encourage DAT co-ordinators to produce and implement local drugs arrest and treatment action plans.

5.5   The GONW held a regional SC conference in November 2002 focusing on partnership activity across Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Lancashire. Part of the conference contained practitioner workshops examining the barriers to improvement. The workshop on drugs made the following recommendations:

- Develop other working philosophies to deal with "reluctant" clients.

- Encourage the Dept of Health to define drug use as a chronic illness.

- Introduce shared targets for agencies to progress shared priorities.

- Investigate the use of police surgeons to do some of the treatment of drug users.

- Plan the discharge from prison of drug users, to include accommodation and training/employment issues.

- Seek to inter-relate treatment and precaution services.

5.6   *Drug testing* – The Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000, Section 57 gave police new powers to drug test detainees in police custody. These new powers are being piloted in nine sites across England and Wales until March 2004 and as part of SCI. Leeds and Nottingham Bridewells were chosen and testing commenced on October 14, 2002.

5.7   Only prisoners charged at the Bridewells were being tested. All disputed results were sent to the Forensic Science Service laboratory for analysis. The confirmed result was returned within 72 hours. Refusal to provide a sample was a criminal offence which carried a penalty of 3 months imprisonment or a fine of £2,500 or both.

5.8 In conjunction with this, in the Leeds Addiction Unit (HEAT) a scheme which included a DAR scheme was first developed in 1998 and involved a number of different agencies in Leeds, including police and social services, working together to provide a holistic approach to dealing with drugs and crime. This included advice and information and referral to treatment centres.

Breaking the cycle of offending

1 Introduction

1.1 An underlying belief often espoused within SCAG was that any long-term, sustainable impact on reducing street crime must include significant effort to break people out of the vicious circle of criminality and, even more importantly, to stop others ever entering.

1.2 Whilst most of the media headlines and ministerial focus concentrated on crime reduction, detection and enforcement, much work was going into:

- Prevention and diversion – in particular diverting young people

- Target hardening – making the offending more difficult or risky

- Deprivation and cultural issues – identifying vulnerability and trends

- Rehabilitation and resettlement – trying to avoid a 'revolving door' effect.

2 Prevention and Diversion

2.1 Although some of these schemes pre-dated SCI, the initiative added impetus and focus to them and in particular the following programmes benefitted from the SCI spotlight and support:

- Behaviour Improvement Programme (BIP)

- Police officers in schools

- Truancy sweeps

- 'Summer plus' activities

- Other diversion schemes.

Behaviour Improvement Programme

2.2 BIPs enabled the selected Local Education Authority (LEA) to focus on behaviour issues within their schools. The funding allowed them to set up mechanisms to support those schools, which have pupils with the most challenging behaviour. Pupils at risk of exclusion, poor attendance and committing crime were identified earlier than they would have been before BIP was introduced. As a result intervention strategies were implemented and resources were better targeted at the pupils most in need.

2.3 The development of multi agency working has been enhanced. In all LEAs visited Behaviour and Education Support Teams (BEST) were established. The location

of BESTs on or near school sites led to faster referral pupils to appropriate professionals and more young people have access to mental health professionals at an earlier stage. However, the timescales for the recruitment of BESTs was unrealistic. Many teams still had vacancies at the time of the inspection and in some a lack of clarification of roles from the outset has led to the BEST being slow to start functioning. Some teams had been set up before support needs were identified. The development of information sharing protocols had been slow to be established.

2.4 The BIP initiative has led to improved liaison between primary and secondary schools with earlier identification of children in need of support. Mechanisms were being developed to identify children in year 6 who need behaviour support on transition to secondary school. However, BEST were largely focused in secondary schools due to LEA anxiety about sustainability of the initiative. This led to slow recruitment because candidates were not attracted to short term appointments

2.5 The appointment of lead behaviour professionals at a senior level within the schools has ensured that behaviour policies were implemented. The role of lead behavioural professional was time consuming for senior managers and many have delegated training and attendance at meetings to middle managers. Schools were empowered by the findings of the behaviour audit to identify the issues relating to behaviour in their schools. Most schools built the findings of the audit into their school development plan. The behaviour audit is over complex and does not allow for progress to be demonstrated as many key indicators are grouped together under one grade. Not all BIP schools had undertaken the behaviour audit.

2.6 The LEA co-ordination of BIP should ensure there is a consistent approach across the schools within the LEA. It enabled LEAs to challenge schools to ensure they achieve targets for attendance and exclusions. The monitoring of the effects of the BIP initiative on behaviour is at an early stage of development.

2.7 Very few LEAs had achieved the target to provide full-time education for temporarily excluded pupils from day one of exclusion. A number had not started to plan for this provision or had plans that were unrealistic. A small number of LEAs had not provided full-time education for all permanently excluded pupils

Good Practice

Exclusions

In Newham, London a protocol for exclusions had been agreed between agencies to exclude pupils committing crime against other pupils in the school, thus ensuring protection for victims and witnesses.

Police in schools

2.8 In some schools the presence of a dedicated, assigned police officer, rather than an occasional visitor, had a very positive impact on pupils' attitudes and behaviour. There were reports of lower incidences of crime and bullying. Some school governors and head teachers were anxious about the effect the presence of a police officer would have upon their reputation. However, within weeks of the police officer arriving at the school these fears were dispelled and schools were positive about an officer's presence.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Police in schools**
>
> In a Manchester school the head teacher had been very negative about the appointment of a police officer to the school. The police officer very quickly established a good relationship with the staff and pupils. He had previously been a PE teacher and therefore understood the school environment. The police officer patrolled at the front gate of the school at the beginning and end of the day and had built up a good relationship with parents. Pupils and staff report that they feel much safer at school. The officer had maintained his authority, everyone knew that his first duty was to maintain law and order, yet he was trusted within the school. Pupils often reported incidents to him. The school felt there had been a dramatic decline in the incidence of bullying. There were early signs that attendance was improving because pupils who were afraid to attend school were now attending. The officer has carried out a baseline analysis of crime figures in and around the school and a crime pattern analysis. This will be repeated after a year to monitor the impact the police officer has had on crime figures.

2.9 There is evidence that the presence of police officers in schools has led to a reduction in crime in the immediate community. In Bristol the incidence of robbery had reduced.

> **Quote**
>
> "Its no good dealing at (named) school, they have a policeman there and they tell him everything."
>
> *Prison Researcher*

2.10 The local communities around schools also felt safer and in some LEAs there had been good use of the safer routes to school procedures. Inspectors were disappointed to discover that the impact of police officers in school on crime rates and on attendance and behaviour was not regularly monitored in all LEAs.

Recommendation 7

LCJBs and LEAs should jointly establish systems to monitor the impact that having a police officer in school has on:

● the number of exclusions

● the incidence of bullying

● attendance at the school

and that national guidelines and a performance framework be designed to ensure effectiveness.

2.11 The presence of police officers had also led to good early identification of young people who were at risk of committing crime which had, in turn, led to intervention strategies being introduced before they move into actual criminal activity.

2.12 In most police forces there were difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of police officers that had the skills and motivation to carry out the role. Most LEAs had not filled all the posts within the schools that had been identified to have a police officer. There was a lack of continuity of staffing of the police officer posts in schools. The provision of dedicated officers for school assignment is also an expensive resource commitment. Whilst forces have prioritised these allocations in the height of SCI, there must be some concern as to whether the number and quality of such appointments can be maintained should other priorities emerge. Even during SCI, police officers were pulled out of schools if they were needed for more urgent duties such as terrorist duties or murder cases. There may be scope for evaluating the potential role for Community Support Officers to carry out or support police in schools.

2.13 The inspection team spoke to a number of the regular officers working in schools and found an extremely variable picture. They ranged from keen dedicated officers, through to those who had not volunteered but been posted to the school. Many were confused by their role and some unaware of the SCI.

2.14 At the time of the inspection visits, the Police Federation had written to The Home Office raising concerns about the role of police in schools and the health and safety of staff. They reported a view from some police officers working in the

environment that the roles, duties and conditions had not been properly risk-assessed nor accompanied by adequate training provision.

2.15 The inspection team found no consistency in the role of the police officers in schools. In one area a police officer had received four job descriptions in six weeks. The role varied from full time member of the BEST to carrying out security patrols of the school site. Within the same force area another police officer was employed and carried out a very different role. Not all police officers were aware of the requirements of the Safer Schools Partnership guidelines. Some police officers did not spend enough time in the school to have any real impact. In others they did not have sufficient authority for pupils to pay them respect.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Police in school**
>
> In a London school the officer wore most of his protective equipment but had it hidden under his clothing. He visited the police station on his way to school to check if any reports had been filed overnight on pupils at his school. He arrived at school in time to patrols the gates and walkways on the approach to school. Once lessons had started he patrolled corridors of the school and tracked down internal truants. At break times he patrolled the outside areas of the school. He was a member of the BEST and had a small caseload of pupils who were at risk of committing crime. He carried out group work and some one to one work with these pupils. Clear protocols had been established between the school and the police officer about when he would carry out arrests within the schools, for example, in drug related cases. At home time he patrolled gates and routes to school. He also attended truancy sweeps in the area around the school. He was able to identify the pupils from his school.

2.16 The training that police officers received was limited and varied in quality. In some instances police officers were using the restorative justice model before they had been trained. In some areas police officers were carrying out extensive one to one work as part of the BEST team but had had no guidance or training to carry out a very different role to that of a police officer. Some officers had not been able to access any training.

2.17 In most of the areas visited information sharing protocols between the police and other professionals were at an early stage of development or had not been developed. This situation particularly hampered efforts to share intelligence on SC offenders, witnesses and victims to allow for appropriate intervention or help to be provided. Police officers often felt vulnerable as they were seen as the conduit for ensuring intelligence flowed through the system.

Truancy sweeps

2.18 In four of the SC areas visited schools saw an increase in attendance as a result of the truancy sweeps (Liverpool, Bristol, Nottingham and Bolton) In those areas where truancy sweeps were having a positive effect the following aspects were found. There had been good media coverage before the truancy sweep had taken place. As a result parents were fully aware that they would take place. Schools were clearly briefed when the sweeps were going to be conducted and they had effective systems in place to receive the pupils when they were returned to school.

2.19 There were dedicated teams, which did not change between sweeps usually consisting of Education Welfare Officers (EWOs) and police officers. In some areas teachers joined the sweeps to identify pupils from there school. In one area plain clothed police officers assisted the truancy sweeps by pursuing pupils who ran away when the truancy sweep arrived. The effective LEAs conducted regular sweeps. In Liverpool truancy sweeps were daily. In Nottingham and Bristol they were twice a week.

2.20 In effective authorities details of the pupils absent from school were entered onto an electronic database. There were clear protocols to enable all workers to have access to information at an appropriate level to their role. Effective multi-agency support was then available.

Case Study: Truancy sweeps

In Liverpool a plain clothed officer picked up a mother who was walking with her child who was dressed in a school uniform. On discussion it appeared that the child had never been registered at school. The mother had mental health difficulties and was referred to the Child and Adolescent Mental Health (CAMHS) team. The child then started to attend school.

2.21 Effective sweeps had good follow-up systems when the targeted children returned to school. Parents were contacted immediately and the school provided effective support systems for the child. In a small number of authorities the impact of the sweep was monitored up to six weeks after the sweep. Liverpool, Bristol, Nottingham and Bolton claimed that they were starting to show signs of reduction in crime levels and improvements in attendance as a result of the sweeps.

2.22 In less effective areas truancy sweeps were not co-ordinated. There was no consistency in the staff used in the sweeps. They took place infrequently. In some LEAs inappropriate areas were searched. For example, in London the areas searched tend to be within the borough in which the school is placed but many children lived in an adjoining borough.

Summer plus diversionary activities

2.23 The Summer Plus activities provided young people at risk of committing crime with a wide range of good quality activities over the summer period. They enabled support agencies to engage with many young people they had not been able to reach before. Young people were well supported by enthusiastic and committed key workers who forged good relationships with them. The best practice was observed from key workers who had extensive experience of working with young people and who knew the local areas well. Those young people who attended the programmes were enthusiastic about the activities and felt they had kept them away from committing crimes. Early evidence suggests that youth crime in the areas that had been targeted with summer activities in 2002 was lower than at the same time the previous year.

2.24 The best practice was seen where existing networks were used to build on the relationships already established with the targeted young people. In Manchester, this resulted in the most appropriate young people being engaged in the summer activities. Key workers already knew the young people and this enabled them to understand their needs and devise a programme that was challenging and in a number of cases led to a qualification or certificate being achieved.

2.25 In areas where there had not been a history of inter-agency working there was some difficulty in identifying the young people who would benefit most from summer activities. In some areas there were no protocols for information sharing between agencies and this meant that the young people most at risk of committing crime were not always identified.

2.26 The LEA areas had little time to plan the activities to be delivered and the support systems to be provided by the key workers. Areas had only a few weeks to recruit key workers, identify young people and establish a varied and interesting programme that extended into the evenings. There was limited time before the holidays began for key workers to make contact with young people to build up their trust and to plan an appropriate individual programme. Very few schemes involved young people in the design of the programmes. Areas that did not have an established programme of summer activities already in place found it very difficult to put on an extensive programme in such a short period of time.

Suggestion K

LEAs would welcome early confirmation of funding for diversionary activities in sufficient time to enable them to:

● Recruit key workers

● Identify appropriate young people and

● Plan activities to take place and that include children in the design of schemes and

● Timetable activities sufficiently ahead to allow for comprehensive planning and funding identification to take place.

2.27 Most areas were able to deliver an interesting programme of activities that met the needs of young people. The programmes were well balanced and included a range of activities including sport, outdoor activities, art, music and personal development. The best activities identified the areas of interest of the young people. For example, in a go-karting course young people learned about health and safety relating to driving and how to build and repair the vehicles. Evidence from the course could be used to build a portfolio towards NVQs in motor vehicle maintenance

2.28 Music technology was used effectively in most schemes to engage young people. Residential schemes and sport were used effectively to enable young people to explore aspects of personal development such as working in teams. There were good examples of activities, which brought together young people from different cultural backgrounds.

2.29 Young people felt that they were well supported by key workers who were enthusiastic and resourceful in their methods to attract them on to the programmes. There were limited formal processes to assess and record young people's progress, achievements and outcomes. In most of the programmes there was a lack of effective transition support for young people.

2.30 In those areas where key workers were employed only for the summer there was an absence of support for young people once the summer activities had finished. In some programmes there was poor tracking of young people's attendance. It was difficult for schemes to identify the numbers of young people who had attended full-time programmes.

Good Practice

Diversionary activities

Some young people in Wolverhampton had been working at a water sports centre since the spring. After working closely with the trained instructors they successfully led groups of young people at the centre as part of the programme of summer activities. These young people had significantly developed their confidence and self esteem and some saw a future as instructors when they leave school.

In Manchester summer activities were in a purpose built youth centre that included a central library, computer rooms, music suite and extensive sport hall. The activities built on the programmes offered during the rest of the year. Young people attended a wide range of activities including courses resulting in certificates in Information Technology, website design and personal presentation skills.

In Slough, where there had been tensions between Asian young men and young men from a Romanian community, a joint scheme was established for the two groups to come together to play kabbadi. Experienced youth workers handled the sessions sensitively. The relationships between the groups of young men improved.

In an innovative scheme in Thames Valley a group of young people were trained to act as peer mentors to work with children. They were trained to support and instigate activities with children. Sessions were well planned and each young person had an individual learning plan. There was evaluation at the end of each session. The young people received certification for aspects of their training. They were all able to describe the progress they had made. All the young people wished to continue with the work and were looking forward to supporting the year 7 children on their transition to secondary school.

In Nottingham, young people were involved in activities devised by the charity, 'Weston Spirit' to tackle social inclusions and address personal development. They were challenged by the sessions, gripped by the tension of questioning of their attitude and behaviour and grew in awareness of responsibility and choice. An important part was in highlighting decision making and effect on other people.

Further Diversionary Activities

2.31 The inspection team found a consensus that prevention was recognised as a key element of the battle against street crime but because of the impetus to achieve immediate results the thrust of the initiative had been directed at the police and courts related services.

2.32 Across most areas, YOTs were involved in major work to target information about street crime towards potential victims and offenders. In addition, offender profiling in Bristol, Sheffield and Lambeth was leading to early identification of those at risk from offending and increasing the likelihood of early intervention.

2.33 In Liverpool, the JAG provided a multi agency, intelligence led approach to targeting preventative action against those most vulnerable to be drawn into, or being a victim of street crime.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Identifying high risk**
>
> The Liverpool JAG sought to identify children, young persons and adults who were highlighted within agencies as being at a high risk of potential involvement in street crime. Some indicators might be;
>
> - Evidence of serious anti-social behaviour in communities.
> - Violence or serious bullying towards others.
> - Serious sub-criminal behaviour of an aggressive nature which could suggest a pre-disposition to an involvement in street crime.
> - Substance misuse linked to a history of aggressive behaviour
>
> Once a concern was raised, a referral process commenced. The process begins with a referral sheet outlining the causes for concern. The sheet then goes to the JAG meeting.
>
> The decision was then taken on whether they go onto the database as a potential offender. If no more information was required, the individual would be put onto the database and information sharing could occur using the database system.
>
> The same filter process occurred and the individual was be graded as high, medium or low risk. For those who were graded as high risk the tasking process and menu of interventions was then considered. See Appendix H.

3 Target hardening

3.1 Another key weapon in trying to break the cycle was making offending much more difficult through focusing on offence situations, locations or types and making the intended criminal target harder to achieve. A number of general tactics are outlined in chapter 4, when reporting the deployment of the national intelligence model and evolution of tactical menus. In this section, two very specific issues are addressed that the inspection team found to be particularly relevant to SCI.

The mobile phone phenomenon

3.2 A main motive for personal robbery is to gain a financial advantage, either directly or by selling ill-gotten gains. Unsurprisingly, therefore, research found that cash was the most likely item to be stolen in robberies, accounting for around one-quarter of all property taken.[22] Close second (18%) and a significant distance ahead of any other category of property, comes the mobile phone. In 2000/1, it was estimated that 2,000 phones were being stolen *every day* in the UK[23]. Specific research into mobile phone theft[24] revealed that the proportion of robberies involving mobile phones had escalated from 8%, in 1998/9, to 28% in 2000/1. It also highlighted a concentration of offending in city centres and particularly around transportation routes, mainly involving buses, railway and underground stations.

3.3 Research within SCI forces also confirmed the transportation connection, not least because so many people emerging from stations virtually immediately sought to call someone. Over a quarter of all mobile phone robberies occurred when making a call or having the mobile on open display.

3.4 Two particular problems presented themselves to SCAG and police seeking to stem the tide of such robberies. Firstly, these phones were increasingly seen as a fashion statement and this encouraged the rightful owner to show them off and the would-be robber to target them. Secondly, once stolen the phones presented a highly viable source of income, with few safeguards in place to invalidate their use post-theft.

3.5 Part of the SCI approach to reducing the visibility of temptation, was the use of high profile publicity literature, especially aimed at young people.

3.6 It was never easy to convince the young to resist the temptation to display the symbols of their street credibility but every effort was made to do so through the awareness campaigns. It was important to ensure that the message was not that young people should not have phones, since parents have routinely provided phones to improve their child's accessibility and safety. The main message

Merseyside Campaign Poster.

had to be that flaunting their possessions was likely to attract the criminal element, and risk victimisation.

3.7 Applying restrictions on the use of stolen phones was a different matter altogether. The technology to render stolen telephones unusable was already available but required concerted and co-ordinated effort and support from the network providers and manufacturers. The problem seemed to be that there was actually very little incentive for the industry to tackle theft of phones or their reprogramming and reuse.

Metropolitan Police Campaign Poster

Quote: Industry reluctance to tackle stolen phones

"If a phone is stolen the victim will invariably buy another, while the old phone will still be used by someone, therefore providing another source of revenue."

Police officer

3.8 SCAG identified a specific action to approach the service providers and after positive responses, in October 2002 two measures were announced that it was hoped would significantly impact on the stolen phone trade. First, The Mobile Telephones (Reprogramming) Act 2002 came into force, making it an offence to reprogramme stolen phones. Second, 5 major UK mobile phone operators (Orange, O2, T-Mobile, Vodaphone and Virgin) set up a joint database to share information on stolen phones, allowing them to be barred from the main UK networks. Whilst this should have had a significant and immediate impact, a few of the operators were slow to introduce appropriate resources and staffing to allow quick turn-around times from reported theft to network barring.

3.9 On 4 March 2003, following further discussions with the network operators, the phone immobilisation scheme was re-launched with a clear campaign message that "Stolen Phones Don't Work Anymore." The Home Secretary, in supporting the campaign said:

> **" I am very pleased to support this new campaign which continues the work we started last year. Mobile phone users can be confident the police, the government and the industry are committed to tackling phone theft."**

3.10 After one false start, it is to be hoped that these measures will now have the impact for which they were designed.

Police visibility

3.11 A second element of making offending more risky within SCI has been the allocation of significant numbers of uniformed police staff within the areas identifies as crime hot-spots, aimed at deterring the potential robbers. During the course of SCI, the police in most of the SC areas had transferred significant resources into high visibility patrolling. Particular media interest was attracted when the Metropolitan Police transferred 315 traffic police officers into high visibility work in the SC boroughs.

3.12 As identified within the HMIC report "Open All Hours"[25], visibility of policing was acknowledged as one of the key contributory factors to enhanced public satisfaction and reassurance. Some commentators suggested that the highly overt presence in robbery hotspots was either likely to be counter-productive, by displacing the offenders into more suburban and probably less surveilled areas of towns and cities. At best, they characterised high visibility policing as a 'sop' to politicians and as a reassurance tool rather than impacting directly on the actual levels of crime.

3.13 It was interesting, however, that during January 2003, when forces, and in particular the Metropolitan Police, were forced to reduce staff deployed to high visibility SCI policing the reported offending rate saw an immediate rise. In London alone, robberies rose by 13.8% and then by a further 9% in the 2 weeks of greatest abstraction.

3.14 It is also important to highlight that the high visibility, intensive policing style

Merseyside Campaign.

commonly adopted in SCI comes at a significant price. Whilst the inspection did not seek to obtain a break down of expenditure, it was apparent from discussions within each force visited that a high proportion of activity was either directly on overtime or made possible by consequential overtime elsewhere. Whilst this is achievable and sustainable in the short term, it is not a viable long term approach, either financially or for the welfare of staff.

4 Deprivation and cultural issues

4.1 Robbery is heavily concentrated in a very small number of predominantly urban metropolitan forces. Just 7% of the Basic Command Units in England and Wales accounted for 42% of all robberies in 2001/2, again highlighting the most urban areas. With such a high concentration, it is perhaps not surprising to find that social deprivation and culture feature large in the backgrounds of SC offenders. The ethnicity of both suspect and victim had been one aspect explored within HO Research Study 254, "The Nature of Personal Robbery", and this had revealed some significant differences across the participating BCUs featured within that research. The proportion of suspects categorised as 'black' varied from 1% to 87% whilst victims were predominantly white throughout, varying from 67% to 99%. As the author remarked:

Extract: Ethnicity and street crime

"Ethnicity and street crime could easily become a highly emotive issue and for this reason data needs to be handled with special care."

HO Research Study, 254

4.2 There were a number of evaluations underway at the time of this inspection that were seeking to highlight the underlying causal factors and identify suitable remedial action to impact on the negative social and cultural issues. Ethnicity and race featured prominently in an external local evaluation in one of the areas inspected. Locally gathered data showed that the proportion of those arrested for street crime who were black had changed from 80% in the early stages to around 20% as SCI progressed. It was unclear to the team, and at the time to those collecting the data, why there had been such a reversal.

4.3 Despite this relatively consistent previous evidence of the over-representation of black people as perpetrators of street crime, the impact of this on the communities involved was not specifically addressed. The inspection team did find evidence of

impact assessment and consultation with the minority ethnic community in Lambeth, though this robbery scheme pre-dated the SCI so could not be attributed to the initiative itself. It did however serve to illustrate how police action with a high degree of ethnic sensitivity could be handled in such a way that the community remained on side.

4.4   At the time of an initial visit to a YOI in London in December 2002 inspectors found all SC offenders were either black or foreign nationals. Although SCAT collected offender ethnicity details on tracker, the inspection team found no evidence that such data was being subject to analysis or consideration, which was a significant omission given the specific duties set out in the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000. A clear lead from the centre would surely have had a significant impact on the way that the initiative was undertaken locally.

Recommendation 8

Performance monitoring of any future national initiative should include the overt monitoring of disproportionality in ethnicity.

Rehabilitation and resettlement

4.5   Rehabilitation and resettlement concerns the attention that is given to addressing offending behaviour and those factors that protect against further offending. Accommodation, employment, stable relationships and financial security are protective factors, and that successful resettlement is more likely when these are in place. However, there was no specific provision in prisons within the SCI for rehabilitation except for tackling drug misuse. The delivery of other interventions and attention to resettlement depended on the extent to which prisons were already addressing these issues generally or on the context of other initiatives.

Good Practice

Post-release

In Birmingham the inspection team found a scheme where all young SC offenders were required to take part in a specifically designed robbery programme.

4.6   Juveniles being released from custody had the benefit of a comprehensive release plan that combined appropriate controls with services and appointments designed to help the young person resettle into his or her community. In some places the plan

required the completion of programmes designed to deal with aspects of their offending and where risk of re-offending was deemed to be high, ISSP was used to impose a further means of control.

4.7 For adults there were several good examples of resettlement programmes or intensive supervision and drug management schemes that had either just started or were proposed at the time of inspection. In most areas the probation service had independently tracked SC offenders and was preparing plans for future resettlement focussing on enhanced levels of supervision and addressing criminogenic needs.

Good Practice	**Post release**

Post release

Merseyside Probation Area

Having identified SCI cases, they are to be prioritised in the delivery of the following services.

- ***Housing***
  There were 2 Prison Service officers employed to liaise with 13 housing providers in the Merseyside area. There was a full range of types of accommodation. Offenders could be worked with in advance of release were referrals were made in good time.

- ***Basic skills***
  All offenders assessed at the start of their orders/licences via the 20 Qs process. There is good in house provision and knowledge of the targets for 2003-4. There is optimism that the targets can be reached.

- ***Employment***
  Merseyside continued to have relatively high unemployment. Funding has enabled a variety of initiatives to tackle employment related needs.

South Yorkshire Probation Area

All Street Crime Offenders serving custodial sentences released to Sheffield were to be considered for the local prolific offender scheme, prior to their release on licence.

Suggestion L

It would be encouraging to see cross agency resettlement projects being established in all CJ Areas to help break the cycle for prolific offenders.

Learning the lessons

1 Introduction

1.1 Phase 1 of the joint inspection identified concerns that there was a distinct absence of meaningful monitoring and evaluation throughout SCI. There was also considerable unease at the validity and application of the performance statistics that were being collected centrally, in particular those emanating from the SC Tracker system.

1.2 SCI has been a very high profile element of the Government's drive to deliver improvements in service delivery so it is not surprising that the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU) has taken a close interest in the progress of the initiative.

1.3 In August 2002, at a SC conference for senior managers and practitioners, Michael Barber (PMDU) identified 4 key elements for achieving 'excellence in public service delivery':

- *Focus* – It is important to have clear and shared objectives and targets if all the partners in a joint endeavour such as SCI are to contribute fully to progress.

- *Clarity* – Messages at all levels need to be clear and unambiguous, both internally and externally, to ensure that all understand what success will look like and how far towards that success the initiative has progressed. Underpinning such clarity of message must be utterly reliable data and information capturing processes.

- *Urgency* – The 'urgency' is vital to maintain a momentum of progress that encourages further success. A key element would be strong leadership that is transparently accountable for delivery and therefore takes responsibility for pro-actively challenging failure or delay.

- *Irreversibility* – Locking in sustainable success requires a process of continuous improvement that is reliant on evaluation of results achieved and an effective process for recycling good practice and learning lessons from mistakes or omissions.

1.4 In applying these 4 litmus tests to SCI during the Phase 2 activity, the inspection team found the initiative lacking in all these areas. Whilst at the national level some activity was noted within each element, and there were isolated pockets of good practice in Areas, there was no clear sense of a co-ordinated or structured overall plan or of respective accountability for the various elements. Where positive relationships existed at a strategic level, which was the case in most of the areas visited, this did not always translate to tangible performance improvements at an operational level.

2 Clear and shared objectives and targets ("Focus")

2.1 One of the key aims of SCAG was to encourage a joined-up approach through establishing cross-CJS objectives. The intention to involve agencies beyond the police in the joint approach was flagged as early as the first Programme Board meeting, when the objectives of the initiative were set as:

Extract: SCI objectives

"To reduce the incidence of robbery through criminal justice interventions and increase the rate of detection and charge by supporting the implementation of targeted policing strategies: and

To increase the number of offenders charged with robbery brought to justice (convictions, cautions, TICs) and the timeliness of the process, by ensuring that they are dealt with promptly, efficiently and effectively at every stage in the criminal justice process."

Street Crime Programme Board, April 2002

2.2 The inspection team found little evidence that these 'joint' objectives were widely communicated or that they consciously influenced the 10 SC Areas by way of encouragement to set area level crosscutting objectives or targets. The only central target that was consistently emphasised was that of robbery reduction and this was largely viewed as a target for which the Police Service alone was accountable. The frequent appearances of chief constables at subsequent SCAG meetings, to account for apparently poor performance further reinforced this perception.

2.3 CPS areas requested central guidance, from CPS HQ, in developing crosscutting objectives and targets in October 2002 but this had not been provided by the time of the inspection fieldwork (January-March 2003). In the absence of crosscutting targets or advice, it is perhaps unsurprising that the inspection team found little evidence that local partnerships had been moved to establish cross cutting objectives or targets.

2.4 On the contrary, the inspection team was more often made aware of conflict between individual agency's national objectives and trying to achieve a coherent joined-up process locally

> ### Quote: Conflicting priorities
>
> "It's all very well saying we should all work together but we are trying to achieve fundamentally different end results."
>
> *Probation officer*
>
> "As long as we are separate organisations with separate funding streams it is difficult to see how truly joined-up working can happen."
>
> *Police manager*

2.5 Conversely, in other areas, practitioners *did* perceive a joint objective.

> ### Quote: Common priorities
>
> "We are all working to the same aim, less offending and safer communities"
>
> *Probation officer*

2.6 The inspection team did find some promising examples of at least potential good practice in the partnership field. In London, several of the SC Boroughs had started to draw up joint objectives, under the co-ordination of the Government Office representative. In Merseyside, the multi-agency "Joint Action Group" was achieving progress towards the same end. At the time of the fieldwork, the one notable exception to the absence of a local crosscutting approach was in Avon and Somerset, where the local agencies structured their approach to ensure genuinely joint working. The chart in Figure 5 shows the partnership approach adopted. It had the advantage of tying in all of the relevant agencies to SCI whilst also ensuring that the specific problems were viewed in the wider context of the mainstream 'community safety' activities of all concerned.

Figure 5: The partnership structure in Avon and Somerset

2.7 Under this structure, partnership targets and substantial action plans were agreed and were regularly reviewed, via the task group checkpoint meetings and Action on Street Crime Leadership Group.

Recommendation 9

That the Government, through the National and Local Criminal Justice Boards, set clear, cross-agency targets for future initiatives to aid the development of relationships between partners within the CJS.

3 Unambiguous messages and results ("Clarity")

3.1 The only clear target understood by practitioners throughout all 10 areas was the robbery reduction target. Beneath this high level message, there were few examples of any initiative-wide consensus on the main messages and the breadth of targets and expectations. Central to any such standardised approach would have been clear standards expected and accurate monitoring of performance against those standards. This section explores both aspects.

Performance against standards

3.2 As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, general case file quality and timeliness have been routinely monitored in all forces through JPM data, but the inspection team found that only in South Yorkshire and Thames Valley had there been any attempt to separate out SCI file data for independent monitoring.

3.3 Usually building upon the CPS "Premium Service" each Area compiled a "SC Service Level Protocol", setting out the expectations for engagement for each of the partner agencies. These protocols would typically, for example, outline activities from the initial police response at a crime scene through to appearance and sentencing at court.

3.4 The inspection team found very little monitoring of actual performance against the promised standards but where it did occur, there were significant failures to meet standards or targets. Initial protocols had proven demanding and many provisions aspirational. They had often been written by senior managers, then implemented with little discussion at practitioner level. As a result of experience, many were in the process of being revised at the time of inspection, to include more achievable standards.

3.5 The one consistent area of monitoring was the overall crime reduction rate, which was scrutinised jointly at Chief Officer level. Performance data was circulated by SCAT to robbery co-ordinators and each Area also had other local management information in place albeit usually agency specific. The YJB also monitored standards in relation to young offenders.

3.6 The pre-existing statistics available to police, CPS and courts on such issues as attrition (i.e. the proportion of cases failing to reach a positive outcome) was rarely surfaced in the SCI meetings and in any case tended to remain at a strategic level in organisations. A significant problem in this regard was that pre-existing CJS statistics

were usually only available 18 months in arrears and therefore of little use in real time management of performance.

3.7   The inspection team found no evidence to suggest that emerging lessons from attrition in respect of SCI cases were being fed back to staff at the operational level. Even where strong relationships existed between CPS lawyers and police, operational police staff were generally unaware of *why* cases were being discontinued or lost.

3.8   One of the central barriers to meaningful exchange and comparison of performance data between different agencies was the long-standing problem that each agency has different base 'units' of measurement. The police recorded offences and track offenders, the CPS monitor defendants and the courts count indictments or cases. These different base lines militate against genuine joined-up working, meaningful tracking of individuals or cases through the system and presented a significant barrier to achieving an integrated IT system for the CJS. This problem pre-dated SCI but represented a major barrier to consideration of joint or cross cutting objectives or measures.

3.9   The general picture within SCI, therefore, was of few crosscutting objectives or targets and little in the way of structured or co-ordinated approaches to joint performance management. Most areas appeared to be looking to the "Performance Officer" role within LCJBs as being the platform for developing inter-agency targets after they are fully established.

Good Practice	In West Midlands there was evidence of comparatively advanced systems of performance measurement. Long-term PSA targets have been incorporated into 12 month police authority targets. Monthly reports were made to the strategic robbery group. Quality assurance, in the form of CPS unit head reports on handling of finalised cases was in place. Monitoring also took place of advice referral and of information provided by police at time of request for advice, as compared with evidence received on full file, to assess whether quality of information has impacted on advice given. In addition monitoring of reasons for cases cracking in some parts of the Area, as well as incidence of acceptance of lesser pleas was being tracked.

Monitoring via 'Tracker' systems

3.10 In addition to pre-existing systems for monitoring individual agency performance, a specific multi-agency "SC Tracker" system was introduced for the purposes of following all SCI offenders through the system, from arrest to sentence. Pre-existing CJ systems did not allow cases to be followed through the extent of the CJS. Using a simple spreadsheet, the SC tracker was designed to contain up to 22 pieces of information covering the 4 key stages of arrest, arrest outcome, first appearance at court and final disposal for each SC offence where an arrest was made.

3.11 SCAT was made the central custodian of the SC Tracker system and also monitored in parallel the performance of each area against crime reduction targets producing weekly SCAT reports, for circulation to all members of SCAG, the Officials Group, PDG and to each SC Area.

3.12 The data for inclusion in these reports was provided by the ten police forces involved, in their joint roles as 'owners' of the crime data and local agents for the multi-agency tracker information. The official SC (arrest) Tracker was in use in each of the 90 police basic command units (BCUs) across the 10 forces involved in the initiative, with custody offices and CJ units being the main source for initial file creation and SC 'flagging'.

3.13 The weekly crime and arrest statistics were undoubtedly heavily scrutinised at national level and a number of significant high level strategic decisions were taken as a direct result of trends and results highlighted in these weekly reports. This allowed for timely intervention or support and thereby achieved or maintained a momentum for improvement which might be lost if figures were too removed from 'real time'.

3.14 Such momentum raised a fear of precipitous decision making but despite an initial view that 2-weekly was "more practical" than weekly and consistent representations throughout the initiative, the weekly reporting schedule was still not changed by April 2003.

3.15 It had been hoped that the SC Tracker would prove a benefit to the agencies locally, within the SC areas, to enable and inform cross-agency working and to assist local commanders to actively manage performance. In fact, the inspection team found virtually no examples of the official tracker data being utilised by tactical or operational staff in any of the agencies involved in SCI.

3.16 Generally, the SCAT statistics were retained at a strategic level, with the product of pre-existing in-house systems being the main information source for managers and practitioners. In fairness, SC Tracker was not designed as a replacement for local

systems but by failing to provide practical data required for operational management its credibility with those staff suffered.

3.17 The quotes set out below are typical of those received from practitioners at area level during mixed agency focus group discussions about Tracker.

Quotes: Making use of Tracker

- "The official tracker is just a collection tool for the Home Office. It doesn't help us at all to do our jobs and we don't use the statistics produced. It's just an extra burden."

- "We prefer to trust our own systems. The 'tracker' rarely matches up with the figures we have."

- "It's very wasteful of time and effort to have to enter the same details over and over again. I thought the government was trying to cut down on bureaucracy."

- "I co-ordinate the data for joint meetings and I haven't seen the national comparative statistics since October." (3-4 months)

All CJ practitioners

Duplication of effort

3.18 The inspection team found that each agency within local partnership arrangements had its own data recording system. Most of these were IT based but none were compatible and so data from one was not capable of transfer to another automatically, even where the same national supplier had provided the different systems. As a result, a proliferation of incompatible 'tracker' systems had emerged, each requiring manual entry and duplication of data held in other databases. The method of capture ranged from simple spreadsheets to hand written logs and files. The number of different trackers in operation varied but the inspection team found up to seven in operation on any one area.

3.19 For all of the agencies inspected, collection and recording of the data required for the "trackers" had become a drain on resources rather than an aide to performance management. In the CPS, for example, extensive resources were being expended to maintain manual records to monitor the incidence of pre-charge advice, discontinuance and attrition because the official SC Tracker system had not been effectively developed as a management tool.

3.20 Tracker did not record any of the stages between first court appearance and sentence, leaving CPS and courts to record these on alternative trackers. Furthermore, 'final outcome' on the SCAT tracker was designated as point of sentence. The important processes of sentence management, rehabilitation and resettlement were therefore not catered for, making the roles of Prisons and Probation unnecessarily more difficult.

Recommendation 10

That the planned integrated IT system for all CJ agencies be fast-tracked, by the Government, as an urgent priority.

Accuracy of data – Arrest to sentence

3.21 The inspection team found strong concerns about the accuracy and validity of the data captured on the various tracker systems due to two issues:

- Inconsistency of interpretation of the definition of street crime

- Error rate caused by multiple-entry of data.

3.22 *Offence definition* – Several sub-issues emerged concerning the definition of 'street crime' adopted and implemented across the 10 areas. The definition included robbery, snatch theft, 'car-jacking' and firearm offences.

3.23 Prior to SCI, not all of the forces involved recorded 'snatch theft' as a separate category of offence. It was not a recognised Home Office classification of crime and although the Metropolitan Police and a few others had historically identified snatch thefts, they were recorded as a sub-category of 'theft from person'. As a new category for most, it created two potential problems:

(i)   it was open to wide variations in interpretation, and

(ii)   there was no comparative data pre-SCI to allow trend analysis.

3.24 The inspection team found that whilst some forces initially appeared to use 'snatch theft' as an alternative to low-level robberies, and so numbers rose as recorded robberies reduced, most erred towards inclusion in the robbery category if there was any doubt whatsoever. SCAT specifically monitored the relative trends in both categories to safeguard against any temptation to down grade reports, to meet targets. To be wholly satisfied of the integrity of the statistics in the longer term, however, it would be necessary to also overtly monitor theft from person.

3.25 There were also misunderstandings amongst operational staff regarding the definitions, and therefore identification, of SC offences. Many staff from all agencies failed to record robbery-related offences, such as attempted robbery, assault with intent to rob and conspiracy to rob on the tracker. These offences often remained unidentified as they proceeded through the courts.

3.26 *National Crime Recording Standard* – Another factor that impacted on recorded crime figures was the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). Following the publication of the HMIC report "On the Record"[26] and the proposals in the Home Office Review of Crime Statistics in July 2000, in April 2001 the Association of Chief Police Officers agreed to introduce the new National Crime Recording Standard across all 43 police forces in England and Wales. The new standard had two main aims:

- To move the crime counts for the 43 forces of England and Wales onto a more consistent national basis; and

- To take a more victim-centred approach to crime recording.

3.27 NCRS was predicted to lead to an increase in the number of recorded crimes for all forces. This would occur because forces would have to ensure that they recorded crime reports that previously might have been rejected at the reporting stage as either clearly non-criminal or lacking sound evidence. The police might also have been disinclined to record for other reasons, for example because the crime could not be investigated further and therefore detected. HMIC predicted that the effect could be to inflate the number of recorded crimes by as much as one third. This increase would represent an artificial increase, one that bore no relation to real changes in the level of crime experienced by society.

3.28 All forces had implemented the new standard by the end of March 2002. However, the different degree to which forces already recorded on a consistent victim-oriented basis, and the variation in the timing of the implementation over the course of the year, made it difficult to accurately assess the impact on SCI offences. The inspection team heard from a number of Chief Police Officers that NCRS had had a negative impact on the viability of long term targets that had been set using base data which did not take account of the NCRS 'factor'.

3.29 In fact, the Home Office carried out an audit in August 2002 and concluded that, whilst each of the SC forces experienced different scales of impact, dependant mainly on their date of adoption of NCRS, the individual effects were capable of being taken into account when performance was assessed.

3.30 *Multiple data entry* – There were also strong concerns about the potential for inaccuracy that multiple-entry of data onto so many tracker systems introduced. The different sets of information input by different agencies cannot easily be reconciled, if at all. The inspection team found that at each stage of the process there was a likelihood of missing or inaccurate data.

- In one force there was no system in place to ensure that all persons *arrested* for street crime were input to tracker where charges were not preferred.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **IT compatibility**
>
> In South Yorkshire data for tracker was automatically transferred from custody computer to tracker, thereby minimising the opportunity for lost data during multiple manual entry.

- The inspection team could find no evidence to ensure that where SC offences were 'taken into consideration' by a court then this would be subsequently entered onto tracker.

- There was evidence of the tracker system distorting figures when a case was re-classified from street crime to another crime type. Tracker then marked this as a discontinuance, which has the effect of widening the apparent 'justice gap'.

- In larger forces, multiple entry sites meant that offender data could be lost when arrested in one part of the force but dealt with elsewhere.

- There was no consistent method of ensuring that the right results were transferred to SCAT tracker in a timely manner. The inspection team were told that a number of forces were having to backtrack data to result cases that had been completed some time previously but without a result being entered onto tracker. As a result, cases were not being finalised promptly, which in turn affected the calculation of attrition and discontinuance rates.

- In one extreme case, an offender had been convicted, sentenced, served six months imprisonment, been released and had again come to police notice before the result had been entered onto tracker.

- In another area the inspection team were concerned that data on discontinuance was being erroneously entered onto tracker causing that area to show a higher rate of discontinuance in SCAT reports than was actually the case.

3.31 The inspection team found a distinct absence of quality assurance comparison of data from different systems to ensure it was valid and matched data contained elsewhere within the area. The situation was made worse by the different 'counting units' for agencies, e.g. cases, defendants and charges.

> **Good Practice**
>
> **Quality assurance of data**
>
> In Avon and Somerset, a CJ Co-ordination office had been established (in advance of LCJBs and associated performance officers), to provide cross agency quality assurance of performance data. This office circulated the 'official' tracker data regularly for each of the other agencies to reconcile their own database.

3.32 During the course of the inspection, a separate audit was being conducted, through SCAT, which included aspects of data reliability. This audit was completed in April 2003 and although the overall conclusion was that data was "reasonably accurate" the audit team expressed the following concerns over data accuracy;

- Car-Jacking and Snatch Theft were not being identified accurately in all areas

- Detailed reasons for outcomes were not always being identified

- Some initial SC arrests were being missed due to local custody systems not recording the information

- Final court outcomes were tardy or incomplete in many areas despite the introduction of CPS Tracker.

3.33 For all its limitations, SC Tracker provided the forerunner for the much-heralded 'J-Track', which is designed to provide a more comprehensive cross-CJS database of persistent offenders. J-Track will continue to track SC offenders, as well as expanding into persistent offender scrutiny. The concept of a single unified tracking system is welcomed but the unavailability of compatible IT systems through the CJ system means that the duplication and bureaucracy is unlikely to be removed. In addition, it is understood that key CJ players such as Probation will have no access whatsoever to J-Track, and the launch date for other agencies will be up to 2 years hence.

> **Quote: Compatible IT in CJS**
>
> "Until we get a common IT system for the whole criminal justice system, we will still be playing about with double-keying and incompatible information. In the 21st Century it totally beggars belief that we don't have systems that at least talk to each other!"
>
> *Court official*

Accuracy of data – Post Sentence

3.34 As previously stated, the SC Tracker was only designed to cover arrest to sentence, despite the initiative having a clear focus on aspects of treatment, rehabilitation and resettlement well beyond the sentencing stage.

3.35 The inspection team found that identification of SC offenders post sentence, by Probation or Prison Services, relied heavily on the efficiency of flagging at earlier stages in the process. Even where this occurred, there were concerns amongst practitioners that SCI offenders should receive priority drug treatment or that resources should be diverted to them from other more serious categories of offender. In one case, a young man was convicted of rape, indecent assault and theft; he received treatment on the basis of the theft rather than the sexual offences.

3.36 The team found many different methods for flagging cases from custody office, through CPS to courts. Methods ranged from stamps on custody records through to annotated unique reference numbers (URNs). Different coloured case files were adopted in some areas but their usefulness diminished when papers were photocopied.

Good Practice	**Flagging SC prisoners to Probation**
	In 5 of the 6 forces visited, the Probation Service were supplied with copies of Tracker data. This helped them in identifying SC offenders in prison and tracking them through sentence. However, it was acknowledged that the data available, beyond sentence was unlikely to capture all SC offenders that were currently serving sentences for SC.

3.37 Universally, however, despite all efforts, magistrates courts reported that many cases still arrived without any flag. Although there were attempts to provide reliable tracking of data in most magistrates courts, many crown courts either had no stand alone system or the system in place was manual and inconsistently applied. Courts generally found that further fallback measures had to be employed to ensure SC cases were appropriately highlighted. These measures ranged from permanently employed administrative assistants through to a reliance on identification by court clerks at the actual court appearance.

3.38 There was no evidence found in any prison that commital warrants for SC offenders were being systematically flagged. In one area, the absence of flagging for commitment warrants was only realised during a pre-meeting arranged locally to discuss issues prior to attending the inspection team focus group on the subject. The omission was immediately rectified.

3.39 Once in prison, very few establishments had any method of ensuring SC offenders were identified at all. The prisons suggested there might be a role for the probation liaison officer in this regard but at the time of inspection no such responsibility existed and identification was largely ad hoc and inconsistent. Particular problems arose when a prisoner was sentenced in one area and committed to prison in another. Remote prisons were likely to ignore a 'flag' unique to another area because they had not been trained to expect one.

Good Practice	**Identifying SC offenders in prison**
	Holloway and Wormwood Scrubs had good systems where staff were given the role of identifying SC offenders using pre-defined criteria.

4 Ownership and accountability to achieve delivery ("Urgency")

4.1 As discussed elsewhere, the over-concentration on the most visible direct measure, of crime reduction against individual targets, led to an over emphasis on the accountability of Chief Constables. Whilst there already existed a number of relevant performance measures at various stages of the CJS, these were not routinely exposed within SCI, thereby missing the opportunity for greater sharing of accountability for achieving the overall objectives.

> ### Quote: Accountability
>
> *"When I see the Chief Crown Prosecutor or head of Probation being called up to explain their performance at a PM's meeting, then I will believe that its not just the police being held to account."*
>
> *CPS senior manager*

4.2 This was a sentiment that emerged regularly. As part of the move to reinforce the original view that the responsibility should be shared across the CJS, on 20 February 2003, the Home Office wrote to each of the 10 SC Area Management Boards and highlighted a suite of eight measures, against which performance would thereafter be measured.

4.3 The measures highlighted were:

- Attrition rate
- Conviction rate
- Ineffective/cracked trials
- Timeliness
- Discontinuances
- Bail conditions
- Sentencing patterns
- Proportion of robbery arrests proceeding to court

4.4 The letter made clear the Home Office view that these were pre-existing measures and, as such, not a new demand on agencies. It was further emphasised, that these should not cut across CJS or LCJB targets or plans. It is too early to tell whether this re-emphasis will contribute significantly towards addressing the lack of shared accountability to date within SCI.

5 Sustainability of effort and achievements ("Irreversibility")

5.1 The main purpose of any initiative must be to achieve improvements and then to sustain those achievements. It is therefore absolutely key for good practice to be identified in a structured manner and then recycled and applied across all the

participating areas. Although some agencies had internal meetings to plot progress and look at what had worked for them, the inspection team found no evidence of any initiative-wide strategic approach to the capture or dissemination of good practice.

5.2 The inspectors did, however, identify pockets of good practice in even the least well tackled aspects of SCI, and some significant good work in the mainstream areas. Although there was a lack of overall co-ordination, there were 3 discernible strands of activity that allowed some of the good practice to emerge:

- Sharing of good practice between practitioners

- Production of tactical menus

- Independent evaluations.

5.3 *Sharing good practice* – As part of the on-going management of the police response to SCI, ACPO established two levels of regular meetings (Chief Officers and co-ordinating Superintendents) aimed at identifying and exchanging good practice between the 10 SCI forces. In addition, they staged national seminars to further expose tactical options that had worked in individual force areas.

5.4 What was missing from this information exchange was any co-ordination of the examination or identification of good practice across agencies. The individual effort of CPS to co-ordinate progress and good practice was mentioned in Chapter 4. Other agencies also reported varying degrees of exchange internally but there was no evidence of inter-agency exchange.

Quote: Cross cutting good practice

"By the summer of 2002, forces had established quite a good exchange and each had learned from the tactics deployed by others. The major gap was in finding any good practice from the other agencies or across agencies to help with the robbery target – so far we have barely scratched the surface."

Police Chief Officer

Recommendation 11

A strategy and structure for identifying, exchanging and implementing good practice should be established at the start of any national initiative.

5.5 *Production of tactical menus* – Building on the direct exchanges between SC forces, ACPO also worked with CENTREX (National Police Training Organisation) to develop a "Knowledge Map" for tackling robbery. The map is an IT-based reference guide to managers and practitioners that steers the user through good practice at tactical levels.

5.6 In addition, The PSU produced (in April 2003) a 'Good Tactics Guide', consisting mainly of the examples of good practice highlighted in the SCAT weekly reports.

5.7 *Independent evaluations* – In the education field, some significant evaluation work was carried out into the effectiveness of summer diversion activities and police in schools (see Section 6 for further details). The inspection team found little evidence of any similar degree of direct activity within other agencies, or indeed across agency boundaries, to identify transferable good practice.

5.8 The table at Appendix I indicates the breadth of evaluation activity identified to the inspection team. Almost without exception, these evaluations have been generated within the individual areas, mostly by police forces in conjunction with academic institutions, and some predated SCI but were relevant to the subject area. Two were directly sponsored and implemented by the Home Office, these being

(i) "The Nature of Personal Robbery" and

(ii) "Tackling Personal Robbery: lessons learnt from the police and community partnerships".

5.9 Both pieces of research had their origins pre-SCI albeit they added to the exchange of tactical good practice when they were published in early 2003.

6 Learning from previous initiatives

6.1 The inspection team also found little evidence of those who were charged with implementing SCI having drawn on specific previous lessons learned or experiences from, previous similar initiatives.

6.2 At a CJS business planning event on December 2000, attended by CJS practitioners, the key outcomes sought by those in attendance, and quoted in "Criminal Justice: The way ahead", were:

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Extract: The way ahead

- 'Bottom up' input to the planning process;

- Clear, prioritised and communicated nation-wide targets;

- Meaningful and diagnostic performance information;

- A planning timetable structured so that national plans can inform local ones; and

- Good practice – what works and what doesn't – to be collated and promulgated by the centre.

CJS Business Planning Event, December 2000

</div>

6.3   In February 2001, a joint inspection[27] reported on the government initiative to speed up the handling of PYOs. Some of the key factors highlighted were:

- positive management of performance by each agency, based on an analysis of accurate data on the progress of PYOs and youth cases generally

- sound procedures by all agencies for identifying correctly PYOs

- flagging of PYOs by all agencies

- active progress monitoring

6.4   In May 2002, a follow-up joint inspection[28] reported again on the PYO initiative and highlighted amongst the key issues:

- Despite agreements to process both PYO and adult cases quickly, in practice this was not happening

- Youth case progression groups should make more use of performance management data in addition to that produced by the court case tracking software

- Poor quality and timeliness of police files together with late review by prosecutors was contributing to cracked and ineffective trials

6.5   It is always difficult to keep track of all the good progress being achieved elsewhere even within an individual organisation. Each of the inspectorates spend an inordinate amount of time reminding agencies of previous recommendations, lessons and good practice. It is immeasurably more difficult, therefore, for organisations or individual agencies to keep themselves aware of cross-discipline lessons, good practice or mistakes. If the CJS is to move further towards a joined-up approach to improving services, it will be vital that good practice and transferable

lessons are not wasted or forgotten. The effort required to continually re-invent existing wheels could be much better deployed in building on sustained success and transferring lessons and approaches to other priority areas.

7   The Way Forward

7.1   The importance of learning from lessons, both of SCI and other initiatives, had not driven significant activity prior to the time of the joint inspection visits but team members were subsequently pleased to participate in a "Street Crime Best Practice Seminar" held on 28 March 2003, organised by PMDU. The seminar was attended by Home Office officials (SCAT, PSU and others) and senior police representatives and was intended to examine the dissemination of 'best practice', at least in the police arena.

7.2   The attendees received presentations from the architects of 2 previous very successful change programmes within the public sector. The first was within education and included the rationale and method for introduction of major changes, epitomised and remembered for the introduction of 'the literacy hour'. The approach used was highly structured, top-down and based on an agreed knowledge base that formed the core of the changes.

7.3   The second example was the changes to primary care arrangements within the health service. This followed a largely 'bottom-up' collaborative and partnership approach to encouraging GPs to identify and adopt existing good practice.

7.4   The seminar also included workshops where participants commented upon the effectiveness of exchange and dissemination of good practice to date and the future approach to get the best from SCI. They were particularly asked to consider whether either or both of the examples discussed might be relevant and provide transferable lessons for SCI.

7.5   The views expressed from those groups can be summarised as:

- A critical next step is to develop a strategic approach to transference of good practice within SCI

- An infrastructure was required for effective capture and transfer

- It is important to make better use of data (in particular shared data) and adopt a 'learn as you go' approach

- Data capture should reflect shared accountability and regularity of capture should match practical ability to make a difference to results

- SCI, if continued, should align to the wider agenda to attract greater buy-in, e.g. focus on 'acquisitive crime' or 'victimisation'

- Policing has been progressed via a 'driven' approach (hierarchical, top-down direction of priorities – similar to the education model) but genuine partnership working might be better progressed via a 'lateral' approach (i.e. more consensus jointly-owned priorities – as the health example)

7.6   It is understood that this workshop will be followed by further consultation to apply the emergent learning. In parallel, SCAT has also reworked the SCAG action plan for the period to April 2004, with 4 strategic themes, namely:

- *"Letting everyone know where they stand"* – Clarity of message

- *"Delivering more of the same only better"* – relentless implementation

- *"Investing for sustainability"* – strengthening partnership capacity

- *"Getting ahead of the game"* – preventing emerging trends

7.7   The inspection team would strongly support a more structured approach to identification, capture, evaluation and dissemination of good practice and transferable lessons.

Chapter 8:
Recommendations

8.1 The joint inspection was conceived to ensure the identification of the key lessons emerging from this unique approach to tackling a single crime problem. The inspection focused on the cross cutting, partnership aspects as well as seeking to assess its sustainability and the transferability of lessons learned to other initiatives.

8.2 This report is the result of collaboration between 8 inspectorates who, in a variety of combinations, visited the SC areas and examined a wide-ranging spectrum of operational and strategic activity. The individual elements of SCI were often a microcosm of the CJS in general and so at times the inspection team felt they were assessing the whole system rather than a relatively discrete process. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many problems within SCI mirrored pre-existing or emerging problems in the CJS in general and consequently some of the findings emerging from SCI have core relevance to the wider CJS and current criminal justice reform.

8.3 Chapters 3-7 have set out, often in some detail, the specific areas of practical and operational concern. Throughout the text, a number of "Suggestions" and "Recommendations" have been made, and these are consolidated in this chapter. Whilst the Suggestions register areas of particular interest and provide the inspection team's views on actions required, the 11 Recommendations form the main thrust of the joint inspection findings.

8.4 SCI has undoubtedly been groundbreaking and challenged both conventional and 'silo' thinking. It has been successful in reducing offending, increasing convictions and improving the treatment of victims and witnesses but it has yet to achieve its full potential, in particular as a partnership initiative and as a model for further reform within wider criminal justice reform.

8.5 The initiative was a rapid and robust response to an urgent problem. The momentum provided by the highest level engagement within Government, the application of significant funding and the establishment of a national structure for delivery undoubtedly drove the speed of progress and produced very positive results in a short timescale.

8.6 The same momentum, however, precluded a depth of pre-planning and consultation at the outset that many within the initiative would now welcome. If the initiative is to progress effectively, it must embed the key elements of 'focus', 'clarity', 'urgency' and 'irreversibility'. To do this it should include consultation over appropriate and jointly-owned targets, continuity of resourcing, a clear and simple structure for measuring and monitoring progress, clarity of ownership and accountability and agreement over the means to ensure sustainability of progress, to include a strategic co-ordination of capture and evaluation of good practice.

The Joint Inspection Team recommends that:

The National Drive

1   *Funding Streams*

       Page 40

Future national initiatives benefit from a 'single pot' funding approach to cut down on bureaucracy and ease allocation and that such funding should be identified for medium and long-term projects to assist with planning and recruitment.

2   *Local Consultation*

       Page 51

In planning national initiatives, early consultation should occur between national and regional stakeholders to ensure that locally agreed priorities are balanced with national goals

Joined up Justice

3   *Standardised Protocols*

       Page 67

In multi-agency initiatives common standards for Joint Agency Protocols should be established in the early stages and be inclusive of all relevant agencies

4   *Case review and preparation*

       Page 71

In order to ensure offenders are dealt with appropriately, monitoring of case progression should include;

● Specific monitoring of police file quality and timeliness, with measurable actions for improvement

● Separation of case data by crime type and

● The agreement of a common CJS flagging system for tracking cases through the system from arrest to resettlement

5	*Responsibility for Victims and Witnesses* Page 91	A single statutory agency should be identified to take ownership of victims and witnesses and that a national protocol is agreed for witness care with clear assignment of responsibilities

Drugs as a Driver of Street Crime

6	*Performance against treatment targets* Page 104	The National Treatment Agency should establish a clear, measurable and achievable standard for the provision of drugs treatment for offenders identified by initiatives such as SCI

Breaking The Cycle of Offending

7	*Police in schools* Page 118	LCJBs and LEAs should jointly establish systems to monitor the impact that having a police officer in school has on; ● the number of exclusions ● the incidence of bullying ● attendance at the school National guidelines and a performance framework should be designed to ensure the effectiveness of this initiative.

8	*Monitoring Ethnicity* Page 129	Performance monitoring of any future national initiative should include the overt monitoring of disproportionality in ethnicity

Learning the Lessons

9	*Performance against standards* Page 134	That the Government, through the National and Local Criminal Justice Boards, set clear, cross-agency targets for future initiatives to aid the development of relationships between partners within the CJS
10	*Tracker and monitoring* Page 139	That the planned integrated IT system for all CJ agencies be fast-tracked, by the Government, as an urgent priority
11	*Adopting good practice* Page 146	A strategy and structure for identifying, exchanging and implementing good practice should be established at the start of any national initiative

The Joint Inspection Team further suggests that:

The National Drive

A	*Regional Government Offices* Page 42	The role of RGO should be clarified and formalised within national criteria to aid partnership working within CJ Areas

Joined up Justice

B	*Video Identification (Central Guidance)* Page 60	There is a need for the development and circulation of central guidance on key ID issues to assist the police and CPS to jointly understand and identify problem cases. It is suggested that the CPS would be best placed to lead this development
C	*Video Identification (Local monitoring)* Page 63	For LCJBs to understand and act on key ID problems it would be necessary to incorporate monitoring of the impact of identification procedures on case outcomes within a nationally agreed framework

D	*Video Identification (NVIS)* Page 64	In developing the National Video Identification Standard, ACPO should consider incorporating a full indexing process to avoid contamination of witnesses
E	*Reviewing cracked and ineffective trials* Page 81	LCJBs should aim to establish a local cross agency process for reviewing all cracked and ineffective trials to help improve attrition rates for all crime.
F	*Plea and Directions Hearings* Page 81	Agency representatives should ensure that they contribute to the effectiveness of PDHs by: ● examining all issues in the case rigorously ● ensuring that witness availability is up to date and reliable ● ensuring that timescales agreed are realistic

Drugs as a driver of street crime

G	*Drugs arrest referral* Page 99	National guidelines and standards for arrest referral workers should be established together with a protocol for arrest referral for children and young persons
H	*Performance against treatment targets* Page 104	That the definition of 'treatment' be amended to exclude any preparatory activity, such as an initial consultation ahead of actual acceptance into a medically supervised programme of activity

I	*Community sentences* Page 107	More use could be made of ISSPs and DTTOs as a realistic alternative to custody in serious crime cases for young and first time offenders
J	*DATs* Page 112	The Partnership Standard for DATs should encourage DAT coordinators to produce produce and implement local drugs arrest and treatment action plans
K	*Summer diversionary activities* Page 122	LEAs would welcome early confirmation of funding for diversionary activities in sufficient time to enable them to:

For item K, the right column continues:

- Recruit key workers

- Identify appropriate young people and

- Plan activities to take place and that include children in the design of schemes and

- Timetable activities sufficiently ahead to allow for comprehensive planning and funding identification to take place

Breaking the Cycle of Offending

L	*Rehabilitation and resettlement* Page 130	It would be encouraging to see cross agency resettlement projects being established in all CJ Areas to help break the cycle for prolific offenders

Appendices

Appendix

Inspection Team Members

Kevin Green	HMIC Lead Staff Officer
Steve Basterfield	HMIC Staff Officer
Graham Lowings	HMIC Staff Officer
Helen Notman	HMIC Inspection Support Manager
Shabana Fazal	HMIC Knowledge Management Team
Penny Silvester	Ofsted Inspector
John Stephenson	Ofsted Inspector
Steve Hart	SSI Inspector
Anthony Chan	HMCPSI Legal Inspector
Wendy Williams	HMCPSI Legal Inspector
Jane Gould	HMCPSI Casework Inspector
David Abbott	HMMCSI Inspector
Andrew Silley	HMMCSI Inspector
Olwen Kershaw	Court Service Criminal Business Division
Monica Lloyd	HMI Prisons Head of Thematic Inspections
Peter Titley	HMI Prisons Inspector
Marjorie Simonds-Gooding	HMI Prisons Lay Inspector
Eddie Killoran	HMI Prisons Drugs Inspector
Sarah Leask	HMI Prisons Research Officer
Mark Boother	HMI Probation Inspector

Critical Readers

Kate Flannery	HMI Inspector of Constabulary
Professor Andrew Sanders	Manchester University

SCI Interim Performance Figures, September 2002 (SCAT, Oct 2002)

Table 1: Robbery and snatch theft combined: April to September (4 week periods)

	Apr 02	May 02	Jun 02	Jul 02	Aug 02	Sept 02	Net change Sept 02 compared to Apr 02	% change Sept 02 compared to Apr 02
Metropolitan Police	5,004	4,908	4,758	4,587	4,576	4,537	-467	-9%
West Midlands	1,322	1,142	1,104	1,072	963	926	-396	-30%
Greater Manchester	1,252	1,134	970	1,045	992	930	-322	-26%
Merseyside	402	385	358	326	391	297	-105	-26%
West Yorkshire	684	644	601	611	536	506	-178	-26%
Avon and Somerset	429	478	367	374	346	338	-91	-21%
Thames Valley	331	349	264	298	260	285	-46	-14%
Nottinghamshire	276	299	287	258	279	238	-38	-14%
South Yorkshire	246	238	235	209	185	264	18	7%
Lancashire	158	171	123	137	171	126	-32	-20%
Total 10 Forces	10,104	9,748	9,067	8,917	8,699	8,447	-1,657	-16%

Table 2: Robbery: March to September (4 week periods)

	Mar 02	Apr 02	May 02	Jun 02	Jul 02	Aug 02	Sept 02	Net change Sept 02 compared to Apr 02	% change Sept 02 compared to Apr 02
Metropolitan Police	3,720	3,427	3,455	3,226	3,033	3,030	3,106	-614	-17%
West Midlands	1,055	978	839	836	788	691	711	-344	-33%
Greater Manchester	970	952	840	741	741	716	669	-301	-31%
Merseyside	273	341	286	272	227	256	189	-84	-31%
West Yorkshire	623	482	432	406	389	324	344	-279	-45%
Avon and Somerset	515	356	378	273	300	261	258	-257	-50%
Thames Valley	209	231	247	173	200	166	173	-36	-17%
Nottinghamshire	220	219	241	223	208	216	188	-32	-15%
South Yorkshire	175	171	171	169	151	129	196	21	12%
Lancashire	123	107	126	100	103	124	104	-19	-15%
Total 10 Forces	7,883	7,264	7,015	6,419	6,140	5,913	5,938	1,945	-25%

Table 3: Robbery Percentage change April to September 2002 compared to April to September 2001 and percentage change July to September 2002 compared to July to September 2001

	April to September	July to September
MPS	-17%	-21%
West Midlands	-16%	-26%
Greater Manchester	0%	-10%
Merseyside	22%	1%
West Yorkshire	7%	-8%
Avon and Somerset	-5%	-25%
Thames Valley	-3%	-21%
Nottinghamshire	19%	4%
South Yorkshire	22%	15%
Lancashire	-11%	-5%
10 Forces	-10%	-18%

The Structure of the CJS
(from Justice for All. Home Office, July 2002)

Attorney General's Office

Lord Chancellor's Department

Home Office

Youth Justice Board

Legal Services Commission

Court Service

Judiciary and Magistracy

National Police Functions

Local Authorities

Local Magistrates Court Committees

Local Police Authorities

Local Probation Boards

Serious Fraud Office

Crown Prosecution Service

42 areas

Criminal Defence Service

Crown Courts

78 Crown Court Services

Magistrates' Courts

42 Magistrates' Courts

Police Services

42 areas

Probation Service

42 areas

Prison Service

13 regions and prisons

Criminal Injuries Compensation scheme and victim support

Youth Offending Teams

34 LA areas

Joint Inspection-Phased Approach and Methodology

1 Phased approach

Phase 1 – April to September 2002

1.1 This was particularly focused on the intended outcomes of SCI, as set out in the SCAG action plan. At such an early stage in the initiative, the inspectorates were sensitive to agencies already stretched energy and resource levels, in establishing and delivering many of the action plans required of them by SCAG. Intrusive inspection activity could have been disruptive to such efforts and potentially counterproductive, by adversely affecting the agencies' ability to deliver against targets set.

1.2 It was decided that Phase 1 should contain only limited field-work, but rather concentrate on examining performance information and data already being collected by SCAT and use the inspectorates' professional knowledge base to assess and identify areas of greatest relevance to joint working within SCI.

1.3 Phase 1 was to be an early assessment of progress but more usefully, a scoping study to help identify areas of apparent good practice or potential problems that would form the basis of in-depth joint inspection activity under phase 2.

Phase 2 – October 2002 to April 2003

1.4 The inspectorates perceived this phase as the earliest likely to provide meaningful evidence of any sustained or indeed sustainable achievements. Having highlighted key areas for examination, in the Phase 1 scoping study, Phase 2 was to include significant fieldwork both individually and in joint teams examining the multi-agency aspects of SCI. The objective was to identify transferable lessons, good practice and any unintended or unforeseen impacts of the initiative.

Phase 3 – Beyond April 2003

1.5 Depending on the sustainability of the initiative, both as a whole and in respect of individual actions within SCI, the inspectorates reserved judgement on whether a formal Phase 3 would be required and what form activity under that phase might take. It was considered that the most likely form would be for individual inspectorates to take responsibility for monitoring the on-going progress of any longer-term SCI actions within their respective fields of responsibility.

2 Inspection methodology

2.1 JISG established a Joint Inspectorate Working Group (JIWG) of practitioners to design the detail of the inspection. The majority of JIWG also took part in the inspection, as members of the team deployed. Over the course of Phases 1 and 2 of the inspection, the team members employed a wide range of inspection and monitoring techniques. They drew on the previous experience of individual team members as well as the respective corporate knowledge of each of the inspectorates involved.

Phase 1

2.2 During Phase 1, the emphasis was on fact-finding and establishing how each area had approached SCI, with a view to identifying the core similarities and key differences in approach. Inspectors also wished to keep intrusion to a minimum whilst having sufficient direct contact to allow validation of the main issues reported by the areas. The main tools deployed were:

- Literature research
- Performance data analysis
- Validation visits re police performance data (HMIC only)
- Standard and customised inspection protocol utilised
- Area position statements required and analysed
- Visits to each area COG (joint team)
- Single-agency interviews with key individuals
- Individual evidence and assessment templates
- Area summary sheets – to consolidate individual findings
- Visits to summer plus activities

2.3 The Phase 1 activity allowed the team to focus on cross cutting issues and identify areas suitable for a more in-depth inspection in Phase 2. An internal report was completed for JISG, setting out the findings and making recommendations on scope and scale for Phase 2 activity.

Phase 2

2.4 During Phase 2, the approach taken in Phase 1 was further developed and the following approach adopted:

- Updated Area position statement required

- Individual agency position statements

- Analysis of common issues from all position statements

- Pre-inspection visits to agree arrangements with the local police SCI co-ordinator

- Consolidated inspection framework document produced

- Customised individual evidence capture logs

- Standard inspection format

- Briefing and debriefing formally built in to each visit

- Individual interviews (single and cross team)

- File reading

- Multi-agency focus groups

- Inspection team debrief workshop

Newham Bail ISSP

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ YOT court officer identifies the need for bail supervision    │
│ and support                                                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                              │
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Does the young person fit the ISSP criteria and at imminent   │
│ risk of custody (1)                                           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Yes	No
YOT contact YOT ISSP staff	Follow current bail supervision and support programme
YOT ISSP complete assessment and asset	Unwilling to comply
Willing to comply	Refer back to YOT court team
YOT make initial referral to Premier, NCY etc. Confirm first appointment	Consider standard bail supervision and support programme
YOT contact parents/carers	Remand into custody (back to **1**) / Bail supervision/conditional bail
YOT present package to court with NCY ISSP present where possible	

Granted ISSP?

Yes	No
YOT obtain court order	Suggest further bail applications in future
YOT confirm with referral agencies provide asset and court order	Follow through with written report for future applications (back to **1**)
Sign contract	

YOT confirm 1st appointment with premier and case manager

Drug Treatment Options

(i) Needle Exchange Schemes

These services offer information and advice, as well as clean needles and syringes in exchange for used. They also offer onward referral to other drug agencies.

(ii) Community Drug Teams

Community Drug Teams are for people who are sufficiently composed to attend community-based services. They offer information and advice, sometimes needle exchange etc. They cannot prescribe directly, but work closely with the clients GP and suggest suitable prescription. This service is suitable for clients who use mainly ONE drug, who do not have mental health issues, and who are not pregnant. They are unable to prescribe over 60ml-methadone daily. CDTs can refer on to Drug Dependency Units, and to SMTs.

(iii) General Practitioners (GPs)

GPs should be able to offer help and advice on drug problems, and sometimes also prescribe methadone. However, some GPs are more helpful than others around this, and some will refuse to prescribe methadone, or will only have a certain amount of patients at any one time to whom they will prescribe. GPs can also refer patients on to detoxification and Social Services for assessment.

(iv) Accident and Emergency Units

As a last resort, drug users may have to use A+E in cases of emergency. As with GPs, A+E can refer patients on to detox and Social Services.

(vi) Drug Dependency Unit (Drug Dependency Unit)

Drug Dependency Unit's are usually hospital based. They provide counselling, detox, substitute prescribing and other treatments. Waiting lists for the Drug Dependency Units are often long, and the structures there may be fairly rigid. They are suitable for more chaotic drug users, such as poly drug use, pregnant women, and people with mental health issues. A lot of DDUs have one or two detox beds attached to them.

Clients need to be referred to Drug Dependency Units, usually via CDTs.

(vii) Detox Unit

Detox Units are normally based in hospitals, and are set up for people who will withdraw rapidly from their drug of choice – usually over a period of about two weeks. They will be admitted for this time, and will probably be prescribed medication to help them with the withdrawal symptoms (most commonly benzodiazepines). Inpatient detox needs to be planned, and funding is arranged through Social Services – each case is assessed, and if accepted, a Care Manager will be allocated from the Substance Misuse Team within Social Services for the relevant borough.

(viii) Rehabilitation Services

Rehabs are usually residential, and run for between 3 – 6 months (for a first stage project), often with the option to be referred on to second stage, and then even third stage – which is usually a 'halfway house'.

First and second stage rehab is funded via Social Services – third stage is paid for by Housing Benefit.

Appendix G

DTTOs

1   Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs) could have a significant impact on persistent offending. A DTTO means that if a court believes an offender of 16 or over misuses drugs and that treatment may be helpful, he or she can be sentenced to treatment, provided he or she agrees to comply. It is likely to be specially valuable for defendants committing multiple crimes to raise money for drugs. The evidence is that offenders are much more likely to use drugs than the law-abiding population – the links between drugs and crime have never been clearer.

2   A DTTO obliges the offender to undergo drug treatment for anything between 6 months and 3 years. The treatment could be at a residential centre or with the offender living at home, or a combination of the two. The DTTO will have added value over previous arrangements for two reasons. First, a condition is that the offender must be tested regularly for drugs. Second, the court itself has a vital role to play in reviewing the offender's progress during the Order.

3   Drug tests and the treatment provider's reports will give a clear idea of how the offender is responding to treatment. The review by the court will both motivate the offender and give the court confidence that the offender is complying with treatment. The court may impose a DTTO only if the offender agrees and if they have arranged a place with a treatment provider. But if the offender refuses to accept a DTTO, or accepts but then fails to comply, he or she will be sentenced in some other way which could result in imprisonment.

4   An evaluation of DTTO pilots showed that drug use and crime were substantially reduced for the offenders who completed their orders, and that many of those emerged drug-free apart from the use of cannabis. However, there have been considerable difficulties for agencies in implementing DTTOs, due partly to the challenge of establishing effective interagency teams. There are also difficulties in aligning resources for DTTOs, particularly health service support,

Joint Agency Group Merseyside

Key Process Map

Population of Database

A → Database

L → Database

W → Database

PO → Name put forward by Agency for renewal → Information sharing

Database → JAG members input information re: individuals onto database in accordance with information-sharing protocols

YES → Identified as potential offender

JAG meeting → Identified as potential offender

Identified as potential offender → Feedback to Agency

NO → Feedback to Agency

JAG members input information re: individuals onto database in accordance with information-sharing protocols → Completion of tasking sheet by Sgt. Parry

Completion of tasking sheet by Sgt. Parry → High Risk

Completion of tasking sheet by Sgt. Parry → Low/medium risk

Low/medium risk → Constant review by JAG staff

Feedback to Agency → Constant review by JAG staff

NO → To JAG meeting for decision re: deletion

Constant review by JAG staff → To JAG meeting for decision re: deletion

To JAG meeting for decision re: deletion → YES

- Successes Identified and marketed
- **Good practice identified**
- **How can we improve?**

JAG meeting → Commission of action plan menu of interventions → **Lead Agency** Identified → Review

Review → JAG meeting

Key
A = Arrested for streetcrime offence (SCAT)
L = Released on licence from prison
W = Witness
PO = Potential offender

Street Crime Initiative Evaluations

	OWNER/SPONSOR DEPARTMENT	EVALUATOR	REMIT	REPORTING DATE
South Yorkshire police	South Yorkshire Police	Sheffield University	Review of Operation Impact, statistical analysis of changing crime patterns and research into victims. Includes interviews with convicted street crime offenders.	Interim findings due end December 2002. Final report expected June 2003.
Diversionary activities	Department for Education and Skills	CRG (external research company)	Evaluation of the Summer Plus programme in 12 LEAs in the 10 street crime areas.	Full report to be published January 2003. Good practice guide to be published.
Diversionary activities	Department for Culture, Media and Sport	Cap Gemini	Evaluation of the 296 joint DCMS/YJB Splash Extra Schemes.	Headline figures published 13 January 2003. Full report to be published January 2003.
The Nature of Personal Robbery Tackling personal robbery: lessons learnt from the police and community partnerships	Home Office Research Development and Statistics Directorate	Jonathan Smith	Examines the nature of robbery in England and Wales, focusing specifically on personal robbery. Pre-dates the SCI but provides an update to take account of it.	Reports due for publication January 2003.
West Midlands regional assessment	Government Office for the West Midlands	GO-WM	Regional assessment of progress with the SCI to date.	End January 2003
Greater Manchester Summer Plus	Greater Manchester Connexions	Centre for Local Policy Studies	An assessment of Summer Plus in each of the five areas of Greater Manchester, an analysis of the staffing arrangements and delivery patterns, identification of good practice and recommendations for future work.	Interim report in January 2003 and final report in March 2003.

	OWNER/SPONSOR DEPARTMENT	EVALUATOR	REMIT	REPORTING DATE
Witness non-appearance	Government Office for the West Midlands	Wolverhampton University	Funded by CAD uplift. Findings of this study will be used to support the witness support pilot.	Witness support pilot due to begin early 2003
	Home Office		To monitor the impact of the new mobile phone legislation and related measures to reduce the incidence of mobile phone theft. Street crime forces have been asked to monitor on a 4-weekly basis the level of street crime offences involving the theft of a mobile phone. Specifically, they have been asked to collect details of: • the number of offences of robbery, snatch theft and theft from the person where a mobile phone was stolen (either as a single item or with other items) for each 4 week period beginning 31 October 2002 onwards; • the number of such offences where a mobile phone was the only item stolen; and • comparable historical data preceding 31st October 2002 (back to January 2002). Further work includes reviewing case studies, data collection from retailers, insurance companies and mobile phone operators about the impact of the database, focused work to examine the impact of and proposed solutions to the problem of false reporting and examining the number of arrests and charges under the new legislation.	First set of specific figures likely to be available in January 2003. April 2003

	OWNER/SPONSOR DEPARTMENT	EVALUATOR	REMIT	REPORTING DATE
Context of street crime in Greater Manchester	GMP	Applied Social Sciences Department of Manchester University	Examines the motivating factors of offenders and victimology	Due to report February 2003
Street crime in Nottingham – a problem profile	Nottinghamshire Police	Professor Nick Tilley, Nottingham Trent University	An evaluation and detailed analysis into the causes and effect of street crime in Nottingham with particular emphasis on location, offender and victim issues	Interim report – February 2003
Operation Nimrod	Lancashire police	Lancaster University	Success of Operation Nimrod (which is aimed at closing down open and semi-open drug markets) will be measured against a number of indicators and targets (including arrests, convictions, drug seizures, ease or difficulty with which drugs can be purchased in an open market).	End of February 2003
Operation Tower	Lancashire police	Huddersfield University	Research will identify good practice and development points, will identify how much of the improved crime reduction performance can be directly attributed to Operation Tower, will identify crucial parts of the project which would need to be in place if it were to be transferred to other parts of the country and will identify if the Project is sustainable.	Report due to be completed by 28 February 2003
Police in Schools	Department for Education & Skills		To evaluate the impact of placing a police presence in selected schools including absence rates, crime levels in the local community and attainment.	The interim report is due around March 2003

	OWNER/SPONSOR DEPARTMENT	EVALUATOR	REMIT	REPORTING DATE
	Government Office for London	South Bank University	Displacement into other crime types.	Work due for completion in the current financial year (ie by end March 2003)
Behaviour Improvement Programme	DfES	Institute of Education, University of London	Evaluation will seek to identify which parts of the programme have been successful and which interventions are likely to work best – hard data and perceptions. The initial phase will focus on all 34 participating LEAs, analysing qualitative and quantitative data. The second phase will analyse 18 LEAs in finer detail, interviewing LEA staff and those involved from other agencies. The final phase will focus in depth on 10 secondary schools and their feeder primaries. Interviews will be conducted with teachers, parent s and pupils. Ongoing results from the evaluation, which are distilled into termly reports, will inform the rollout of the BIP to a further 27 EiC partnerships in 2003/04. Researchers report to a steering group consisting of representatives from LEAs, DfES, Ofsted, Home Office and, in future, DoH and schools (primaries and secondaries).	First interim report due Easter 2003, with termly reports thereafter. Consultative conference at end of evaluation (September/ October 2004)

	OWNER/SPONSOR DEPARTMENT	EVALUATOR	REMIT	REPORTING DATE
Links between street crime and drug misuse	GMP and street crime steering group	Centre for Sustainable Urban and Regional Futures	Funded by CAD uplift.	Due to report in the first quarter of 2003.
Safer Schools Partnerships	YJB			Due to report in September 2003
Merseyside's response to the SCI		Liverpool John Moore's University	Evaluation of the SCI on Merseyside.	Evaluation running for 18 months with interim reports during the process.
Birmingham summer activities		Government Office and Birmingham YOT	Evaluation of summer activities in Birmingham.	
Diversionary activities	OFSTED	Youth Service Inspectorate	Inspection of five Summer Plus areas.	

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16   From HO & PMDU Review March 2002

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Glossary of Terms

ACPO	–	Association of Chief Police Officers
BCU	–	Borough Command Unit
BEST	–	Behaviour and Education Support Teams
BIP	–	Behaviour Improvement Programme
CAD	–	Communities Against Drugs
CAMHS	–	Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service
CARAT	–	Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice & Through-care
CDRP	–	Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships
CDT	–	Community Drug Team
CENTREX	–	Central Police Training & Development Authority
CJ	–	Criminal Justice
CJB	–	Criminal Justice Board
CJS	–	Criminal Justice Service
CJU	–	Criminal Justice Unit
COBR	–	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
COG	–	Chief Officer Group
Compass	–	Drug Agency
Connexions	–	Connexions service is responsible for providing advice and support to 13–19 year olds
CPS	–	Crown Prosecution Service
CS	–	Court Service
CSP	–	Community Safety Partnership
DAR	–	Drug Arrest Referral
DARW	–	Drug Arrest Referral Worker
DAT	–	Drug Action Team
DCV	–	Direct Communication with Victim Units

DDU	–	Drug Dependency Unit
DPAS	–	Drugs Prevention Advisory Service
DTA	–	Drug Treatment Agency
DTTO	–	Drug Treatment & Testing Order
ECHR	–	European Court of Human Rights
EWO	–	Education Welfare Officers
GO	–	Government Office
GONW	–	Government Office of the North West
GOWM	–	Government Office of the West Midlands
HEAT SCHEME	–	The Leeds Addiction Unit
HMCIC	–	Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary
HMCPSI	–	Her Majesty's Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate
HMIC	–	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMIP	–	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Probation
HMIPris	–	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons
HMMCSI	–	Her Majesty's Magistrates Court Service Inspectorate
HOLMES	–	Home Office Large Major Enquiry System
ISSP	–	Intensive Supervision & Surveillance Programme
JAG	–	Joint Action Group
JISG	–	Joint Inspection Steering Group
JIWG	–	Joint Inspection Working Group
JPM	–	Joint Performance Management
LCD	–	Lord Chancellors Department
LCJB	–	Local Criminal Justice Board
LSP	–	Local Strategic Partnerships
NCIS	–	National Criminal Intelligence Service

NIM	–	National Intelligence Model
NRF	–	Neighbourhood Renewal Fund
NTA	–	National Treatment Agency
NVIS	–	National Video Identification Strategy
NVQ	–	National Vocational Qualification
NYPD	–	New York Police Division
ODPM	–	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
Ofsted	–	Office for Standards in Education
PACE	–	Police and Criminal Evidence Act
PDG	–	Programme Delivery Group
PDH	–	Plea & Direction Hearings
PITO	–	Police Information Technology Organisation
PMDU	–	Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
PROMAT	–	Alternative Video Identification system
PSA	–	Public Sector Agreement (targets)
PSR	–	Pre-Sentence Reports
PSU	–	Police Standards Unit
PYO	–	Persistent Young Offender
RDS	–	Research Development & Statistics Directorate
RGO	–	Regional Government Office
SC	–	Street Crime
SCAG	–	Street Crime Action Group
SCAT	–	Street Crime Action Team
SCI	–	Street Crime Initiative
SMART	–	Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, Time-bound
SMT	–	Senior Management Team

SRB6	–	Single Regeneration Budget
SSI	–	Social Services Inspectorate
VIPER	–	Video Identification Parade Electronic Recording
VSS	–	Victim Support Service
VTU	–	Voluntary Testing Unit
WS	–	Witness Service
YJB	–	Youth Justice Board
YOI	–	Young Offenders Institutes
YOT	–	Youth Offending Team